• The present study aims to analyze the autonomy of will regarding the civil legal act, by reference to the limitations that the legal norms, public order or good morals set both in terms of substance and formally. The legal will, a complex psychological phenomenon which is the basis of the conclusion of any legal act, is governed by two basic principles, namely the principle of real will and the principle of freedom or autonomy of will. The principle of real will, enshrined in Romanian law, gives valency to the internal/psychological element to which the party is animated at the conclusion of the civil legal act. As for the principle of autonomy of will, it finds its legal consecration in Article 1169 of the Civil Code, establishing the parties’ freedom to conclude any contracts and to establish their content. However, this freedom must not be viewed in absolute terms, knowing a series of limitations of substance and form, which we have pointed out in this article.
  • The oblique action is a means of preserving the claim that has been regulated both in the sense of the new Civil Code and in the sense of the old Civil Code. The new regulation, however, brings some improvements to clarify the conditions and effects of the oblique action. At the same time, the notion of general pledge of creditors is replaced by the notion of joint guarantee. As such, a study on the effects and conditions of the oblique action is extremely useful, especially as it is compared with the provisions of the new French Civil Code. Through this paper we have understood to deal with a very important and up-to-date subject as it is a means of protecting the claims at the disposal of any creditor. At the same time, the parallel with the direct actions comes to clarify the confusion that has been created many times in both doctrine and judicial practice between the two legal mechanisms.
  • The article analyzes the Decision of the Constitutional Court No 369/2017, by which the phrase „as well as in other requests assessable in cash worth up to ROL 1 000 000 inclusive” was declared unconstitutional. In the Civil Procedure Code, in Article 483 (2), there are listed the judgments that can not be challenged with recourse, among which there are the requests assessable in cash worth up to ROL 500 000. By Article XVIII of the Law No 2/2013, this threshold was increased to the amount of ROL 1 000 000 inclusive. We consider criticizable the establishing of the categories of court judgments that have eluded the recourse taking into account the value criterion and we propose to eliminate this criterion. In our opinion, we agree with the admission of the plea of unconstitutionality, which has eliminated the value threshold for the promotion of judgments that can be challenged with recourse. Likewise, we consider criticizable also the delimitation of the material competence between judges and tribunals, being based on the value criterion. In our opinion, the delimitation of the material competence must be made depending on the nature of the litigation brought to justice, not on the value criterion of the request for summons.
  • Leave of absence is a motivated missing (absence) from the workplace, being a period when the employee does not work. As the leave of absence from the workplace is not legally regulated by the normative acts in force, in practice, when the employee requests leave of absence in order to solve some personal matters, discussions arise as to whether or not he receives salary during the leave of absence. This study raises for discussion some considerations and proposals referring to the legal status of the leave of absence from the workplace, both for the employees from the budgetary sector and for the employees from the private sector.
  • The faulty interpretations of the normative system as a hierarchical system are due to analysing the matters of validity and of withdrawal of legality on the basis of the same methods of interpretation as when the matter of conformity is examined. If we clearly operate this distinction, using the pre-war case law, then the ordinary courts have competences in the matter of contentious of validity of rules and even some competences in the matter of contentious of conformity, despite the Constitutional Court’s claim to monopolize the constitutional contentious of rules. Likewise, they have competences in the matter of contentious of conformity of the infraconstitutional rules with the Constitution, which is questioned only due to the understanding of the normative hierarchy according to the French model, which is not applicable pursuant to the Constitution of Romania. Finally, I will prove that the ordinary courts have the competence to verify the agreement of the rules declared unconstitutional with the C.C.R decision.
  • The most important normative act, which regulates the matter of establishing, organizing and dissolving societies, is Law No 31/1990. According to Article 1 (1) of the Law No 31/1990, for the purpose of carrying out activities for profit, natural persons and legal persons may associate and form companies with legal personality, in compliance with the provisions of this law. Article 1 (2) of the same law provides that the companies referred to in paragraph (1) based in Romania are Romanian legal entities. Violations of legal norms regulating the establishment, organization, modification and cessation of the activities of societies can be manifested in various forms and may, as the case may be, imply criminal, civil, disciplinary, tax liability etc. Taking into account the fact that the companies have a special importance in the field of business, the Romanian legislature criminalizes certain facts of violation of the norms provided by the Law No 31/1990.
