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Law does obviously not benefit from the privilege of having its own exhaustive language. We might say that most concepts used in law are borrowed from other branches of knowledge. The quite rare concepts that are its own often do not receive a definition that can be classified, according to the methodology of the act of definition itself, as “legal”. The amalgamation of legal terminology with the economic, political, sociological or philosophical terminology, without revising the concepts and without their clear understanding in the areas of knowledge from where they come makes the doctrine and the case law too often flat and stereotyped, if not even chaotic from the conceptual point of view. Lawyers are no longer seen as persons of learning, who try to explain the nature of things through justice, but as simple technicians, who apply concepts taken from other social-human sciences. Under these conditions, one of the fundamental problems for lawyers is to explain a fact that seems to be overlooked by our current culture: what is meant by a legal concept? Afterward, it becomes equally important to understand the way in which the non-legal concepts used in law should be revised, namely what the standards of the legal definition of concepts are. The above-mentioned article attempts to answer to these challenges. -
The author of this study, starting from the premise that both the employees of public authorities/institutions (who carry on their activity based on an individual labour contract), as well as the civil servants of these budgetary structures (who carry on their activity based on a job relation) have a legal labour relation each, comes to the conclusion that the present jurisdictional system regarding the labour conflicts (the disputes) of the two categories of personnel mentioned (the labour conflicts of the employees of the public authorities/institutions are settled by the labour jurisdiction courts, while the same type of cases, in case of civil servants, fall within the jurisdiction of administrative disputes courts) is obviously unnatural and discriminatory. This being the case, it is proposed the unification of the jurisdiction in this respect, in the sense that both for the employees of the public authorities/institutions and for the civil servants in their service, the competence to settle the labour conflicts is going to pertain to the labour jurisdiction courts. -
This paper aims to analyze the difficulties which the Romanian judge faces, in the attempt to ensure the exigencies imposed by Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights in matters of reasonable time. In this regard, the paper is structured in three parts: the first part briefly presents the Court’s standard as regards the reasonable time; the second part analyzes the compatibility of an institution recently introduced in the Civil Procedure Code – the contestation concerning the delay of the trial (Articles 522–526 of the Civil Procedure Code) – to the notion of effective remedy, within the meaning of Article 6 and Article 13 of the Convention; the last part emphasizes, based on some jurisprudential examples, the risks which the national judge must manage very carefully when he tries to ensure the reasonable time: the risk of acting ultra vires and the risk of creating a non-unitary case-law, thus generating the premises of some new violations of Article 6 of the Convention. -
If in ancient times it was often confounded with legal science and constituted a genuine source of law, gradually, case-law transformed into a form of explanation, addition, and elimination of obscurity of the legal text, by the judge, in the process of interpreting and enforcing the law. At the same time, its relations to the doctrine have also evolved, the latter being called upon today to decode case-law rules, assuring their clarity and complete expression of their meanings, from the „inside” of the process of creating law. Case-law phenomenon is an object of analysis for the legal science, in terms of external factors that configure and influence it. The case-law revival noticed partially and specifically after 1989 also in Romania, given the transition, is expected to fully manifest itself in the following period, just after the end of the legislative reform, realized by the adoption and entering into force of the new codes. -
Foarte mulți autori moderni întrebuințează în lucrările lor expresia jus ad rem pentru a desemna dreptul de creanță, opunându-l astfel dreptului real jus in re. Această expresie a avut o influență considerabilă în evoluarea instituțiilor juridice. Scopul nostru este de a examina aici cum au fost aduși autorii să numească dreptul de creanță jus ad rem, precum și cele două mai importante consecințe ale acestui fel de a concepe natura dreptului de creanță: dispariția obligației chirographare și transformarea efectelor vânzărei. -
The climate dispute, developed explosively in the last decade, has had a first experience also at the level of EU law through People’s Climate Case (2018) in which 10 families and a civic association have brought an action before the EU Tribunal against the European Parliament and the European Commission for the insufficiency of the objectives assumed in the matter of climate changes. It was required the cancellation of several European Union legislative texts in the clime package and a compensation for the prejudice claimed to be incurred in this context. By the Ordinance of 8 May 2019, the action was dismissed as inadmissible, as the conditions of Article 263 (4) TFEU were not met, whereas there had been challenged legislative texts which did not concern and did not affect the applicants individually. The case law thus created leads to conclusions notable for the climate justice. -
