This study focuses on the legal issues involved by the provisions of Articles 125 (3) and 132 (2) of the Constitution (according to which the office of judge or public prosecutor shall be incompatible with any other public or private office, except for the didactic offices in the higher education institutions) in correlation with the provisions of Article 41 (1) of the Constitution (according to which the right to work shall not be restricted, and everyone has a free choice of his/her profession, trade or occupation, as well as work place). Currently, the relevant administrative practice and case law interpret and apply extensively (lato sensu) Articles 125 (3) and 132 (2). Such approach leads to the presumption that any other activity performed by judges or public prosecutors is forbidden (otherwise triggering disciplinary liability thereof) unless that other activity is not related to didactic offices in higher education or is not assimilated to such offices by special law (or, as it happens most often, by a decision issued by the Plenum of the Superior Council of Magistracy). This study demonstrates that, on the contrary, the aforementioned constitutional provisions establish a presumption according to which the judges and public prosecutors can lawfully perform not only the activities which consist in „didactic offices in higher education”, but also any other activity which is not an „office” and in relation to which there is no „conflict of interest” in the light of the relevant legal provisions. In order to reach this conclusion, the constitutional and legal provisions on the concept of holding multiple „offices” must cease to be interpreted extensively (lato sensu), as it is made currently by the administrative practice and the case law, but restrictively (stricto sensu) – as those constitutional provisions constitute an exception from the constitutional principle of the free right to work, establishing a restriction of this fundamental right exercise. The legal provisions laid down in this field can be qualified as consistent with the Constitution only if their normative content does not produce an extensive application of the constitutional provisions concerning the holding of multiple „offices”. Thus, by the words „other public or private office” (with which the office of judge or public prosecutor is prohibited to be held simultaneously) one has to understand exclusively a public or private activity performed regularly and in an organized manner within an institution (organization) against a remuneration.

The ordinary courts have the general competence to protect the rights and freedoms of individuals, whether provided or not in the international treaties or in the Constitution of Romania. The Constitutional Court’s claim to be the only one to exercise constitutional justice powers is based on a faulty interpretation of its own competence, which is constitutionally determined as being to ensure the supremacy of the Constitution, and on reducing the constitutional contentious to the contentious of rules. A correct interpretation of the constitutional provisions and the fructification of the Romanian tradition in the matter of constitutional justice demonstrate that the ordinary courts are competent to apply the Constitution in order to protect the rights and freedoms of individuals, therefore to exercise constitutional justice powers, because this is not reduced to the control of the constitutionality of the laws.

Stipulation for another and direct actions are two topical legal mechanisms that, although in theory are clearly explained, the judicial practice is hesitant in their application. At the same time, due to the multitude of similarities regarding the effects of these legal mechanisms, a confusion has been created in numerous situations both in terms of their legal meaning and their applicability. As such, a comparative study of the two legal notions contributes and facilitates the substantiation in law of the stipulation for another and of the direct actions, but also the way of application in the judicial practice. In the present study we mainly focused on presenting the origins of the stipulation for another, but also on its application over time, so far, concluding with a comparison with the direct actions, regarding the main effects of the two legal mechanisms. We hope that the judicial practice will outline in time a more effective differentiation of the two notions with a wide spread in the fields of law.

In this article, the author advocates the necessity to adopt a special law on the liability of magistrates for committing the judicial errors through bad faith or due to their own negligence. The beginning of reforming the political system set in motion in December 1989 has generated also the change of the judicial system as a whole and, at the same time with it, of the relations between the state and the citizen, according to the principles of the constitutional democracy. As the new government system places at its foundation the individual-citizen, it was natural for the state to assume a direct liability for the violation by its judicial agents of the legitimate rights and interests of the citizens. In this framework, it was built a system of corrections for judicial errors, extended to the effective legal liability of the judges and of the public prosecutors who, in bad faith or gross negligence, have violated the processual rights of the parties in the trial, have convicted them unjustly, or have subjected them without any grounds to some repressive procedures. This system of moral and material corrections does not work, the provisions in the matter, included in the processual legislation, are not sufficient for the citizen to gain full confidence in the act of justice. A special law is necessary not only to ensure the corrections of the judicial errors, but also to exemplarily sanction the guilty parties for violating the law.

