Fundamentally, all intentional crimes may be under continuous form, the forest offence being one of them. In practice, we come across various ways of committing forest offences, through a single action or multiple actions, which may meet, separately or conjunctively, elements of the crime of illegal cutting or theft of trees, but usually, when the criminal offence is committed in a longer period of time, twice or several times, without considering whether each single action meets the constitutive elements of the crime for which the defendant is prosecuted, Art. 41 para. 2 of the Criminal Code shall apply automatically. Authors’ analysis refers to the offence’s content unit, namely that the execution deeds of the same kind must submit each the content of the same offence. In legal practice it was decided that there is no requirement that the execution deeds should be identical, but each to cover the contents of the same offense, even if some of them correspond to the variant type and the other to the qualified one and, therefore, in the test case reviewed by the authors it was enough to evidence the existence of two or more trees cutting and stealing acts carried out at different intervals, each causing a damage which exceeds the threshold value for which the act stands for a crime and it was not required that for each of them, the damage caused and the value of timber, respectively, exceed at least 50 times the average price of a cubic meter of standing timber, on the offence’s finding date. Therefore, in order to determine the continuous nature of the act, it is required to administer evidence that should establish the volume of timber (for the offense of theft), and the amount of damage (for the cutting offence), for each action – execution deed, respectively its petty offence or criminal nature.

Law does obviously not benefit from the privilege of having its own exhaustive language. We might say that most concepts used in law are borrowed from other branches of knowledge. The quite rare concepts that are its own often do not receive a definition that can be classified, according to the methodology of the act of definition itself, as “legal”. The amalgamation of legal terminology with the economic, political, sociological or philosophical terminology, without revising the concepts and without their clear understanding in the areas of knowledge from where they come makes the doctrine and the case law too often flat and stereotyped, if not even chaotic from the conceptual point of view. Lawyers are no longer seen as persons of learning, who try to explain the nature of things through justice, but as simple technicians, who apply concepts taken from other social-human sciences. Under these conditions, one of the fundamental problems for lawyers is to explain a fact that seems to be overlooked by our current culture: what is meant by a legal concept? Afterward, it becomes equally important to understand the way in which the non-legal concepts used in law should be revised, namely what the standards of the legal definition of concepts are. The above-mentioned article attempts to answer to these challenges.

The author explains in detail the concept of “civil servant”, according to the interpretation of the provisions of art. 175 of the new Criminal Code adopted by Law no. 286/2009, attempting to reveal both the merits and the limitations of the interpretative rule examined contextually. The author examines each of the categories of persons falling, according to the lawmaker’s wish, under the notion of “civil servant”, which he accompanies with examples, at the same time mentioning numerous decisions of the courts of law keeping their validity in relation to the provisions of the new Criminal Code as well. In the end, following the analysis made, the author reaches certain conclusions and formulates some de lege ferenda proposals aimed at improving the text examined.

The author, without claiming to exhaust the subject, drew up this study in the attempt to start a theoretical discussion, but with practical implications as well, regarding the real concurrence of offences between the aggravated thefts committed under the circumstances provided by art. 209, parag. 1, letter i) of the Criminal Code, namely by breaking, escalade or use without right of a real or false key and the trespassing provided by art. 192 of the Criminal Code.

In this study, the author makes a relatively exhaustive analysis of the provisions of Articles 1221 to 1224 of the new Romanian Civil Code (Law no. 287/2009, republished on July 15, 2011 and effective since October 1st 2011) stressing the differences - substantive - between regulations on damage (as vice of consent) in the present Civil Code and in the previous Civil Code (of 1864).

This study examines the issue of the joint security of creditors over the debtor’s patrimony in the light of art. 2324 of the current Romanian Civil Code (Law no. 287/2009, republished on July 15th 2011 and entered into force as at October 1st 2011), with a special regard concerning the mentioned issue in case of establishment of patrimonies of affectation over the joint security of creditors.

According to the monist conception regarding the private law, the current Civil Code (Law no. 287/2009) inserted in the scope of its regulation the trade, including bank agreements – the current bank account, the bank deposit, the credit facility, the rental of safety deposit box for valuables. The specificity of the scope, mainly, „the publicity” and the reiterative nature of banking operations, left the essential, not only the technical aspects, within the scope of special regulations – prevalent, numerous and difficult to be codified. This study reveals the items set up by the current Civil Code regarding the typically bank agreements, the more so as no substantial right of them has existed until the adoption of this legislative instrument.

The rule included in art. 41 paragraph 3 of the Criminal Code adopted in 1968 defines the concept of complex offence in a way which does not exclude any critique. Among the numerous critiques submitted for this definition, the legislator of the new Criminal Code adopted by Law no. 286/2009 assumed a single critique regarding the inaccuracy of using the phrase „aggravating circumstance” that it replaced by the phrase „aggravating incidental element”. However, in the author’s opinion, the most important critique of the definition consists in the fact that concepts such as “action or inaction” are used in order to describe the absorbed offence, referring only to the objective side.

