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  • At the same time with the change of the jurisdiction of the courts vested with the solving of the applications for relocation in the new Civil Procedure Code1, the incidence of a particular situation was ignored: the subsistence of the reasons for relocation also at level of the courts of appeal competent to solve the relocation applications, when the relocation is requested from a court of first instance or a tribunal located in the same locality as the court of appeal, and the legitimate suspicion has sources well-anchored at local level. The High Court of Cassation and Justice was not late in „completing” this omission, by admitting an application for relocation of a relocation process, from the court of appeal in the locality where there were suspicions of lack of impartiality to another court of appeal, contributing, a fortiori, indirectly to the relocation of the substantive litigation to another court, away from the local sphere which did not provide sufficient guarantees of independence of justice.
  • If any person can admire his own image without any restriction, then anyone is free to fix his/her image by reproduction in different forms (self-portrait, autosculpture, etc.) and finally the image can be exploited by reproduction (here by the question of whom belongs the product of the image, how it can be exploited, who owns the good in the image, how to exploit its image). The central point of the work is the exploitation of the image of persons and goods. We will try to find out what is the legal basis of image protection depending on its subject. In this way, a leap forward will be made in the legal regulation of the right to image followed by a doctrinal and jurisprudential approach to the law that is invoked to protect the image of the goods. We will also try to capture the need for a distinct right to protect the image of goods by correlating it with the mechanism of regulating the right to image of the individual.
  • Perioada dintre rămânerea definitivă a hotărârii de condamnare și reluarea procesului penal, ca urmare a admiterii redeschiderii procesului penal în cazul judecării în lipsă a persoanei condamnate, este luată în considerare pentru stabilirea împlinirii termenului de prescripției. (Judecătoria Târgu Jiu, Sentința penală nr. 2141/2017, definitivă prin neapelare – nepublicată – cu notă critică)
  • Soluția legislativă cuprinsă în art. 345 alin. (1) din Codul de procedură penală, care nu permite judecătorului de cameră preliminară, în soluționarea cererilor și excepțiilor formulate ori excepțiilor ridicate din oficiu, să administreze alte mijloace de probă în afara „oricăror înscrisuri noi prezentate”, este neconstituțională. (Curtea Constituțională a României, Decizia nr. 802/2017 – cu notă aprobativă)
  • This study emphasizes that, from a substantial point of view, the criteria required to be fulfilled for cataloguing a deed as pertaining to the criminal domain are: the qualification of the deed in the domestic law, the nature of the deed and the purpose and the severity of the sanction. Formally, an official report of finding and sanctioning the contravention which represents at the same time also a criminal charge in the conventional sense must cumulatively include the description of the deed and the presentation of the legal classification. The effect of classifying the report of finding and sanctioning the contravention in the category of the criminal charge in a conventional sense is given by the fact that to the procedure for finding and sanctioning the contravention there are attached its own guarantees of a fair trial. The presumption of lawfulness of the report is compatible with the presumption of innocence only if it respects certain limits, taking into account the gravity of the stake and protecting the rights of the defence. The limits of the presumption of lawfulness of the official report, in the context of protecting the rights of the defence, are: the imperative that the deed be perceived directly, through its own senses, by the fact-finding agent and the exigence not to impose on the person concerned an impossible task, as regards the administration of the proof to the contrary.
  • In this study, the author brings back to memory a doctrinal discussion, inspired by the decision of a tribunal (seized as a court of judicial control), published by the „Romanian Journal of Law”, in two issues, in the period between 1983 and 1984, a discussion in which its protagonists, accepting the idea of an extensive interpretation of the provisions of the old Civil Procedure Code regarding the procedure of verification of scripts, concluded that this procedure may also cover the application for summons, in case that one of the applicants claims that he did not initiate the trial, the signature on the application is not his, nor did he mandate his brother (the co-applicant) to initiate the trial in his name. The doctrinaires have reached, in illo tempore, to the conclusion that the denial of the signature on the application for summons by the person to whom the document is attributed, in fact challenging of the quality of party to the trial, as an applicant, may be invoked, for the first time, also in the means of appeal, the court of judicial control following to submit the application for the procedure of verification of scripts. The tribunal has appreciated that the verification of the signature on the application for summons could only be made by its indictment as false and sending the case to the prosecutor. This point of view was not accepted by the person filing the recourse who considered that the proof of his statements could also be made through a procedure of verification of scripts of the document, before the civil court (which could order, if necessary, a graphological expertise to be made), not wanting to expose his brother, or himself, to criminal investigations. The fact that the second author involved in the discussion claimed the lack of consistency of the claim that the person filing the recourse has not acquired the quality of party (namely of appellant), since he could only exercise the recourse as a party (and not as a third party), has offered the occasion to the last two authors participating in the doctrinal discussion to make the distinction between the quality of party to the trial and the processual quality.
