The present study is an analysis of the theoretical and recent judicial practice occasioned by the offences of trafficking in human beings and by proxenetism. His author has quoted relevant opinions from the specialized doctrine, succeeding in creating a complete picture of the two types of offences, and these elements were doubled by invoking some aspects of the judicial practice in the field. Some of the statements invoked in this study are criticized in an argumentative manner. The manner of conceiving the theme reveals its author’s intention to emphasize also those aspects that confer a comparison content of the offences trafficking in persons and trafficking in minors, on the one hand, and proxenetism respectively, on the other hand. In the course of the analysis, aspects related to other forms of exploitation of the person, as defined in the Criminal Code, were tangentially pointed out as well. At the same time, the article also contains some very pertinent de lege ferenda proposals, based on the good knowledge of the analyzed field.

The study refers to the way in which national criminal processual legislation provides safeguards regarding the respect for the right to a fair trial, with particular reference to the obligation of the courts of law to properly motivate the solutions they pronounce in solving the merits or even the ordinary remedy of appeal. From the research made, the author concludes that the European standards do not find an explicit consecration in the current national legislation and identifies situations from the recent case law in which the courts have directly applied the European conventional provisions, by abolishing the sentences analyzed and sending the case for retrial by the same court even without Article 421 (2) b) of the Criminal Procedure Code providing such a case. The author proposes that it should be completed de lege ferenda the text itself previously invoked by including a case which should refer to the failure to provide proper motivation for the sentence of the court examining the merits and he continues the argumentation by proposing the extension in the same way also of the cases in which an review in cassation may be lodged against the decisions of the courts of appeal. The conclusion he reaches has in view the fact that the two legislative amendments would be likely to provide adequate safeguards to the right to a fair trial in criminal matters, without the need to resort to conventional provisions which should be conferred direct applicability, a solution often avoided by the courts in this field.

The probative force of the document under private signature derives from the signature of the party or, as the case may be, of the parties. The signature of a document guarantees in full faith, until proved otherwise, the existence of the consent of the party that has signed it with regard to its content. In case of the document under private signature the presumption of authenticity will no longer operate. The person to whom it is opposed a document under private signature is obliged either to acknowledge, or to contest the writing or the signature, because, until it is voluntarily acknowledged or verified in court, one can not know whether the signature belongs or not to the person who appears in the document as signatory and whether or not he has knowledge of the content of the document. The document under private signature, acknowledged by the opposing party or considered by the law as acknowledged, makes proof between the parties until proved otherwise, including with regard to the mentions in the document which are directly related to the legal relation between the parties. On the other hand, the mentions in the document not related to the content of the legal relation between the parties can serve only as prima facie written evidence. The attitude of the party, to whom it is opposed a document under private signature, not to protest against the use of that document or not to give an opinion in one sense or the other, is presumed to be a tacit acknowledgment. In case the writing or the signature has been contested by the party or declared unknown by its heirs or successors in rights, the court will proceed to the verification of the document according to the provisions of Articles 301–303 of the Civil Procedure Code. However, if the party claims that the document has been forged after signing, by erasures, additions or corrections in its content, or that the document contains an intellectual forgery, the party in question will be able to denounce the document as false, by means of the procedure regulated by Articles 304–308 of the Civil Procedure Code. The document not signed by the parties or by one of the parties is not valid as instrumentum probationis, but the legal operation (negotium iuris) remains valid and can be proved by other means of evidence, if the written form is not required by law ad validitatem. Even the document not valid as document under private signature is worth as prima facie written evidence, if it is opposed to the party who wrote it. The documents under private signature (signed) for which the formality „plurality of copies” or, where appropriate, the formality „good and approved” has not been accomplished is always worth as prima facie written evidence. In the relations between professionals it is recognized the probative force of a document not signed, but commonly used in the exercise of the activity of an enterprise in order to establish a legal act, unless the law imposes the written form in order to prove the legal act itself. The date indicated in the document under private signature has the same probative value, in the relations between the parties, with the other mentions in the document. Against third parties, the date of the document under private signature, by itself, is not evidence. Only the certain date is opposable to third parties, a date obtained by one of the methods established in Article 278 of the Civil Procedure Code or by other means provided by law.

In the present study, the author gives us a general examination concerning the right to a fair trial and of the settlement of the case within an optimal and predictable time limit. The approach is carried out in accordance with the international and internal regulations, but also in consideration of the latest doctrinal and jurisprudential evolutions in the matter. The first part of the study is devoted to the fair trial, and the main ideas promoted in the context are related to the complex character of the subjective right proclaimed by Article 6 (1) of the European Convention on Human Rights. In the second part of the present approach there are presented the procedural meanings of the right to the settlement of the case in an optimal and predictable time limit. Likewise, some considerations have also been formulated on the legal contest concerning the delaying of the trial, a remedy deemed useful by the author, although the results involved by this institution can not be regarded as spectacular. The author also evokes the recent amendments to the new Civil Procedure Code, such as those concerning the suppression of the review filtering procedure and the possibility of extending the term for the motivation of the judgment no more than twice.

The purpose of the present analysis is to determine the applicable legal regime to certain procedural acts made in bad faith in relation to the abuse of rights theory, and the lis pendens (same trial pending in the same time before two or more panel of judges) and joined cases institutions. The analysis started from a particular case in which a claimant filed two statements of claim having the same object in two considerably distant moments (7 years between them) against the same defendant. The only aspects which the claimant drafted differently in the second case file, in order to eliminate risk of identity, were the claims’ phrasing and some additional arguments in his favour which were not inserted in a proper form in the first case file. Nevertheless, through the second statement of claim, the claimant himself raised the lis pendens exception, in order to send the second case file in front of the initial judge and thus to overcome his incapacity to invoke additional arguments in the first case file. The court vested with the judgment of the lis pendens exception stated that the exception is applicable and in the case at hand. Thus, it has sent the second file to be analyzed together with the initial statement of claim. In addition to this, the court fined the claimant for misconduct represented by filing intentionally the two statement of claims having the same object. In consequence, in the present article we have analyzed the conditions to be met in order to state the presence of an abuse of rights in the light of the lis pendens and joined cases institutions. We have identified the purpose for the regulation of these legal institutions and the similarities and differences between them. In addition to this, we addressed the conduct which the court should have in order to correctly analyze the two statements of claim which are object of the lis pendens exception. Finally, our theoretical conclusions related to the three institutions were applied to our particular case, in order to prove the presence of an abuse of right.

In this article, the author analyzes extensively the issue of the status of the judges of the Constitutional Court from Romania, as it was prefigured in the theses debated by the Constituent Assembly in 1991 and regulated in the provisions of the Constitution approved by the national referendum of 8 December 1991 and revised by the Law No 429/2003. The status of the constitutional judges is analyzed by reference to the role and attributions of the Constitutional Court. The status of the constitutional judges derives from the role of the Court as guarantor of the supremacy of the Fundamental Law. The constitutional provisions regarding the status of the constitutional judges are developed by the Law No 47/1992 on the organization and functioning of the Constitutional Court, as well as by other special laws. The judges enjoy independence and are obliged to impartially exercise their attributions. The constitutional provisions provide that the constitutional judges are incompatible with any other public or private office, except for higher legal education teaching activities, are independent in the exercise of their mandate and irremovable during their term of office. The Law No 47/1992 establishes that the judges are not legally responsible for the opinions and votes cast in connection with the cases pending before the Court. For any other deeds, the constitutional judges may be tried in criminal proceedings with the consent of the plenum of the Constitutional Court, under the conditions provided by the Law No 47/1992.