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10 December 2016 marks 60 years from the date when the General Assembly of the United Nations Organisation opened for signature (and 50 years from the date when they entered into force) the two international covenants on human rights: International Covenant on civil and political rights and International Covenant on economic, social and cultural rights. These, along with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the United Nations Organisation Charter, make up the hard core of the protection of human rights, within the United Nations Organisation (UNO). The 50th anniversary of their entry into force is equally a reason for balance, namely reflection and projection into the future. Thus, in 1966, the design of the two different conventional instruments, corresponding to the two traditional categories of human rights (civil and political rights, on the one hand, and economic, social and cultural rights, on the other hand), was based on their different legal nature, on the East-West ideological divisions, or on the necessity to treat them differently in the process of implementation at state level: the immediate implementation (civil and political rights) v. progressive realization (economic, social and cultural rights). However, the initial situation did not stay within the same parameters, but it gradually evolved. Although initially conceived as „political obligations” in the economic, social and cultural fields and rather left at the discretion of StatesParties, the economic, social and cultural rights have acquired, in time, through the work carried on by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), a position that allows them to claim, in the next 15 years, a significant role in the process of implementation of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda. In such conditions, in this paper, the author initiates an evaluation of the doctrine of economic, social and cultural rights in the past two and a half decades, as well as of the way in which CESCR has built the „profile” of these rights, in this regard being evaluated two of the work methods used by CESCR, namely: General comments and the new LOIPR procedure – List of Issues Prior to Reporting. -
The author, after explaining the „valorism” and „value debt” concepts, enters into details on the issue of aggregation of default interests (art. 1088 of the Romanian Civil Code – 1865 –, still into force), reaching a conclusion, which agrees to a minority juridical doctrine, that the interest may be aggregated to a value debt. -
Analyzing the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights on freedom of expression (Article 10 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms), the author reveals the close connection between the concept of States’ margin of appreciation (paragraph 2 of Art. 10 of the Convention) and the quality of the Convention as “a living instrument”. Therefore, the purpose of the study is precisely the dialecticism of the relationship between the “freedom of expression” (proclaimed by the Convention) and the exercise of that freedom “that carries with it duties and responsibilities” and which, under national law, may be subject to “such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties” (granted under Art. 10 of the Convention, as well). In light of this line of thinking, the author carries forth an extensive case law of the European Court of Human Rights, expression of a broad relevant casuistry. -
The repeated conviction by the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter ECHR) of the Republic of Moldova for violating Article 1 of Protocol No 1 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter ECHR) was a mandatory invitation for national actors to harmonize their own legal system with the European case law, both by legislative, administrative way and by judicial way. Although there have been reported cases in which the European Court of Human Rights has pointed out some shortcomings with regard to harmonizing the Moldovan law with the European exigencies, however most judgments are based on jurisprudential shortcomings. Thus, in order to avoid new convictions by the Strasbourg Court in the sphere of Article 1 of Protocol No 1, in this study the techniques of compatibilization of the national case law with the European ones are researched. Starting from the stated purpose, in the present study it is realized a jurisprudential exercise of the notion of „good” from the perspective of the conventional judge and of the way in which the national courts received it in their own judgments. At the same time, this scientific approach identifies the positive and negative obligations of states and their margin of appreciation left by the ECHR in case of some issues concerning the right to respect for property, as well as the consequences for the state in case of a judgment of conviction. -
This article underpins the normative framework given to judicial bodies competent to make investigations into marine navigation in Romania, according to the provisions of the Romanian criminal law, followed by a brief history of the establishing and dissolving of the courts in Romania regarding maritime and river matters, and examination of the normative framework given to the competencies of the Court of justice on investigations into marine navigation, and finally this article is drawing some conclusions and implications related to lex ferenda.
