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  • JUS AD REM

    15.00lei
    Foarte mulți autori moderni întrebuințează în lucrările lor expresia jus ad rem pentru a desemna dreptul de creanță, opunându-l astfel dreptului real jus in re. Această expresie a avut o influență considerabilă în evoluarea instituțiilor juridice. Scopul nostru este de a examina aici cum au fost aduși autorii să numească dreptul de creanță jus ad rem, precum și cele două mai importante consecințe ale acestui fel de a concepe natura dreptului de creanță: dispariția obligației chirographare și transformarea efectelor vânzărei.
  • The attributions that confer substance to the activity of the prosecutor before the jurisdictional body are the participation in the trial of the criminal and civil cases, the exercise of the means of appeal against the judgments, the examination of the cases of non-uniform application of the law and the analysis of the cases in which the courts have delivered final judgments of acquittal, return or referral to the prosecutor. In criminal matters, the prosecutor mandatorily participates in the trial, under the sanction of absolute nullity, in the cases where the law expressly provides for his participation, and optionally, in cases other than those in which the law establishes the obligativity of participation. In civil matters, the rule is that the prosecutor takes part in the trial optionally, when he considers it necessary to defend the rule of law, the rights and interests of citizens. By way of exception, the prosecutor mandatorily participates in the trial of the civil cases when the obligativity is expressly provided. In criminal matters, the law opens for the prosecutor the path to exercise all means of appeal, ordinary (appeal, contestation) or extraordinary (recourse in cassation, contestation for annulment, revision), against various judgments. In civil matters, the prosecutor may exercise the means of appeal when he deems it is necessary to protect the rights and legitimate interests of minors, of the persons placed under interdiction and of the missing persons, or when he has participated in the trial of the case.
  • In this study we wish to discuss and find a solution to the many aspects specific to the measures with equivalent effect to the quantitative restrictions, but also to follow up the influences on the policy of protection of similar domestic products within the European Union. We will analyze in detail the free movement of goods, as well as aspects concerning the customs duties and the modality to impose them. We will define the notion of measures with equivalent effect to the quantitative restrictions and we will also subject to research the modalities in which they arise. For the elaboration of this study, we will take into account the domestic law in the matter, the provisions of the international conventions on the free movement of goods, the provisions in the matter of the European law, the legislation and the case law of different states, and we will also raise for discussion the Dassonville and Keck decisions which are of a particular importance in the MEERC matter.
  • Typical as they could be for the continental legal system and bearing common landmarks recommended by the Council of Europe and European Union, France, Italy and Spain are the three examples of states best suited to illustrate the European vision on the civil liability of judges and prosecutors for the damages caused by the exercise of their legal powers in deciding upon acts and measures taken in the framework of litigation, including the final decision on the case. The analysis of these examples represents the continuation of a former study published in the same legal journal on the matter, but viewed through the lenses of the US Supreme Court of Justice and laws. Based on the Council of Europe Charter on the Statute for Judges and Recommendation on the judge’s independence, efficiency and responsibilities, guided by the case law of the EU Court of Justice and ECHR, the law and legal practices on civil liability of judges and prosecutors find their expression in slightly different manners in France, Italy and Spain, but all of them respect the paramount principle of the indirect liability which could be enacted only based on the state’s direct liability. There are some national differences but nevertheless they don’t represent deviations from the common European approach. The present study searches for all different and common views of the three states on the subject, emphasizing on the main principles that should guide the continental legal system’s states on that respect.
  • The independency or autonomy of public servants in construing and applying the law is warranted by the Constitution or by law. By virtue of the independency or autonomy, public servants construe and apply the law according to the own beliefs, being entitled to reject any interference from authorities or persons. Errors of public servants in the process of construing and applying the law can result in their non-criminal legal liability, if the conditions of such legal liability are fulfilled, as the case may be, civil tort or contract, disciplinary, material, taxation or contravention liability, in no case criminal liability for the offence of abuse of office provided by Article 297 (1) of the Criminal law.