The author performs a thorough analysis of the legal content regarding the crime of fraud, provided at art. 244 of the new Criminal Code, with frequent references to the domestic judicial practice and compared with the new criminal dispositions. With respect to the normative proceedings set forth at par. 3, 4 and 5 of art. 215 of the Criminal Code adopted on 1968, abolished by the new regulation, the author believes they have not been abrogated and they shall be found as factual methods in the legal content of the crime of fraud, provided at art. 244 of the new Criminal Code, as long as the other incrimination requirements therein indicated will be accomplished. However, the author expresses some reserves regarding removal of the circumstance from the fraud ks aggravated content, when it generates highly serious consequences, as well as regarding the oversized reduction of the special limits for the penalty provided for this serious crime. Furthermore, the object of criminal protection, the crime ks subjects, the objective and subjective aspect, the forms, methods, sanctions and some procedural aspects regarding the felony set forth at art. 244 of the new Criminal Code are examined. Moreover, the author does not hesitate to express his point of view regarding the constitutional content of this criminal felony and to suggest some solutions and own opinions.

The engagement – although traditionally used in social life k did not have any legal regulation in the modern Romanian legislation, prior to the enforcement of the new Civil Code (October 1st 2011), namely: the Civil Code of 1864 and next, the Family Code. Instead, the new Civil Code (Law no. 287/2009, republished on July 15th 2011) regulates engagement in art. 266-270. The authors of this study analyze the aforementioned enactment of engagement, concluding that the express regulation of this private law institution in the new Civil Code is beneficial.

The author analyzes the legal status of undue payment, regarded as a source of civil obligations, such as they results in the texts of the new Civil Code. It has been specified since the beginning of the study that in general no essential amendments were reported in relation to the definition and existence conditions of this legal deed. However, it is noted as a novelty that the rules of undue payment in the new legislative environment apply also when the payment consists of the provision of services or execution of works. Likewise, the new Civil Code, unlike the old regulation, does not set forth anymore expressly the condition that the payment be made in error by solvents; however, the author argues, with convincing arguments, that the error of solvens is usually an actually relative prerequisite of the undue payment. A large space is given to the obligation to reimburse the undue payment and the rules applicable to it regarding the existence, the limits and its manner of execution. Most of these rules are located in a separate title of the Civil Code (Art. 1635 to 1649) and apply, with some exceptions, to all reimbursement obligations, regardless of their source. The author notes that, in their content, these rules contain many new elements compared to the old Civil Code, which tries and manages to examine carefully, formulating relevant solutions and answers.

In a study published in the “Dreptul” Magazine no. 3/2013, p. 108-115, an author criticized the regulation stated in Art. 519-521 of the new Code of Civil Procedure (entered into force on 15 February 2013) regarding the seizing of the High Court of Cassation and Justice for passing a preliminary ruling for clarifying certain law-related issues, which is why he proposed the repeal of these texts. In response, in this study, the author considers that the regulation in question is useful and therefore should not be repealed.

Considering the importance that information technology has acquired in recent years and how it has come to influence the criminal policy at the international level, the author of this study founds it necessary to analyse the subject matter of the offence taking into account this new technological context. Thus, it has been attempted to highlight the need for a reconceptualization of the offence’s subject matter, emphasizing the idea according to which intangible elements may be part of its structure. In support of this thesis, there was reviewed the problem of theft of virtual goods and of certain cybercrimes that reveal the existence of an intangible subject matter which is likely to be interposed between the agent’s behaviour and the social value protected by the rule of incrimination. Last but not least, the author has pointed out a possible consequence of the reconceptualization of the subject matter of the offence, referring thus to the applicability of the supporting cause of self-defence.

The choice made by the Romanian pouvoir constituant in 1991 in favour of the European model of constitutional review does not seem to have been followed by legal terminology. Most probably in order not to break with a tradition that still enjoys good reputation among legal scholars and practitioners, the label of „exception of unconstitutionality” has been preferred to the one of „preliminary reference”. This apparently minor semantic detail managed to have a lasting impact on the admissibility of this procedure to the point where the very legal institution has been completely transfigured: from a preliminary question it has become a defensive procedural tool.

Under art. 164 to 177 of the Civil Code the legislator regulates “the protection of the judicial prohibited” and “the placing under judicial interdiction procedure” under art. 935 to 940 of the Code of Civil Procedure; these texts essentially take over the old regulation provisions and also establish some updates, including that of determining jurisdiction in the matter in favor of the court guardianship, court which also takes over the guardianship authority duties. This study aims to explore and explain the legal rules above.

According to art. 147. (4) of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court rulings are generally binding. Therefore, the public authorities, including courts, regardless of their level, must observe the Constitutional Court rulings both in terms of the operative part and recitals thereof. Although they do not constitute a source of law, the High Court of Cassation and Justice judgments rendered after settlement of an appeal in the interest of law, require the courts a particular solution to a law issue, therefore an interpretation of legal rules. When performing the interpretation and application of law, a contingent conventionality control also occurs; such control is carrying out by this Court whilst assuming that the courts’ divergent practice is given by the different application of the (European) Convention on human rights and fundamental freedoms provisions. Not infrequently, the High Court of Cassation and Justice’s jurisprudence on the matters submitted to trial did not coincide with that of the Constitutional Court, and this study aims to point out and analyze such cases. The proposed solution takes into account a possible constitutionality review of the previously reported judgments of the High Court of Cassation and Justice; such control has already been carried out indirectly in certain rulings of the Constitutional Court.