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Pre-trial detention was defined as the most intrusive custodial preventive measure in the exercise of the person’s right to freedom, by which the judge or the court orders the detention of the defendant for the duration and under the specific conditions provided by law, in places specially intended for this purpose, in the interest of the criminal prosecution, the preliminary chamber procedure or the trial. In order to take pre-trial detention, it is necessary to meet all the general conditions provided by law for taking preventive measures, as well as the existence of at least one of the prev. of Article 223 of the Civil Procedure Code. In practice, in almost all cases, preventive arrest is based on the provisions of Article 223 (2) of the Civil Procedure Code. Under these conditions, we tried to create both a general presentation of these grounds and a theoretical analysis of the main issues that can generate confusion and problems in the application of the cases provided for by Article 223 (1) of the Civil Procedure Code. All this theoretical analysis has, as far as possible, been examined in conjunction with solutions from judicial practice, where appropriate.
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This paper is the first part of a more extensive commentary on Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which will be entirely published in three consecutive issues of this law journal. The present work assesses the general features of the right to liberty and security as they emerge from the relevant case-law of the European Court on Human Rights. On this occasion, it underlines the purpose of this right, namely the protection of the individual from arbitrariness, and it analyses the general conditions for deprivation of liberty. It also goes on to evaluate the first two such situations of authorised deprivation of liberty enshrined in Article 5 § 1 a) and b) of the Convention.
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After the entry into force of Article 1541 of the Civil Procedure Code, the judgments will have a different communication regime as compared to the other procedural documents. More precisely, if the party indicates the appropriate data in order to communicate the procedural documents by e-mail, the court will have the obligation to communicate the judgment to the party by e-mail, in accordance with the provisions of Article 1541 (1) of the Civil Procedure Code, however, it will not be obliged to communicate the summons or the other procedural documents to the respective party by e-mail, since with regard to these procedural documents remain applicable the provisions of Article 154 (6) of the Civil Procedure Code, which regulates only the possibility of the court to communicate these procedural documents by e-mail, and not the obligation of the court to proceed in this way. Therefore, we note the existence of an asymmetry, with regard to the communication regime, between the judgment and the other procedural documents, which is why we believe that the legislator should intervene in order to standardize the communication regime of all procedural documents, there being no reason why the respective communication of procedural documents should be carried out differently.