  • In essence, the expropriation procedure goes through two stages, the administrative stage and the judicial stage, the common law in the matter being represented by the Law No 33/1994, as amended and supplemented. The litigation procedure is criticizable however, in many aspects, for the lack of transparency and of access to data, from the perspective of the holder of the restricted real right. Thus, although in the preamble of this normative act it is affirmed the necessity of equalizing the right of private ownership with the public interest, the latter has priority in many of the situations that have arisen in practice.
  • One of the forms under which it is presented the right of joint ownership on forced quota-shares is represented, in the conception of the legislator that has created the current Civil Code, also by the periodic ownership. Placing this form of joint ownership within the joint ownership on forced quota-shares is the creation of the legislator, but it is not sheltered from criticism. Among the issues raised by the regulation of the periodic ownership in Articles 687–691 of the Civil Code is also the obligation of compensation and the exclusion, legal provisions upon which the authors of this study have insisted. The provisions of Article 691 of the Civil Code are criticizable both in the way they are formulated and in respect of the effects that the legislator has pursued.
  • The issue of the correct determination of the moment when it begins to run the time limit for declaring the contestation for the prosecutor against the interlocutory judgments by which the judge orders the rejection of the proposal of preventive arrest or of house arrest, the revocation of the preventive measure or the replacement of the preventive measure with a slighter measure has a particular importance given that it will also mark the moment when this processual right of the prosecutor will cease, under the terms of Article 268 of the Criminal Procedure Code. As we will show in the arguments offered in our paper, the criminal processual provisions do not provide for a distinction as to the moment when the time limit for declaring the contestation begins to run as the prosecutor or the processual subjects were present or absent when the judgment was pronounced, but provide expressis verbis such a distinction between the prosecutor and the processual subjects in this respect, the only rigorously correct interpretation is the one showing that, always in the matter of preventive measures, the time limit for declaring the contestation begins to run from the pronouncement of the judgment in relation to the prosecutor, whether or not he was present at the time of pronouncement.
  • The question of law to which the present paper intends to provide an answer concerns the processual remedy whereby it is intended to put an end to the effects of a precautionary measure taken by the prosecutor in the course of the criminal prosecution, in the particular assumption that, in the course of enforcement of the criminal judgment, the prejudice caused by committing the offence is recovered otherwise than by the realisation of assets subject to that measure. From the legal regulation of the matter of precautionary measures in the criminal trial it follows that there are three processual remedies whereby it is intended to put an end to the effects of a precautionary measure, in general: the contestation against the act of taking the precautionary measure, the contestation against the manner of carrying out the precautionary measure, the application for lifting the precautionary measure. Among these, the application for lifting the precautionary measure is the processual remedy specific for the assumption which we are analysing. The former defendant must file an application having as object to lift the precautionary measure, legally grounded on Article 957 (1) of the Civil Procedure Code. It will be addressed to the civil court and will be solved according to the procedure provided by the legislative text to which we referred. The civil court is the one that will verify the fulfilment of the condition that the debtor (the former defendant) gives an satisfactory guarantee.
  • The rule of issuing urban planning permits (building or demolition permits) under the reserve of respecting the civil rights of third parties has two important consequences. First, it makes it clear that this sort of administrative permit does not affect the rights of the third parties; second, it means that the subsequent civil right is not taken into consideration in the management of the file and the issuing of the permits. The said permits solely assure the respect of urban planning law, excluding private law obligations and servitudes.
  • The idea of this study has been suggested to us by the phrase the subjective right to contract, used in the name and the content of an article relatively recently published in „Dreptul” magazine. Wishing to find out how it was motivated from a logical-legal viewpoint and what such a subjective right involves, we read the article but, to our surprise, we have noticed the lack of any action in this respect. The aspects that have drawn our attention have become reasons why we have decided to try to substantiate some logical-legal solutions regarding some legal notions or phrases, in relation to which the author of the article refrained from arguing her own options, such as the subjective right, the subjective right to contract and the good faith in relation to bad faith.
  • In the absence of technical basis, the two criticized normative acts, through the refusal of the legislature to consider the reactions of all actors involved and relevant institutions, the legislature has transformed the principles of law and rules of law into abstract and worthless rules that can be violated at any time. The intervention of the Constitutional Court through its two decisions (Decision No 623/2016 and Decision No 62/2017) restored legal order, which was seriously violated by these acts.
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