In this article, the author aims to analyze the theoretical foundations of two essential principles for the state of law and how to balance the relations between the three powers: the principle of constitutional loyalty and the principle of loyal institutional collaboration between the public authorities vested with the governing powers. The two principles are not formally provided in the text of the Constitution, but can be deduced by way of interpretation from other constitutional principles. As for the first principle, the author shows that it has its source in the obligation freely assumed by each member of a community of individuals organized according to the principles of social hierarchy, or imposed by the public authority with supreme force in the community, to respect a summum of legal norms, whose purpose consists in the regulation and harmonization of the social relations. The origin of the second principle is found in the principle of separation of the three powers in the state, which in the governing process are obliged to collaborate loyally with each other, within the institutional framework prescribed by the constitutional norm.
In the end, the author concludes that the substance of the principle of constitutional loyalty includes not only the general obligation of citizens and of both public authorities and institutions to respect the will of the Constituent Legislator formally expressed in the text of the Constitution, but also the obligation of the STATE and of each public authority provided in the Constitution, to be loyal to the CITIZEN. Otherwise, the relations between the state and the citizen are compromised, or will take the form and content of totalitarian-type relations, in which the individual is deprived of rights and absorbed by the state as a dehumanized form of life.
The author considers that the loyalty of the state towards the citizen is an obligation of constitutional rank and, on this basis, he proposes, de lege ferenda, its express inclusion in the text of the Constitution at a future revision thereof.
The aggravation of the global ecological problems, including by multiplying and amplifying the effects of the acts of massive and sustainable destruction of the environment, as well as intensifying the concerns for its protection require also the increase of the contribution of the law, especially by strengthening the criminal response, by stressing the particularisation and increasing the efficiency of the measures adopted for this purpose. In expressing this tendency we are witnessing the emergence of a process of recognition and inclusion, thus, among international crimes, of the crime of ecocide, together with and in the potentiation of the meanings of the already existing one of genocide. It is perceived from a legal point of view and it is established in terms of action a new absolute value, that of the security of the planet. In this way, the concept of „crime against ecoumanity” is forged, opening new horizons for legal reflection and for relevant legal-administrative and judicial practice. As part of the effective approach, the definition of „ecocide” has a preliminary nature and it has already known relevant expressions. Among the latest projects of an international definition of ecocide it is distinguished that of the L. Neyret team (2015) and of the Stop Ecocid Foundation (2021). Their analysis, accelerated in the context of the absolute affirmation of the climate change, generates new concrete and doctrinal challenges, the expression of which is assumed as such.