Modern society is based on the predominance of organic solidarity over mechanical solidarity and, consequently, on the predominance of the law which ensures cooperation between autonomous subjects from repressive law, which sanctions, through penalty, any deviation from the standards of the common conscience. Modern society is „civilized”, i.e. it is firstly and foremost based on „civil” law, the repressive law only being exceptional, which translates into three principles: that of the subsidiarity of criminal law, that of the necessity and legality of offences and penalties, and that of the additional protection of individual freedom when the subject is criminally charged. The consequence thereof is that, in modern liberal democracies, all repressive law is criminal, that any charge which may lead to the application of a repressive sanction is a criminal charge and that the law-maker cannot assign to the administration the competence regarding the application of repressive sanctions. Under these circumstances, the transformation of some repressive norms into norms of administrative law is a violation of the fundamental principles that structure the legal order of modern liberal states. Nonetheless, this type of practice is becoming more common. In order to ensure individual freedom, this tendency must be corrected. As politicians are not willing to do so, naturally this is a task for the judicial courts, that can rely for this endeavour on the European Court of Human Rights’ constructive jurisprudence.

The author aims to present a historical perspective by connecting to the current juridical perspective, addressing and making an exegesis of one of the institutions which are convergent to the two essential procedural codifications, namely the Civil Procedure Code and the Criminal Procedure Code, but rather incompletely regulated by the legislator, namely the offence of hearing. Emphasizing the fact that in neither of the two Procedure Codes the notion of the offence of hearing is not expressely and categorically defined, the legislator has conceptualized the procedure which is going to be followed by the judge insofar as he directly finds, through his own senses, such an offence/deed provided by the criminal law, the two procedures presenting similarities, but also differences, some of them being non-resilient to scientific criticism, as we will try to demonstrate this conclusion in the content of the material, in which there have been inserted de lege ferenda proposals as well.

As a fundamental instrument for ensuring the functioning of the European Union legal order, the action for the non-compliance with the European obligations is the judicial instrument by which the Union authorities, led by the Commission and the Luxembourg jurisdictional structure, exercise direct control over the conduct of the Member States in relation to EU law imperatives. Located somewhere in the middle between the legality control and the action for liability, the non-compliance with the obligations raises separate and complex issues difficult to understand in the absence of the vast jurisdictional experience of the Court of Justice of the European Union. If, under procedural terms, the present action does not present particular challenges, imposing, as a rule, a mechanism for cooperation between the European Commission and the defendant Member State (as a pre-contentious phase), in which the Court of Justice often plays a subsidiary role (contentious phase), from a material point of view, the non-compliance with the European obligations involves different forms and meanings that transcend both the letter and the spirit of the treaties, even in their current form, consolidated after the Treaty of Lisbon (2009). In such a context, the present study aims to review the most frequently used meanings which the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union has given to the phrase „non-compliance with European obligations”, in the light of current regulations, past experiences and, last but not least, the aim pursued by this procedure, namely to sanction any derogation from the uniform and synchronized application of the European Union law.

Organizațiile societății civile pot fi uneori demersul cel mai accesibil și eficace pentru cetățeni, de a acționa pentru apărarea unui drept sau interes legitim. În plus, membrii grupurilor pot avea un cuvânt greu de spus cu privire la acțiunile ori inacțiunile statului. Aceste aspecte creionează o forță civică, ce, folosită cu bună-credință, poate duce la progresul întregii națiuni. În absența unui simț civic dezvoltat, comportamentul unor persoane ce doresc a abuza de o organizație a societății civile apare ca fiind extrem de nociv pentru democrație1 . Practic, dintre acei puțini români ce se implică, o parte nu urmăresc dezvoltarea comunității, ci propria bunăstare.

Despite the extraordinary multiplication and pertinent diversification of environmental protection regulations, at national, regional (EU) and international level, the efficiency and effectiveness of environmental law norms still remain a desideratum. Their level of achievement is insufficient and different from one country to another, being particularly low and, consequently, representing a problem that should be a priority in Romania. The causes of the situation are profound and diverse (being related to the non-perception and non-expression of the specifics of the matter at all stages and at all levels of the legal phenomenon), and its solving involves a „true legal revolution and a reconsideration of the new branch of law”. The ways to overcome the impasse include, in addition to adapting the legislation and promoting appropriate legal tools and mechanisms, also the establishment of specialized jurisdictions and the specialization of persons involved in the functioning of the environmental process. The topic approached by the author is of increased interest as long as the first institutional steps in this direction are being taken in Romania as well.

In the context of the express consecration of the protection of non-patrimonial rights also for the legal persons, according to Article 257 of the Civil Code, it becomes useful to analyze the evolution of the practice in the matter of repairing the non-patrimonial damage caused to the legal persons. Also, the historical perspective of the notion of moral damages, the procedural means and the relevant jurisprudence of the ECHR allow us to place this issue today, concluding that the principles of the tort civil liability apply to each case, depending on the proven factual evidence, but also on the diversity of the legal persons, on the variety of their objectives.