The legal epistemology justifies the interest of this study for the relations which are established between the notions of branch of law, of sub-branch of law, of legal institution, as well as their relations with the forms of legal liability which they regulate. In the problems of the dynamics of the relations between the branches of law and the forms of legal liability the rule is that every branch of the law knows or generates at least one form of legal liability. Starting with the theoretical challenge launched by Professor Antonie Iorgovan, regarding the elements that announce the appearance of a new form of legal liability within or outside a branch of law, the novelty proposed by this study consists in the approach of the inverse relation, precisely of the capacity of a new form of legal liability to generate a new branch of law, as well as its reception by a legal science of branch. The verification of the validity of the capacity of mutual cogeneration between the forms of legal liability and the branches of law will be achieved by means of the examples of the relations established between the ecological liability and the environmental law, the objective liability and the insurance law, the managerial liability and a possible managerial law on the ground of legal methodology.

The Romanian Criminal Code in force (in 1969) does not mention domestic discipline among the reasons removing the criminal nature of the deed (art. 44-51). Similarly, the new Romanian Criminal Code (Law no. 286/2009) does not stipulate domestic discipline among the supporting reasons (art. 18-22) or among the reasons of non-imputability (art. 23-31). The following question arises under these conditions: Will the parent who pulls his / her child by the ears when committing acts of disorder in the family or behaves violently with his colleagues be convicted? Some lawyers and teachers respond affirmatively, others negatively, thus creating discussions about the existence of a right of discipline. In this study, the authors analyze domestic discipline in respect of the parents, educators and military, arguing that they enjoy a moderate and limited right of discipline, which is provided in some cases by law and in others is not.

Arbitration is an alternative private jurisdiction to the State jurisdiction, in order to settle civil litigations. The private character of this jurisdiction is marked by the decisive role of the autonomy of will of the parties in the organization and conduct of arbitration, in the establishment of the arbitral tribunal, in which the arbitrators nominated by the parties are not designated by a public authority or by a public institution. The arbitrary source of the arbitration merges with the judicial nature conferred by the judgment pronounced, which enjoys the authority of res judicata and is executed in exactly the same way as any judgment pronounced by a state court. As a result, arbitration has a dual, contractual nature, through its source, and jurisdictional, through the judgment pronounced. In the present study several objectives have been pursued on the subject discussed, namely establishing the legal nature of the arbitral jurisdiction, the types of arbitration convention and its role, the elements of convergence between the arbitration clause and compromise, the formal requirements of the arbitration convention, its limits and the consequences and the exceptions from these limits in terms of trial, the conditions of validity of the arbitration convention, its effects and its effectiveness, the causes of cessation of the arbitration convention.

The legislation on the matter of stamp duties, although it should be free of problems of interpretation, is no exception to the fact that the interpretation is the one that generates problems in the application of legal norms. The related controversies reveal that the current regulation inclusive is far from the desideratum to maintain a fair balance between the public interest to collect these budgetary resources in the quantum envisaged by the legislator and the interest of the litigant not to have the relevant legislation interpreted to his detriment. There are difficulties concerning the determination in practice of the actions which the legislator regulates generically by formulating „cash assessable actions and claims”, a phrase used in Article 3 (1) of the Government Emergency Ordinance No 80/2013. The same situation we encounter in the case of applications determined by the phrase „applications not assessable in cash”, phrase used in Article 27 of the Government Emergency Ordinance No 80/2013, with which the legislator intends to cover all the categories of applications not regulated in the previous texts. Other difficulties, revealed inclusively by the decisions of the High Court of Cassation and Justice, concern the interpretation of the phrase „different finality”, used in Article 34 (1) of the Government Emergency Ordinance No 80/2013, for the situation of the actions with multiple claims. Since these three phrases evoke genuine principles underlying the manner of regulation used by the legislator in the matter, by the controversies reviewed, the study argues either the necessity of the minimum approach of defining the terms contained therein by the author of the normative act, or that of rewriting it pursuant to an inventory of the objects of the claims encountered in the judicial practice. This inventory is easy to obtain by the legislator from the courts, with the necessity to update it, after taking over in the normative act of domain, either by the regulations that generate new categories of applications addressed to the justice, or by amending accordingly the normative act having as object exclusively the stamp duty fees. However, this regulatory manner is used by the legislator in the legislation by which it establishes tax obligations, duties and taxes respectively. It is easy to imagine the implications of some norms susceptible to interpretation in this latter matter, which, in essence, has the same nature as the one in question.

