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  • In this study, the author brings back to memory a doctrinal discussion, inspired by the decision of a tribunal (seized as a court of judicial control), published by the „Romanian Journal of Law”, in two issues, in the period between 1983 and 1984, a discussion in which its protagonists, accepting the idea of an extensive interpretation of the provisions of the old Civil Procedure Code regarding the procedure of verification of scripts, concluded that this procedure may also cover the application for summons, in case that one of the applicants claims that he did not initiate the trial, the signature on the application is not his, nor did he mandate his brother (the co-applicant) to initiate the trial in his name. The doctrinaires have reached, in illo tempore, to the conclusion that the denial of the signature on the application for summons by the person to whom the document is attributed, in fact challenging of the quality of party to the trial, as an applicant, may be invoked, for the first time, also in the means of appeal, the court of judicial control following to submit the application for the procedure of verification of scripts. The tribunal has appreciated that the verification of the signature on the application for summons could only be made by its indictment as false and sending the case to the prosecutor. This point of view was not accepted by the person filing the recourse who considered that the proof of his statements could also be made through a procedure of verification of scripts of the document, before the civil court (which could order, if necessary, a graphological expertise to be made), not wanting to expose his brother, or himself, to criminal investigations. The fact that the second author involved in the discussion claimed the lack of consistency of the claim that the person filing the recourse has not acquired the quality of party (namely of appellant), since he could only exercise the recourse as a party (and not as a third party), has offered the occasion to the last two authors participating in the doctrinal discussion to make the distinction between the quality of party to the trial and the processual quality.
  • The legislative unification was the main national project of the Unified Romania. The necessity of achieving this project was emphasized starting right with the days immediately following the declarations of unification of the representatives of the three historical provinces (Basarabia, Bucovina and Transylvania) with the Old Kingdom, and the effort for its achievement continued, in a sinuous dynamics, until after the fatidic year 1940. With very few exceptions, the jurists across the country have declared to be in favour of the legislative unification, regardless of the fact that their opinion has been expressed from the chair, in university studies and classes, in the activity of the unification commissions or of the Legislative Council or in the pretorium of justice.
  • This study proposes an analysis of the regulation of the institution of return by right of ownership of land located in the built-up area, with particular reference to the interpretation of the provisions of Article 25 (1) of the Law No 18/1991, amended, supplemented and republished. In the thematic approach, there are presented a series of reasons meant to clarify the legal content of the terminology of the text, emphasizing the jurisprudential meaning of the syntagms used by the legislator. Thus, the notions of reconstitution, constitution and return by right of ownership are analyzed distinctly, showing that the text of law in question is incidental both in the assumption that the agricultural cooperative of production has attributed lots for use in the gardens located in the built-up area of the former owners to third parties, cooperative members who were not the owners of that land, and in the assumption that such lots were attributed to the former owners themselves, who became members of C.A.P., either on the same site, in continuation of the 250 square meters of personal property, according to the regulations of that time (the dwelling house and household dependencies, the land on which they were located and the yard), or on another site in the built-up area. Some critical remarks are made on some approaches coming from a land fund county commission, but also from the court, which, in our opinion, did not take into account the conceptual efforts of the doctrine and the judicial practice in the matter. We are convinced that reading this study will effectively contribute to the reduction to evanescence of the risk of bringing prejudice to the real protection guaranteed by the legal order in the field of establishment, defence and exercise of the legitimate rights and interests of the persons covered by this text of law.
  • Neutral power can manifest itself in modern liberal democracies also in the form of autonomous authorities. Their neutrality is based on two kinds of reasons. The first category involves the positioning of the neutral authorities outside the separation of powers in the state, their reactive (not active) political character and their role of balancing the separate powers of the state or of balancing the relations between the state and civil society. They are in the Romanian law authorities with constitutional status. The second category of authorities that call/consider themselves neutral founds its position on the neutrality of the experts in their structure. They have in the Romanian Constitution the status of some atypical, autonomous administrative authorities. Modern states are based on political freedom, i.e. on the liberation of man from objective laws. The expression of this freedom substantiates all the institutional mechanisms of modern constitutionalism. In exchange, the autonomous administrative authorities are set up to release the regulation of certain social mechanisms of political influence. They are not based on modern political freedom. Formed of experts who know the „objective” laws of social development and apply them „scientifically”, these authorities are „objective”. It is thus created a dichotomy: the people or the expert? The increasingly dense contemporary option for the expert can lead to significant risks for the human rights and for the democratic system.
