This paper presents a point of view regarding the correlated interpretation of both articles 53 from the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter, ECHR) and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (hereinafter, the Charter) in the context of EU accession to ECHR. Opinion 2/13 of the EU Court of Justice from 18 December 2014 establishes that there is no provision in the Commission’s project agreement for EU accession to ECHR that envisages to ensure a coordination between both articles 53, allowing Member States to provide for higher standards on human rights protection than ECHR or the Charter, which could entail the undermining of the primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law.

Se știe că, în materie represivă, prescripția produce un îndoit efect, acel de a stinge acțiunea publică și cea civilă, care izvorăște dintr’o crimă, delict sau contravenție polițienească (art. 593–595 C.pr.pen.), și acel de a stinge pedeapsa pronunțată de tribunalele represive art. (596–598 C.pr.pen.). Pentru a se justifica aceste dispoziții s’au dat mai multe motive, asupra căror vom reveni mai târziu tot în coloanele acestui ziar, când vom expune considerațiile generale asupra prescripției penale. Destul este să spunem deocamdată că motivul cel mai puternic și poate singurul motiv ce se poate invoca în specie este că societatea nu are nici un interes a pedepsi o infracțiune a cărei amintire este ștearsă. Legea penală nu vorbește de suspendarea prescripției, ci numai de întreruperea ei. Actele întreruptive consistă, când este vorba de prescrierea acțiunei publice, în acte de instrucțiune și de urmărire (art. 593 C.pr.pen.). Vom vederea îndată care sunt actele întreruptive de prescripție când este vorba de prescrierea executărei pedepselor.

The concept of material error is evoked in two texts of the Civil Procedure Code, respectively in Article 442 and in Article 503 (2) point 2. For the purposes of Article 442 of the Civil Procedure Code, according to the opinion unanimously accepted by the doctrine and by the case law, material error is the mistake slipped in the contents of the judgment, at the time of drafting, which does not affect the foundation or the legality of the solution pronounced by the court. The correction of such material errors is made according to a special procedure regulated by law, which has as its finality the correction of such errors slipped, at the time of drafting, within the minutes, the preambles, the recitals, or even within the operative part of a judgment, which may be a sentence, a decision or a minutes of the session. This category of material errors includes those related to: the name, quality and oral submissions of the parties, those of calculation, etc. The legal meaning of the concept of material error, within the meaning of Article 503 (2) point 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, is sensitively different from that attributed to this concept by Article 442 of the Civil Procedure Code. From this perspective, the material error is any essential and involuntary omission in relation to the situation existing in the file at the time when the court of recourse delivers the judgment. In other terms, the obvious material error concerns formal aspects of the recourse which had as consequence the wrongful settlement of this legal remedy. It is about that mistake made by the court by confusing some important elements or some material data and which determines the solution delivered. The doctrine defines the judicial error as the error of judgment committed by judges or by prosecutors in the course of conducting a judicial procedure. This error may be of law or of fact and in any system of law such an error stands as basis for exercising of the ordinary or extraordinary legal remedies.

The legal report between the commercial company and the administrator is a report of mandate. The administrator mandate can be with representation or without representation and has contractual content and also legal one. The powers of the administrator of the company include two elements: the power to fulfil management abilities; the power to represent if it was expressly granted. The power to represent is distinct from the power of administration and exists only if it has been conferred. The representation of the company by the administrator is exercised differently depending on the type of company. For concluding the dispositions, the company’s administrator does not need a special power of attorney in the authentic form for this purpose. When the acts concluded by the representatives of the company are done with the overcoming of its object, they are the duty of the company except in the cases when the third parties knew or should have known the overcoming of the object or when the acts of the same are concluded by exceeding the limits of the powers of the respective bodies.

This study has as object the incidental regulations in the matter of illegal border crossings and of asylum, as well as how they intersect, and it intends to find an adequate solution for what happens with the criminal prosecution, in the cases of fraudulent crossings of the state border, in the course of solving the application for being granted a form of protection submitted by the person who has illegally crossed the border. It is proposed the intervention of the legislator in the sense of introducing a rule which provides as cause of suspension of the criminal prosecution the situation where the person wanted for the fraudulent crossing of the state border has subsequently submitted an application for being granted a form of protection and is subject to the asylum procedure. The need for such intervention is motivated by the ineffectiveness of continuing the criminal prosecution and of the settlement of the case provided that, at the end of the asylum procedure, the person concerned can be granted a form of protection from among those recognized by the Law No 122/2006, the cause of non-punishment provided in Article 11 of this law being thus incidental.

