Prin Rechizitoriul din data de 18 octombrie 2013, procurorul din cadrul Parchetului de pe lângă Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție – Secția de Combatere a Infracțiunilor Conexe Infracțiunilor de Corupție a dispus trimiterea în judecată a inculpaților: M.J. pentru săvârșirea infracțiunii prevăzute și pedepsite de art. 132 din Legea nr. 78/2000 raportat la art. 248 C.pen. 1969, P.C. pentru complicitate la săvârșirea infracțiunii prevăzute și pedepsite de art. 132 din Legea nr. 78/2000 raportat la art. 248 C.pen. 1969 și Z.P. pentru complicitate la săvârșirea infracțiunii prevăzute și pedepsite de art. 132 din Legea nr. 78/2000 raportat la art. 248 C.pen. 1969.

This study aims to present the main amendments that were brought to the Labour Code in France by the Law No 1088/2016. The emphasizing of these amendments seems to be a relevant one, given the many similarities between the French and Romanian labour legislation and also the fact that even France, which had a traditional labour legislation, has amended it for the purpose of rendering more flexible labour relations. In order to emphasize the amendments brought, the study contains a few comparative references also with regard to the regulation existing until the adoption of this normative act. As a fundamental guideline, the rights of employers are increased, but there are also regulations favourable to the employees. A change of vision is noticed with regard to the roles of the sources of labour law, for the purpose of bringing to the foreground the collective bargaining at the level of unit, to the detriment of the legal norms and of the conventional norms at level of branch of activity.

The objective of this short study is to answer a question: is there today a „contraventional law”, as a result of the fragmentation of the administrative law? Assuming the answer is affirmative, we must establish whether the contraventional law itself faces today a process of fragmentation, i.e. if we can talk, for example, about a road contraventional law, a contraventional law of competition, a fiscal contraventional law, etc.

Separately from the assumption that the public authority has issued with a delay the answer to the application of the person concerned, in the administrative practice there is a situation which, due to its frequency, is likely to become a real phenomenon of the silence of the administration. It concerns the inaction of the administration that, separately from the classic situation represented by the passivity to answer to the applications of individuals, lies in its omission to act in the exercise of its legal competence or of the competence imposed by the administration itself, in this latter situation discussed a genuine „ex officio” inaction/silence, which in other countries not only is recognized, but it even benefits from a separate regulatory framework. Or, this assumption of the administration’s omission to act in order to carry out its legal competences or those established „ex officio” does not benefit in the Romanian law by a normative framework that would allow it to be challenged in the administrative disputes court, which determined us to also make a de lege ferenda proposal appeared from the undertaken analysis.

Websites are part of our everyday lives, giving us access to information in all areas, old or new, short or complex, original or processed, but few people who are accessing websites know that the latter also have a „memory”: they are able to remember exactly who has accessed them, from what location they have been accessed and which were the preferences of the author. This memorization manifests itself by cookies – small size files that are stored on a user’s computer at the time when the latter uses the Internet network. They are created when the browser on the user’s computer loads a particular website. The user’s computer system accumulates a multitude of personal data as cookies, whose tasks are to identify the user’s person for an easier interaction with a website, this leading of a state of insecurity, invasion, violation of his own world – ultimately of the private life.

The archaeological sites – material forms of our past – are a finite and non-renewable resource of knowledge of our history, in a constant state of vulnerability to external factors that can lead to their irretrievable loss. Among these factors, the most destructive one that can be distinguished is the phenomenon of archaeological poaching as a source of supply to the national and international art markets. The illegal trafficking of cultural goods, often also involving activities of laundering of money or even of terrorism, is a widespread phenomenon worldwide. In order to fight it, the real protection offered to archaeological sites and museums, as well as ensuring the effectiveness of the instruments of international cooperation are the most effective means for defending the national cultural heritage.