  • This study is a thorough analysis of the procedure of judgment in the absence of the defendant. In particular, there are assessed the remedies that the Romanian regulation provides to the one who has been the subject to a procedure of judgment in contumacy. The author brings arguments of comparative law and of systemic interpretation of the internal legal rules, his conclusion being that there are many aspects in which the internal regulation is deficient.
  • The debate over the future of the juveniles’ court and the juvenile justice system has been between proponents of a retributive philosophy and advocates of the traditional individual treatment mission. Both punitive approaches and those focused solely on treatment have failed to satisfy basic needs of crime victims, the community and offenders themselves. Neither offers hope for preserving a separate justice system for juveniles. This document outlines an alternative philosophy, restorative justice, and a new mission, the balanced approach, which require that juvenile justice system devotes attention to making amends to victim and the community, increasing offender competencies, and protecting the public, through process in which offenders, victims and the communities are all active participants.
  • This paper is a plea for adopting the legal conception on the notion of result of the offence. It points out both the shortcomings of the formal conception, which dominates the current theory on the result of the offence, as well as the shortcomings of the old naturalistic conception, which is still preserved today, being supported by the highly questionable theory of the civil tort liability.
  • The institution of preventive arrest is regulated by the new Criminal Procedure Code in Article 223 and the following, representing the hardest preventive measure that can be taken against the defendant in the criminal prosecution phase, in the preliminary chamber phase or in the trial phase. As it is normal, the institutions referred to in the Criminal Procedure Code appear to be very strictly and concisely regulated, but even so, there may be problems in the practice of the courts and of the public prosecutor’s offices that function next to them, with regard to the interpretation of the rules. The measure of preventive arrest is the harshest of the preventive measures, because it completely deprives of liberty the defendant accused of committing an offence. In relation to the cases in which the measure of preventive arrest may be ordered and the conditions to be satisfied for taking this measure, the practice is not always unitary. If most of the cases expressly provided in the Criminal Procedure Code in which this measure may be ordered do not pose problems of interpretation, their applicability being strict and commonly understood by practitioners, some cases, also expressly provided, bring to light a series of profound legislative matters that will have to be solved, in the future, by means of the legislator’s action of amendment and supplementation of the provisions in the matter or by means of interpretation of these provisions by the High Court of Cassation and Justice in order to unify the judicial practice.
  • În primul meu articol, publicat în Dreptul dela 8 Decembrie 1913, arătam că unul dintre cele mai mici și mai sărăcăcioase bugete, în care spiritul de exagerată economie, de adevărată sgârcenie, se arată la fiecare pas, este acel al Justiției. Nu știu cum s’a făcut, că aproape toți miniștrii de justiție, deși avocați prin meseria lor obișnuită, deci cunoscând în deaproape pe magistrați și situațiunea lor materială mai mult decât precară, nu au intervenit până acum de a schimba normele și alcătuirea acestui buget sărăcăcios și nedrept. În adevăr, acest buget, care până mai eri era de 10 milioane, azi, după atâtea secțiuni noui de Curți și tribunale înființate, abia se ridică la 11 milioane și jumătate. Iar salariile magistraților și ale celorlalți funcționari judecătorești, de acum 24 ani, dela legea organizărei judecătorești din 1890, a d-lui Teodor Rosetti, au rămas aceleași! Și cât de mult s’a schimbat în 24 ani situațiunea economică a țărei! Banul s’a eftenit, iar prețul obiectelor de prima necesitate s’a întreit și împătrit chiar.
  • Art. 1100 dispune că creditorul nu poate fi silit a primi alt lucru de cât acela ce i se datorește, chiar când valoarea lucrului oferit ar fi egală sau mai mare. Acest text, care nu este de cât o consecință a art. 9691 și a interpretărei voinței părților, reproduce No. 530 din obligațiile lui Pothier: «Obicinuit, zice acest autor, nu se poate plăti de cât lucrul datorit; și debitorul nu poate să oblige pe creditorul său a primi drept plată alt ceva de cât ceea ce i se datorește.» «Aliud pro alio, invito creditori, solvi non potest.»2 «Nici creditorul, zice art. 1862 din Codul Calimach (1213 C. austriac), nu poate fi silit să primească împotriva voinței sale alt ceva, fără de cât aceea ce are dorit să ceară, nici datornicul nu este îndatorit să dea sau să facă alt ceva, fără de cât aceea ce este dator să dea sau să facă. Aceasta are tărie și pentru vremea, când, și pentru locul, unde, și pentru chipul cum are să se împlinească îndatorirea.»3
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