In this article the author shows that justice is one of the pillars of the state of law, which ensures the implementation of the principle of the rule of law, the foundation on which this type of state is built and developed. Likewise, the author makes brief considerations on the notion of justice, as well as on its administration, especially on the independence of judges and on the impartiality of justice. The analysis takes into account both the European standard and the Romanian law in the matter. -
1.- La signification de la planification hydrologique dans la Directive Cadre sur l’Eau. 2.- Les retards significatifs des États dans l’application de la Directive. 3.- Les districts hydrographiques comme référence des plans hydrologiques. 4.Les autorités administratives responsables des districts hydrographiques. 5.- Les procédures d’élaboration des plans hydrologiques. 6.- Le contenu des plans hydrologiques. 7.- Valeur et effets des plans hydrologiques. 8.- Le contrôle judiciaire des plans hydrologiques. Bibliographie. -
In this study, the author presents a constitutional reform on the Hungarian Constitutional Court, in the sense of extending its substantive jurisdiction, which entered into force at the beginning of the year 2012. Indeed, the mentioned reform preserves the classic system of the constitutional courts, but it receives an additional jurisdiction, i.e.: after a judgment has become final, either party may address to the Constitutional Court if the decision made is contrary to a fundamental right established by the Constitution. This way, concludes the author, the Constitutional Court is elevated at the level of a centre of the state power, an independent branch thereof which, in a certain sense, conducts a control on all branches of the state power.
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This paper presents an analysis of the legality of the decisions made by the administrations of the places of detainment to forbid to the persons deprived of their freedom to receive and acquire different categories of foods, decisions based on safety reasons regarding the detainment, as per Article 148 (6) in the Regulation of Enforcement of Law No 254/2013, as well as the extent to which these decisions violate or not the right to receive and buy goods according to Article 70 from the Law No 254/2013. The paper summarizes the currents of opinion formed both in the practice of the judges of surveillance of deprivation of liberty, as well in the courts by displaying certain judicial situations regarding the nature of some foods which are not particularly regulated in Annex 1, Title IV of the Regulation, situations which not even at present have received unitary unification in relation to the character of the actions taken by the prison as a restraint or a reduction of the right to receive and buy goods. The conclusions of this endeavour offer a possible solution to this problem of great actuality in practice starting from the assumption that reducing the exercise of the right to receive and buy goods is legal in the extent to which the principles of legality, equity, the realization of goals and proportionality are abided.
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The object of the general part of criminal law and its relation to the special part are still uncertain, and this is because the criminal doctrine has always neglected the general criminal norms, by focusing its attention on the norms of incrimination, which are specific to the special part. In relation to these matters, the doctrine often makes contradictory statements and, as a result, some authors have deducted that the connection between the general part and the special part of criminal law is that of a general law (common law) and a special law (exceptional law), so that a possible conflict between a general criminal norm and a special criminal norm is solved according to the rule specialia generalibus derogant. And, unfortunately, such an opinion tends to become dominant, as evidenced by the fact that the criminal legislator disregards more and more frequently the norms with value of principles of branch, which are included in the general part of the Criminal Code. Therefore, in order to combat this completely unacceptable legislative practice, the author of this paper has intended to point out that the general part is a framework-law, with a higher legal value, while the special part is a (derived) subordinate law, which can only specify (clarify) the norms of the general part, but can never derogate from them. However, starting from this premise, the author has noticed that the persisting doubt about the relation between the two parties also has a deeper cause, which resides in the fact that no modern legislator has been preoccupied with determining and explicitly providing the general conditions and rules of punishment. Although the criminal doctrine has, for a long time, noticed that the norms of incrimination lay down special rules of punishment, the scope of which is limited to a specific, well-determined offence, however, in the absence of general rules of punishment, it has concluded wrongly, that the incrimination norms are autonomous independent norms, while general criminal norms are derived (secondary) norms.
