The formation of public law in the Romanian Principalities bears, on the one hand, the imprint of the political will of the states with strong influence in this part of Europe in the first half of the 19th century, and, on the other hand, it reflects the spirit of Western constitutional thought and practice, much modernized after the French Revolution of 1789. Concerned with the constitutional and administrative modernization of the two Principalities were mainly Russia, France, England and Austria, each of these great European powers pursuing, in fact, their own objectives, of political and economic nature. Instead, Turkey did not support at all the modernization of Wallachia and Moldova, being interested in maintaining the Phanariot regime. At the confluence of the contradictory interests of these powers, the Principalities did not have an active, decisive role in their own constitutional and administrative modernization. Nevertheless, the changes and transformations produced in the Principalities at the initiative and with the determination of the mentioned states, were generated by the clauses of some international documents (the Treaty of Adrianople of 1829, the Peace Treaty between Russia and Turkey of 1856 and the Paris Convention of 1858). To these it is added the Developing Statute of the Paris Convention, imposed by the will of Prince Alexandru Ioan Cuza

The article addresses the problems concerning the crime of child pornography, in general, but it also includes some special emphasis on the legal implications which the conduct of the minor who makes pornographic materials with his own person, without being coerced by another person, might have. The analysis is one based on arguments from the specialized literature, but also on solutions from the judicial practice. In particular, the author proposes the recognition of existence, in the case of the crime of child pornography, in all its forms, of a special main legal object aiming at the need to respect the public order and peace, and, in particular, of a secondary object formed of the social relations referring to the protection of minors and of t he social relations whose proper development is conditioned by defending the public morality. With regard to the special issue caused by the minor’s act of producing, storing, possessing or distributing strictly in private pornographic materials of himself, the author rightfully considers that this act should not be subject to criminal liability, but rather to the psychological counselling of the minor with regard to the implications of the beginning and the development of the sexual life and, respectively, of the consequences that such deeds may have on the normal sexual development of the child.

Două opțiuni a avut Adunarea Constituantă în 1991 cu privire la echilibrarea raporturilor între puteri, îndeosebi între Parlament, ca depozitar suveran al puterii legislative și cele două autorități de vârf ale puterii executive: Președintele României și Guvernul 1 . Fiecare opțiune cu avantajele, neajunsurile și riscurile ei. Adunarea Constituantă ar fi putut să instituie republica parlamentară, ca specie eminamente și formal democratică a regimului parlamentar, consacrat și prin constituțiile din 1866 și din 1923, dar nealterat esențial de regimurile autoritare ulterioare, sau să modifice tradiția parlamentară a regimului politic și să instituie un alt tip de regim. Regimul prezidențial nici nu a intrat în calculele Adunării Constituante, deoarece acesta, ca tip de separație și echilibrare a puterilor, nu a putut fi extins la niciun popor în forma sa clasică, izbutită exclusiv în Statele Unite ale Americii...

The authors of this article, starting from a case, approach the new regulation of the novation contract by changing the debtor, analyzing some legal limits of this type of contract, in the hypotheses in which, the new debtor – legal entity – takes over a debt free of charge. In this sense, highlighting the limits provided by the Constitution, the Civil Code, the Law on companies No 31/1990 1 , Criminal Code, Law on the procedures for preventing insolvency and for insolvency No 85/2014 2 , conclude that the novation contract by changing the debtor and taking over free of charge the debt of the old debtor by a legal entity third party is prohibited by several mandatory provisions of the Civil Code, the Law on companies No 31/1990, the Criminal Code and the Law on the procedures for preventing insolvency and for insolvency 85/2014. To admit otherwise means to accept the enrichment of the old debtor without just cause, to favour the administrators of the old debtor to evade the responsibility for being brought into insolvency or state of default, as well as the prejudice of the new debtor’s associates, his creditors, etc.

Contractul de ipotecă poate fi desființat, sub forma anulării, numai în condițiile art. 1648 alin. (1) C.civ. în ceea ce privește soluționarea cererii de anulare a contractului de ipotecă, exclusiv ca o consecință a rezoluțiunii contractului de vânzare prin care pârâta a dobândit dreptul de proprietate asupra terenului, cu privire la care a constituit ulterior un drept real, reprezentat de dreptul de ipotecă în favoarea pârâtei. Aceste dispoziții fac trimitere însă la regulile de carte funciară, urmând, așadar, ca, în continuare, să fie observate dispozițiile art. 908 C.civ., ce reglementează ipotezele în care se poate dispune rectificarea cărții funciare.