In the situation that a person has been sanctioned by an administrative authority for committing a contravention, this person can no longer be subsequently prosecuted for the same deed contemplated in its materiality, whereas, in this situation it is applicable the ne bis in idem principle which determines, from the perspective of the criminal procedural law, the incidence of the case provided by Article 16 (1) i) of the Criminal Procedure Code, with reference to the authority of res judicata, which prevents the exercise of the criminal action against that person.

The study shows that Article 291 of the Criminal Procedure Code, with the marginal name „Referrals made by persons in management positions and by other persons”, provides a sui generis way of referral to the criminal prosecution bodies, separately from the complaint, denunciation and ex officio referral. It is appreciated that the text establishes an obligation to refer the matter to the criminal prosecution body, particularised by subject and object. The subject of this obligation is, among others, any person who exercises a service of public interest for which he has been entrusted by the public authorities. This description corresponds to the notion of civil servant, within the meaning of Article 175 (2) of the Criminal Code. The judge pertains to this category, by the fact that he exercises a service of public interest and by the fact that he has been entrusted by the public authorities to exercise it. Consequently, it is shown that subject of the obligation to refer the matter to the criminal prosecution body is an offence about the commission of which the judge has become aware in the exercise of his duties. The article also notes that Article 346 (7) of the Criminal Procedure Code is mandatory for the preliminary chamber judge, but the extent of this obligation is limited by the need to comply with Article 354 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code. Thus: as a rule, the preliminary chamber judge who ordered the commencement of the trial has the obligation to join the composition of the judicial panel that exercises the judicial function; by way of exception, if the preliminary chamber judge that has ordered the commencement of the trial is prevented by an objective cause from joining the composition of the judicial panel, he may be replaced with another judge. The sanction of the violation of Article 346 (7) of the Criminal Procedure Code is the absolute nullity arising from the non-observance of the rules regarding the composition of the judicial panel. It is appreciated that absolute nullity is incidental, since Article 346 (7) of the Criminal Procedure Code is violated, in two hypotheses: the preliminary chamber judge who has ordered the commencement of the trial is not also the judge who exercises the judicial function, and this is not caused by any impediment; the preliminary chamber judge who ordered the commencement of the trial is not also the judge who exercises the judicial function, and this is caused by a non-objective impediment.

The article proposes a discussion about the institution of the putative deed. Considering the fact that this institution does not know an explicit legal regulation, it gave rise to heated discussions in the specialized legal literature, which had not only a theoretical importance, but also a great practical importance. In the beginning of the presentation it is shown what is the correct name of this institution of criminal law, from the author’s perspective, arguing at the same time the opinion to which he understands to rally. It is shown that the putative deed corresponds to an inverse error either of law or of fact. Given that, in a first hypothesis, the author considers that the deed committed is incriminated by a rule of criminal nature, although in reality such an activity is not incriminated or, in another hypothesis, although the author’s deed is incriminated by the criminal law, the actual manner of committing the deed does not fall within the respective legal text. Similarly, it is also presented perhaps the most heated discussion in the legal literature, namely the one in which the author executes certain acts of execution with the intention of killing a person, not knowing that he had died prior to the moment of beginning the activity. It is shown that, given the legal reality in our country, at this time, the perpetrator has to be held liable for committing a putative deed, not an attempt, whether a punishable or non-punishable attempt is discussed. At the same time, it is stated that the judicial practice has retained the commission of a putative deed, and not of an offence, in the hypothesis that it is required a qualified active subject for committing a certain offence and the person who committed the deed did not act in this capacity. In the author’s opinion, in such a hypothesis, it will not be retained the commission of any offence, but only the commission of a putative deed, only in the situation that the deed committed does not represent another offence. At the end of the article conclusions are drawn, also showing how the legislator could intervene in order to put an end to the discussions arisen in the legal literature and, at the same time, in order to enable possibly the sanctioning of the persons who commit putative deeds which pose a high social danger.