This study deals with aspects related to the procedure of recourse in cassation, which involves two stages: the admissibility in principle, which plays the role of a filter of recourses in cassation, and the examination of the recourse in cassation after the admission in principle. There are presented the effects of the recourse and the solutions that can be given for its settlement, underlining their lack of correlation with the cases of recourse in cassation, where appropriate, in the light of the decisions of the High Court of Cassation and Justice. Likewise, the decisions of the Constitutional Court and the legislative amendments operated so far concerning the trial procedure of the recourse in cassation will be considered.

The matter of personal data was subjected to review, in order to adapt the dynamics of the new technologies to the imperatives for protecting personal life. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and Directive (EU) 2016/680 have as their object the personal data processing operations and reflect the process of adaptation to the new national and cross-border realities, and also reflect the harmonization of the numerous proposals formulated, particularly by companies and by the representatives of the civil society. The analysis concerns the new Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and is divided as follows: the first part delineates the relevant provisions of the personal data, identifies the right to privacy and the right to the protection of personal data, as fundamental rights of individuals, outlines the scope of the Regulation, details the terminology aspects and exposes the personal data processing principles; the second part addresses the rights of the persons concerned and the obligations of professionals in handling the personal data, the international data transfer, control authorities and procedures envisaged in the interstate cooperation.

The Regulation (EU) 2016/679 provides a special protection regime for the sensitive data, given the nature of the information and the high risk of processing it in relation to the rights and freedoms of individuals. The regulation of the rights of the persons concerned is considerably improved, and the set of obligations incumbent for those responsible is strengthened. The international transfer of personal data knows several methods, depending on the existence of the decision concerning the adequate protection level or the presence of the appropriate guarantees. Among the novelty elements we can find the creation (at national level) of a unique contact point and the establishment of the European Committee for data protection (body of the Union, with legal personality).

In the absence of technical basis, the two criticized normative acts, through the refusal of the legislature to consider the reactions of all actors involved and relevant institutions, the legislature has transformed the principles of law and rules of law into abstract and worthless rules that can be violated at any time. The intervention of the Constitutional Court through its two decisions (Decision No 623/2016 and Decision No 62/2017) restored legal order, which was seriously violated by these acts.

The question of law to which the present paper intends to provide an answer concerns the processual remedy whereby it is intended to put an end to the effects of a precautionary measure taken by the prosecutor in the course of the criminal prosecution, in the particular assumption that, in the course of enforcement of the criminal judgment, the prejudice caused by committing the offence is recovered otherwise than by the realisation of assets subject to that measure. From the legal regulation of the matter of precautionary measures in the criminal trial it follows that there are three processual remedies whereby it is intended to put an end to the effects of a precautionary measure, in general: the contestation against the act of taking the precautionary measure, the contestation against the manner of carrying out the precautionary measure, the application for lifting the precautionary measure. Among these, the application for lifting the precautionary measure is the processual remedy specific for the assumption which we are analysing. The former defendant must file an application having as object to lift the precautionary measure, legally grounded on Article 957 (1) of the Civil Procedure Code. It will be addressed to the civil court and will be solved according to the procedure provided by the legislative text to which we referred. The civil court is the one that will verify the fulfilment of the condition that the debtor (the former defendant) gives an satisfactory guarantee.

The issue of the correct determination of the moment when it begins to run the time limit for declaring the contestation for the prosecutor against the interlocutory judgments by which the judge orders the rejection of the proposal of preventive arrest or of house arrest, the revocation of the preventive measure or the replacement of the preventive measure with a slighter measure has a particular importance given that it will also mark the moment when this processual right of the prosecutor will cease, under the terms of Article 268 of the Criminal Procedure Code. As we will show in the arguments offered in our paper, the criminal processual provisions do not provide for a distinction as to the moment when the time limit for declaring the contestation begins to run as the prosecutor or the processual subjects were present or absent when the judgment was pronounced, but provide expressis verbis such a distinction between the prosecutor and the processual subjects in this respect, the only rigorously correct interpretation is the one showing that, always in the matter of preventive measures, the time limit for declaring the contestation begins to run from the pronouncement of the judgment in relation to the prosecutor, whether or not he was present at the time of pronouncement.