Introducere. La nivel constituțional, principiul referitor la activitatea legii penale a fost consacrat odată cu adoptarea Constituției României din 1991, iar, după revizuirea din anul 2003, principiul a fost extins și cu privire la legea contravențională. Potrivit art. 15 alin. (2) din Constituție, „Legea dispune numai pentru viitor, cu excepția legii penale sau contravenționale mai favorabile.” Transformarea unui principiu legal într-unul constituțional are și importante semnificații juridice, pentru că „neretroactivitatea legii, ca principiu constituțional, este obligatorie pentru toate ramurile de drept, fără excepție, nu numai pentru acelea care îl prevăd explicit. Apoi, în afara excepției stabilite prin Constituție, nicio altă excepție nu poate aduce limitări acestui principiu constituțional, orice alte prevederi legale contrarii trebuind a fi considerate neconstituționale și putând fi atacate pe căile controlului de constituționalitate”1.

The present article focuses on the legal liability, having as main character the company administrator and presenting an overview of the the sanction specific to the administrator non-patrimonial liability:the administrator revoking. Concomitantly, the problems occurring in the legal practice are also taken into consideration: decision-making competence and the juridical control of the revoking decision. Due to the intuitu personae character of the mandate, the revoking of the company administrator, even when abusive, is final. So, in practice it was stated that the mandate, even arbitrary withdraw, can not be held in justice against the principle‘s will, the only right the proxy has is the claim damages, but not reintegration, as the trust representing the graunds for the mandate can not be imposed. Also, an administrator can not reguest reintegration but, if abuses were committed, by withdrawing the mandate, the administrator has damage claim. In the situation in which the administrators have been appointed by the article of incorporation, their dismissal presupposes its amendament. That is why, the court can not order the administrator‘revoking, as it would mean the modification of the articles of incorporation. In the condition in which the administrator acquired this quality by the company‘s articles of incorporation, his dismissal does not only have the character of an revokingl but it also represents an amendament of the articles of incorporation. The article also includes a detailed analysis of the opinions expressed in the speciality literature and the solutions in the legal practice for the administrator revoking problem.

Pursuant to Article 914 of the new (Romanian) Civil Code „The owner of the estate recorded in the land register may request at any time the amendment of the mentions in the land register concerning the description, the destination or its surface, according to the law.” In reference to this text, in the case-law there is a controversy, whether, in the first instance, the jurisdiction ratione materiae lies with the court of first instance or with the tribunal. After examining this issue, the author comes to the conclusion that, de lege lata, presently the jurisdiction lies with the tribunal, according to the rule included in this Article 95 point 1 of the new Civil Procedure Code. Likewise, de lege ferenda, the author proposes that such cases fall within the jurisdiction of the court of first instance, having regard to their nature and their reduced complexity.

The judicial practice in the matter of representation, including in that of the Supreme Court, reveals difficulties in interpreting Article 84 (1) of the Civil Procedure Code. A poor interpretation thereof, by ignoring ratio legis, creates a gap for the illegal practice of the specialized legal professions. In the same context, it is necessary to distinguish between the plea of lack of evidence of the quality of representative and that of illegal representation, and the latter must be preceded by the plea on the nullity of the contract from which the judicial mandate arises.

In this study, the author proves that the owners’ association does not have the legal capacity to acquire land intended to be used by the association members as parking lots or for ensuring access to the building where the individual dwellings of the members are situated. In this respect, it is claimed that the legal documents for the acquisition of such land by the association are subject to absolute nullity, since they infringe the principle of specialty of the legal entity’s usage capacity, established by art. 34, parag. 1 of Decree no. 31/1954 regarding individuals and legal entities. Consequently, it is concluded that the use of land having the above-mentioned destinations may be acquired by the owners in a condominium only by legal documents concluded in their own names.