In this article, the author advocates the necessity to adopt a special law on the liability of magistrates for committing the judicial errors through bad faith or due to their own negligence. The beginning of reforming the political system set in motion in December 1989 has generated also the change of the judicial system as a whole and, at the same time with it, of the relations between the state and the citizen, according to the principles of the constitutional democracy. As the new government system places at its foundation the individual-citizen, it was natural for the state to assume a direct liability for the violation by its judicial agents of the legitimate rights and interests of the citizens. In this framework, it was built a system of corrections for judicial errors, extended to the effective legal liability of the judges and of the public prosecutors who, in bad faith or gross negligence, have violated the processual rights of the parties in the trial, have convicted them unjustly, or have subjected them without any grounds to some repressive procedures. This system of moral and material corrections does not work, the provisions in the matter, included in the processual legislation, are not sufficient for the citizen to gain full confidence in the act of justice. A special law is necessary not only to ensure the corrections of the judicial errors, but also to exemplarily sanction the guilty parties for violating the law.

Stipulation for another and direct actions are two topical legal mechanisms that, although in theory are clearly explained, the judicial practice is hesitant in their application. At the same time, due to the multitude of similarities regarding the effects of these legal mechanisms, a confusion has been created in numerous situations both in terms of their legal meaning and their applicability. As such, a comparative study of the two legal notions contributes and facilitates the substantiation in law of the stipulation for another and of the direct actions, but also the way of application in the judicial practice. In the present study we mainly focused on presenting the origins of the stipulation for another, but also on its application over time, so far, concluding with a comparison with the direct actions, regarding the main effects of the two legal mechanisms. We hope that the judicial practice will outline in time a more effective differentiation of the two notions with a wide spread in the fields of law.

The ordinary courts have the general competence to protect the rights and freedoms of individuals, whether provided or not in the international treaties or in the Constitution of Romania. The Constitutional Court’s claim to be the only one to exercise constitutional justice powers is based on a faulty interpretation of its own competence, which is constitutionally determined as being to ensure the supremacy of the Constitution, and on reducing the constitutional contentious to the contentious of rules. A correct interpretation of the constitutional provisions and the fructification of the Romanian tradition in the matter of constitutional justice demonstrate that the ordinary courts are competent to apply the Constitution in order to protect the rights and freedoms of individuals, therefore to exercise constitutional justice powers, because this is not reduced to the control of the constitutionality of the laws.

This study focuses on the legal issues involved by the provisions of Articles 125 (3) and 132 (2) of the Constitution (according to which the office of judge or public prosecutor shall be incompatible with any other public or private office, except for the didactic offices in the higher education institutions) in correlation with the provisions of Article 41 (1) of the Constitution (according to which the right to work shall not be restricted, and everyone has a free choice of his/her profession, trade or occupation, as well as work place). Currently, the relevant administrative practice and case law interpret and apply extensively (lato sensu) Articles 125 (3) and 132 (2). Such approach leads to the presumption that any other activity performed by judges or public prosecutors is forbidden (otherwise triggering disciplinary liability thereof) unless that other activity is not related to didactic offices in higher education or is not assimilated to such offices by special law (or, as it happens most often, by a decision issued by the Plenum of the Superior Council of Magistracy). This study demonstrates that, on the contrary, the aforementioned constitutional provisions establish a presumption according to which the judges and public prosecutors can lawfully perform not only the activities which consist in „didactic offices in higher education”, but also any other activity which is not an „office” and in relation to which there is no „conflict of interest” in the light of the relevant legal provisions. In order to reach this conclusion, the constitutional and legal provisions on the concept of holding multiple „offices” must cease to be interpreted extensively (lato sensu), as it is made currently by the administrative practice and the case law, but restrictively (stricto sensu) – as those constitutional provisions constitute an exception from the constitutional principle of the free right to work, establishing a restriction of this fundamental right exercise. The legal provisions laid down in this field can be qualified as consistent with the Constitution only if their normative content does not produce an extensive application of the constitutional provisions concerning the holding of multiple „offices”. Thus, by the words „other public or private office” (with which the office of judge or public prosecutor is prohibited to be held simultaneously) one has to understand exclusively a public or private activity performed regularly and in an organized manner within an institution (organization) against a remuneration.