  • The legislative unification was the main national project of the Unified Romania. The necessity of achieving this project was emphasized starting right with the days immediately following the declarations of unification of the representatives of the three historical provinces (Basarabia, Bucovina and Transylvania) with the Old Kingdom, and the effort for its achievement continued, in a sinuous dynamics, until after the fatidic year 1940. With very few exceptions, the jurists across the country have declared to be in favour of the legislative unification, regardless of the fact that their opinion has been expressed from the chair, in university studies and classes, in the activity of the unification commissions or of the Legislative Council or in the pretorium of justice.
  • Neutral power can manifest itself in modern liberal democracies also in the form of autonomous authorities. Their neutrality is based on two kinds of reasons. The first category involves the positioning of the neutral authorities outside the separation of powers in the state, their reactive (not active) political character and their role of balancing the separate powers of the state or of balancing the relations between the state and civil society. They are in the Romanian law authorities with constitutional status. The second category of authorities that call/consider themselves neutral founds its position on the neutrality of the experts in their structure. They have in the Romanian Constitution the status of some atypical, autonomous administrative authorities. Modern states are based on political freedom, i.e. on the liberation of man from objective laws. The expression of this freedom substantiates all the institutional mechanisms of modern constitutionalism. In exchange, the autonomous administrative authorities are set up to release the regulation of certain social mechanisms of political influence. They are not based on modern political freedom. Formed of experts who know the „objective” laws of social development and apply them „scientifically”, these authorities are „objective”. It is thus created a dichotomy: the people or the expert? The increasingly dense contemporary option for the expert can lead to significant risks for the human rights and for the democratic system.
  • There are many questions concerning the context in which we witness the entry into force (on 25th May 2016) of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and its application (starting 25th May 2018). The answers can be numerous: political, sociological, journalistic, etc. However, we choose to analyse from the legal point of view. The GDPR was adopted taking into account the weaknesses that the Directive 95/46/EC has shown, specific weaknesses, in fact, of a EU legal act of this type, compared to the type of regulation. The Directive in question has failed to prevent the fragmentation of the way data protection has been ensured in all EU Member States. Legal uncertainty or public perceptions according to which there are significant risks to the protection of individuals, especially online, have been widespread. It is further added that the differences in the levels of protection existing in the 28 EU Member States, differences due to the transposition and application of the Directive, have sometimes led to a slowdown in the application of the principle of the freedom of movement of personal data within the EU, which may constitute real obstacles to economic activity at this level, distorting competition and preventing authorities from fulfilling their responsibilities under EU law.
  • The study analyzes Article 961 of the current Civil Code on the removal of the effects of unworthiness, introduced as a novelty, to the previous regulation. There are analyzed the conditions in which it may be operated a removal of the effects of successoral unworthiness by the express forgiveness. Then, it is analyzed whether or not it may operate the removal of the effects of successoral unworthiness by the tacit forgiveness of the unworthy, with arguments in a negative sense. Within the study it is examined the future of the legacy left by the testator by a testament drawn up after the act of successoral unworthiness has ben committed, whether it has the meaning of forgiveness of the unworthy and of removal of the effects of unworthiness or whether, without having these meanings, it is actually recognized the right of the legatee to collect the legacy left by the testator by a testament drawn up after the act of successoral unworthiness has ben committed.
  • Following a critical study of the provisions of the Government Ordinance No 121/1998 on the material liability of the military, the author points out that this normative act is contrary to Article 73 (3) j), Article 118 (2), (3) of the Constitution. The juridical reasoning is based on the standard imposed by the case law of the Constitutional Court in respect of the status of the public officers and of the military staff, the author emphasising the necessity to adopt an organic law/several organic laws to regulate the material liability of the military staff and of the public officers within the Ministry of National Defence, Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Romanian Intelligence Service, the Protection and Guard Service, the Foreign Intelligence Service, the Special Telecommunications Service and the Ministry of Justice.
  • For the appeal, which generates, in principle, a new judgment on the merits, given also the finality of exercising the appeal – the nullity of the judgment challenged – it is required another approach to the cases of nullity different than the traditional one in the matter of procedural acts. For the situation of referral of the case for retrial, it is required to argue that it is necessary to specify, in the judgment of referral, where appropriate, the part which is cancelled from the procedure followed by the court of first instance, respectively of the procedural act from which the retrial begins.
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