The article proposes a discussion about the institution of the putative deed. Considering the fact that this institution does not know an explicit legal regulation, it gave rise to heated discussions in the specialized legal literature, which had not only a theoretical importance, but also a great practical importance. In the beginning of the presentation it is shown what is the correct name of this institution of criminal law, from the author’s perspective, arguing at the same time the opinion to which he understands to rally. It is shown that the putative deed corresponds to an inverse error either of law or of fact. Given that, in a first hypothesis, the author considers that the deed committed is incriminated by a rule of criminal nature, although in reality such an activity is not incriminated or, in another hypothesis, although the author’s deed is incriminated by the criminal law, the actual manner of committing the deed does not fall within the respective legal text. Similarly, it is also presented perhaps the most heated discussion in the legal literature, namely the one in which the author executes certain acts of execution with the intention of killing a person, not knowing that he had died prior to the moment of beginning the activity. It is shown that, given the legal reality in our country, at this time, the perpetrator has to be held liable for committing a putative deed, not an attempt, whether a punishable or non-punishable attempt is discussed. At the same time, it is stated that the judicial practice has retained the commission of a putative deed, and not of an offence, in the hypothesis that it is required a qualified active subject for committing a certain offence and the person who committed the deed did not act in this capacity. In the author’s opinion, in such a hypothesis, it will not be retained the commission of any offence, but only the commission of a putative deed, only in the situation that the deed committed does not represent another offence. At the end of the article conclusions are drawn, also showing how the legislator could intervene in order to put an end to the discussions arisen in the legal literature and, at the same time, in order to enable possibly the sanctioning of the persons who commit putative deeds which pose a high social danger.

The study shows that Article 291 of the Criminal Procedure Code, with the marginal name „Referrals made by persons in management positions and by other persons”, provides a sui generis way of referral to the criminal prosecution bodies, separately from the complaint, denunciation and ex officio referral. It is appreciated that the text establishes an obligation to refer the matter to the criminal prosecution body, particularised by subject and object. The subject of this obligation is, among others, any person who exercises a service of public interest for which he has been entrusted by the public authorities. This description corresponds to the notion of civil servant, within the meaning of Article 175 (2) of the Criminal Code. The judge pertains to this category, by the fact that he exercises a service of public interest and by the fact that he has been entrusted by the public authorities to exercise it. Consequently, it is shown that subject of the obligation to refer the matter to the criminal prosecution body is an offence about the commission of which the judge has become aware in the exercise of his duties. The article also notes that Article 346 (7) of the Criminal Procedure Code is mandatory for the preliminary chamber judge, but the extent of this obligation is limited by the need to comply with Article 354 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code. Thus: as a rule, the preliminary chamber judge who ordered the commencement of the trial has the obligation to join the composition of the judicial panel that exercises the judicial function; by way of exception, if the preliminary chamber judge that has ordered the commencement of the trial is prevented by an objective cause from joining the composition of the judicial panel, he may be replaced with another judge. The sanction of the violation of Article 346 (7) of the Criminal Procedure Code is the absolute nullity arising from the non-observance of the rules regarding the composition of the judicial panel. It is appreciated that absolute nullity is incidental, since Article 346 (7) of the Criminal Procedure Code is violated, in two hypotheses: the preliminary chamber judge who has ordered the commencement of the trial is not also the judge who exercises the judicial function, and this is not caused by any impediment; the preliminary chamber judge who ordered the commencement of the trial is not also the judge who exercises the judicial function, and this is caused by a non-objective impediment.