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The author analyzes the territorial jurisdiction of the court to settle the actions for annulment of the decisions of invalidation or for amendment of the settlement decisions issued by the National Commission for Real Estate Settlement pursuant to the Law No 165/2013, appreciating that it lies with the civil section of the Bucharest Tribunal, as the court in whose district it is located the headquarters of the entity issuing the contested act. The term „entity” within Article 35 (1) must be understood in relation to the provisions of Article 3 points 4 and 5 of the Law No 165/2013, which enumerates the entities involved in the restitution procedure in various stages thereof, as well as the document issued by these entities. -
The article analyzes the material jurisdiction to settle the action for liability of the mayor for the prejudice caused to the state budget in the exercise of his mandate by the deficient fulfilment of the duties devolving on him, a prejudice established by the Court of Auditors by its act of control. In the absence of a derogatory regulation concerning jurisdiction, such an action, being governed by the rules and principles of the tort civil liability regulated by Article 1349 of the Civil Code, falls under the material jurisdiction of the court or of the tribunal, depending on the value of the object of the dispute (of the quantum of the damage requested to be repaired), according to Article 95 point 1 in relation to Article 94 point 1 k) of the Civil Procedure Code. -
Law no. 119/2010 settled that all service pensions (except those of magistrates and judges of the Constitutional Court) become common pensions (therefore established under the common law of pensions, i.e. Law no. 19/2000). In order to enforce Law no. 119/2010, Government Decision no. 735/2010 was issued. Among service pensions (now common pensions) are also the pensions awarded to retired persons coming from the system of defense, public order and national security. From July 2010 to January 2011, these service pensions were recalculated as common pensions under Law no. 119/2010 and Government Decision no. 735/ 2010. Subsequently, under Government Emergency Ordinance no. 1 / 2011, from February to December 2011, based on other criteria, said pensions were recalculated again (under Government Emergency Ordinance no. 1 / 2011). Being that, by law, each of these recalculations can be challenged in court, the author of this study examines the jurisdiction to settle the appeal of the decisions to recalculate the pensions in question, both those set initially according to Law no. 119/2010 and Government Decision no. 735/2010, and those recalculated again subsequently according to Government Emergency Ordinance no. 1 / 2011. -
Cererea formulată în temeiul art. 595 alin. (1) C.pr.pen., respectiv în caz de intervenire a unei legi penale noi după rămânerea definitivă a hotărârii de condamnare sau a hotărârii prin care s-a aplicat o măsură educativă, se adresează fie instanței de executare, fie instanței corespunzătoare în grad acesteia în a cărei circumscripție se află locul de deținere sau, după caz, centrul educativ ori centrul de detenție. Din perspectiva formelor competenței, cea reglementată potrivit art. 595 alin. (2) raportat la art. 553 alin. (1) C.pr.pen. este o competență funcțională (ratione officii) întrucât vizează o activitate ce se poate realiza strict de către instanța de executare ori de către instanța corespunzătoare în grad acesteia în circumscripția căreia se află locul de executare a pedepsei ori măsurii privative de libertate.
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The faulty interpretations of the normative system as a hierarchical system are due to analysing the matters of validity and of withdrawal of legality on the basis of the same methods of interpretation as when the matter of conformity is examined. If we clearly operate this distinction, using the pre-war case law, then the ordinary courts have competences in the matter of contentious of validity of rules and even some competences in the matter of contentious of conformity, despite the Constitutional Court’s claim to monopolize the constitutional contentious of rules. Likewise, they have competences in the matter of contentious of conformity of the infraconstitutional rules with the Constitution, which is questioned only due to the understanding of the normative hierarchy according to the French model, which is not applicable pursuant to the Constitution of Romania. Finally, I will prove that the ordinary courts have the competence to verify the agreement of the rules declared unconstitutional with the C.C.R decision. -
The ordinary courts have the general competence to protect the rights and freedoms of individuals, whether provided or not in the international treaties or in the Constitution of Romania. The Constitutional Court’s claim to be the only one to exercise constitutional justice powers is based on a faulty interpretation of its own competence, which is constitutionally determined as being to ensure the supremacy of the Constitution, and on reducing the constitutional contentious to the contentious of rules. A correct interpretation of the constitutional provisions and the fructification of the Romanian tradition in the matter of constitutional justice demonstrate that the ordinary courts are competent to apply the Constitution in order to protect the rights and freedoms of individuals, therefore to exercise constitutional justice powers, because this is not reduced to the control of the constitutionality of the laws.