The purpose of imposing the criminal processual sanctions is to respect the principle of legality that governs the criminal trial. The principle of legality, established in Article 2 of the Criminal Procedure Code, is the fundamental principle of the criminal trial according to which the conduct of the entire criminal trial, namely in all its phases (criminal prosecution, preliminary chamber, judgment, enforcement phase), takes place strictly according to the provisions stipulated by the law. The effects of this principle are materialized in a series of processual guarantees, one of the most powerful guarantees of the fulfilment of the processual and procedural acts according to the legal rules being precisely the processual sanctions. The problems which arise in the practice in connection with the application and interpretation of the regulations incidental in the matter of criminal processual sanctions have led us to proceed to the elaboration of this study.

This article proposes a solution to identify the initial moment of the period of prescription of the criminal liability in case of the offence of deception, in the particular situation where the material element is separated in time from the immediate follow-up. In order to resolve this matter of law it is necessary to establish the legal nature of the offence of deception, from the point of view of the offence unity. If a progressive offence is in question, the form of legal unity being part of the category of offences with duration of consummation in time, the period of prescription of the criminal liability begins to run from the date of committing the action or inaction.

The present study aims to analyze the autonomy of will regarding the civil legal act, by reference to the limitations that the legal norms, public order or good morals set both in terms of substance and formally. The legal will, a complex psychological phenomenon which is the basis of the conclusion of any legal act, is governed by two basic principles, namely the principle of real will and the principle of freedom or autonomy of will. The principle of real will, enshrined in Romanian law, gives valency to the internal/psychological element to which the party is animated at the conclusion of the civil legal act. As for the principle of autonomy of will, it finds its legal consecration in Article 1169 of the Civil Code, establishing the parties’ freedom to conclude any contracts and to establish their content. However, this freedom must not be viewed in absolute terms, knowing a series of limitations of substance and form, which we have pointed out in this article.

The oblique action is a means of preserving the claim that has been regulated both in the sense of the new Civil Code and in the sense of the old Civil Code. The new regulation, however, brings some improvements to clarify the conditions and effects of the oblique action. At the same time, the notion of general pledge of creditors is replaced by the notion of joint guarantee. As such, a study on the effects and conditions of the oblique action is extremely useful, especially as it is compared with the provisions of the new French Civil Code. Through this paper we have understood to deal with a very important and up-to-date subject as it is a means of protecting the claims at the disposal of any creditor. At the same time, the parallel with the direct actions comes to clarify the confusion that has been created many times in both doctrine and judicial practice between the two legal mechanisms.

The faulty interpretations of the normative system as a hierarchical system are due to analysing the matters of validity and of withdrawal of legality on the basis of the same methods of interpretation as when the matter of conformity is examined. If we clearly operate this distinction, using the pre-war case law, then the ordinary courts have competences in the matter of contentious of validity of rules and even some competences in the matter of contentious of conformity, despite the Constitutional Court’s claim to monopolize the constitutional contentious of rules. Likewise, they have competences in the matter of contentious of conformity of the infraconstitutional rules with the Constitution, which is questioned only due to the understanding of the normative hierarchy according to the French model, which is not applicable pursuant to the Constitution of Romania. Finally, I will prove that the ordinary courts have the competence to verify the agreement of the rules declared unconstitutional with the C.C.R decision.

The most important normative act, which regulates the matter of establishing, organizing and dissolving societies, is Law No 31/1990. According to Article 1 (1) of the Law No 31/1990, for the purpose of carrying out activities for profit, natural persons and legal persons may associate and form companies with legal personality, in compliance with the provisions of this law. Article 1 (2) of the same law provides that the companies referred to in paragraph (1) based in Romania are Romanian legal entities. Violations of legal norms regulating the establishment, organization, modification and cessation of the activities of societies can be manifested in various forms and may, as the case may be, imply criminal, civil, disciplinary, tax liability etc. Taking into account the fact that the companies have a special importance in the field of business, the Romanian legislature criminalizes certain facts of violation of the norms provided by the Law No 31/1990.