  • There are many questions concerning the context in which we witness the entry into force (on 25th May 2016) of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and its application (starting 25th May 2018). The answers can be numerous: political, sociological, journalistic, etc. However, we choose to analyse from the legal point of view. The GDPR was adopted taking into account the weaknesses that the Directive 95/46/EC has shown, specific weaknesses, in fact, of a EU legal act of this type, compared to the type of regulation. The Directive in question has failed to prevent the fragmentation of the way data protection has been ensured in all EU Member States. Legal uncertainty or public perceptions according to which there are significant risks to the protection of individuals, especially online, have been widespread. It is further added that the differences in the levels of protection existing in the 28 EU Member States, differences due to the transposition and application of the Directive, have sometimes led to a slowdown in the application of the principle of the freedom of movement of personal data within the EU, which may constitute real obstacles to economic activity at this level, distorting competition and preventing authorities from fulfilling their responsibilities under EU law.
  • The study analyzes Article 961 of the current Civil Code on the removal of the effects of unworthiness, introduced as a novelty, to the previous regulation. There are analyzed the conditions in which it may be operated a removal of the effects of successoral unworthiness by the express forgiveness. Then, it is analyzed whether or not it may operate the removal of the effects of successoral unworthiness by the tacit forgiveness of the unworthy, with arguments in a negative sense. Within the study it is examined the future of the legacy left by the testator by a testament drawn up after the act of successoral unworthiness has ben committed, whether it has the meaning of forgiveness of the unworthy and of removal of the effects of unworthiness or whether, without having these meanings, it is actually recognized the right of the legatee to collect the legacy left by the testator by a testament drawn up after the act of successoral unworthiness has ben committed.
  • Following a critical study of the provisions of the Government Ordinance No 121/1998 on the material liability of the military, the author points out that this normative act is contrary to Article 73 (3) j), Article 118 (2), (3) of the Constitution. The juridical reasoning is based on the standard imposed by the case law of the Constitutional Court in respect of the status of the public officers and of the military staff, the author emphasising the necessity to adopt an organic law/several organic laws to regulate the material liability of the military staff and of the public officers within the Ministry of National Defence, Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Romanian Intelligence Service, the Protection and Guard Service, the Foreign Intelligence Service, the Special Telecommunications Service and the Ministry of Justice.
  • For the appeal, which generates, in principle, a new judgment on the merits, given also the finality of exercising the appeal – the nullity of the judgment challenged – it is required another approach to the cases of nullity different than the traditional one in the matter of procedural acts. For the situation of referral of the case for retrial, it is required to argue that it is necessary to specify, in the judgment of referral, where appropriate, the part which is cancelled from the procedure followed by the court of first instance, respectively of the procedural act from which the retrial begins.
  • The retransmission of the right to successoral option raises some difficulties of theoretical understanding and practical application, at least for the following reasons: the Civil Code, now in force, substantially changes the logic of the previous regulation of this legal institution; in practice, there are being debated, with a significant frequency, inheritances opened before 1 October 2011 (the moment when the current Civil Code entered into force) and which consequently fall under the incidence of the provisions of the former Civil Code (which ultractivates); there are encountered, in practice more frequently, several inheritances in respect of which the right to successoral option has been successively retransmitted; the institution about whose issues we are concerned herein, in particular, have some resemblances to the successoral representation and to the retransmission of the inheritance. For all these reasons, and we believe that there are not few, nor the only ones, we will discuss further the retransmission of the right to successoral option, starting from the theoretical aspects, which are indispensable for its just understanding and for its proper application in practice. In this context, we will give concrete examples, with the hope that they will be of use to theoreticians and, in particular, to practitioners in the field of successions.
  • Înscrierile în cartea funciară nu au caracter constitutiv/translativ, ci numai efecte de opozabilitate față de terți (art. 25 din Legea nr. 7/1996 arată că „înscrierile în cartea funciară își vor produce efecte de opozabilitate față de terți...”). Astfel, această lege asigură publicitatea imobilului și nu are efecte constitutive/translative ale dreptului de proprietate. (...)
  • This paper appears as a response to the debate created by the new proposals to amend the criminal codes. I believe that a legal debate should start from the fundamental principles of law and be conducted academically, presenting legal arguments and also knowing the comparative law issues related to the topic debated. This is why this paper offers a historical, current and comparative perspective in terms of recognizing the right to silence to the person being heard as a witness in the criminal trial.
  • The extension of the preventive arrest is one of the instruments available to the judicial bodies in order to remove some threats to public order, undermining at the same time a fundamental right of the defendant, the right to freedom. The procedure of extension of the preventive arrest must respect the right to a fair trial, as regulated in the international conventions and the internal provisions. This article analyzes the possibility of breaching the principles of equality of arms and of equality of treatment in the procedure of judging the contestation against the decision to extend the preventive arrest measure.
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