Guilt is that psychic attitude of the active subject, who – voluntarily committing an act provided by the criminal law, anti-juridical and imputable – is aware of the objective circumstances in which he externalizes his conduct or, although he does not have this conscience, should and could have it. Guilt is separate from the foresight of the criminal law and covers the subjective elements of the content of the crime. The structure of guilt includes two psychic processes, which are called factors thereof. The first is conscience or the intellective factor, and the second is the will or the volitional factor. The conscience deliberates on the deed and decides whether it will be committed. The will mobilizes the energy necessary for the implementation of the decision taken. The forms and modalities of guilt are defined by relating the conscience and the will to the objective circumstances. Intellectively, what relates to objective circumstances is the presence or absence of conscience. Volitionally, what relates to objective circumstances is the content of the will. Conscience can be present and objective circumstances can be represented correctly, when there is intent, direct or indirect. Conscience may be present, but objective circumstances may be misrepresented when there is premeditated guilt. Conscience may be absent when – in the presence of the obligation and of the possibility of predicting objective circumstances – there is guilt without foresight. Direct intent, indirect intent, and premeditated guilt are defined by the foresight of the objective circumstances. The direct intent is defined by pursuing the result, the indirect intent is defined by accepting the result, and the guilt with foresight is defined by rejecting the result. Guilt without foresight is defined by the failure to foresee the objective circumstances and by the obligation and the possibility to foresee them. The classification of the intent in direct and indirect is made according to the way of reporting the will to the result of the crime. The intent is direct, if the active subject pursues the result of the crime. According to the way in which the active subject prefigures the result of the crime, the direct intent has two degrees of intensity. Each degree in its turn has two stages. The active subject prefigures the result of the crime as an end in itself (the first stage of the first degree), as a necessary means to achieve another goal (the second stage of the first degree) or as an inevitable consequence (the first stage of the second degree) or very probable (the second stage of the second degree) of the manner in which the commission of the crime is conceived. The intent is indirect, if the active subject accepts the result of the crime. In case of indirect intent, two results are discussed. Indifference to the second result (which is illegal, provided by criminal law) is the essence of indirect intent. The classification of the intent into simple and qualified is made according to the existence of a special purpose or motive, expressly provided in the incrimination norm. The intent is simple, if the active subject commits the crime without pursuing a certain purpose and without being pushed by a certain motive, expressly provided in the incrimination norm. The intent is qualified, if the active subject commits the crime pursuing a certain purpose or being pushed by a certain motive, expressly provided in the incrimination norm. The qualified intent is direct when the characteristics of qualified intent and those of direct intent intertwine. The qualified intent can also be indirect, when the characteristics of the qualified intent dissociate from the characteristics of the direct intent. The qualified intent is direct, if: a certain circumstance is foreseen in the content of the crime both as a result and as a purpose or as a motive; a certain circumstance is provided in the content of the crime as a result and is prefigured by the active subject as a necessary means to achieve the special purpose or to satisfy the special motive or as an inevitable or very probable consequence of achieving the special purpose or satisfying the special motive. The qualified intent may also be indirect, if a certain circumstance is provided in the content of the crime as a result and another circumstance, different from the first, is provided as a special purpose or as a special motive and the result is not prefigured by the active subject neither for the achieving of the special purpose or for the satisfaction of the special motive, nor as an inevitable or very probable consequence of the achievement of the special purpose or of the satisfaction of the special motive. The classification of the intent into premeditated and spontaneous is made according to the mental state that the active subject has at the moment of making the decision to commit the crime, as well as the length of time between the time of making this decision and the time of its execution. The intent is premeditated, if the active subject decides to commit the crime in a state of calm and if from the moment of making the decision to commit the crime until the moment of its execution a longer time interval passes. There are two theories regarding premeditation: one objective and the other one subjective. In the objective theory it is considered that premeditation requires preparatory acts, that it is compatible with the provocation and that it is a personal circumstance, which is objectified in the content of the crime and produces the effects of a real circumstance. In the subjective theory, to which I adhere, premeditation does not require preparatory acts, is incompatible with the provocation and is a personal circumstance, which does not affect the participants. The intent is spontaneous, if the active subject decides to commit the crime in a state of over-excitement and if from the moment of making the decision to commit the crime until the moment of its execution, passes a time interval as short as possible. The intent is pure and simple, if it does not meet either the conditions of the premeditated intent, or the conditions of the spontaneous intent. The classifications of the intent highlight certain levels of danger of the active subject, which are investigated on the occasion of the individualization of the punishment. The different stages of danger of the active subject, detached from the different degrees and stages of intensity of the direct intent, impose different solutions with reference to the judicial individualization of the punishment. The danger stage of the active subject related to the indirect intent is lower than the one related to the direct intent. Qualified intent imprints a degree of danger, as a rule, greater or, exceptionally, lower of the active subject. The special purpose or motive enters into the content of the crime as a constitutive element or as an aggravating circumstantial element, as a rule, or as an attenuating circumstantial element, by exception. The premeditated intent is capitalized as an aggravating circumstantial element (in the content of the qualified murder), a general legal aggravating circumstance (pre-ordered intoxication) or an aggravating criterion of judicial individualization of the punishment. Spontaneous intent is capitalized as a legal, general (provocative) or special (killing or injuring the newborn by the mother) mitigating circumstance. Pure and simple intent is neutral from the point of view of judicial individualization.