The author of the study critically refers to the contradictory opinions expressed in the doctrine with regard to the scope of companies covered by Article 1931 of the new Civil Code, a text which regulates the tacit extension of the duration of the company contract. Noting that, according to an opinion, the text is applicable not only to the simple company, but also to all companies with legal personality regulated by the Law No 31/1990 on companies, and, according to another opinion, it is applicable only to the simple company, the author advocates and argues his own opinion. According to the author’s opinion, the tacit extension of the duration of the company may occur in case of simple company (without legal personality), regulated by the new Civil Code, but also in cases of stock company and company limited by shares (companies with legal personality), regulated by the Law No 31/1990 (a special law in relation to the new Civil Code). On the contrary, the author considers that the text of Article 1931 of the new Civil Code is incompatible with the legal regime of the general partnership, of the company limited by shares and of the limited liability company (companies with legal personality regulated by the same special law), because, otherwise, the legal rule by which it is recognized to the personal creditors of the associates in these companies the right to opposition to the extension of the duration of the legal person would be eluded.

The scientific approach of the authors starts from the fact that, when it comes to concepts such as, for example, resilience or victimology, which can not be understood or applied without a multidisciplinary, interdisciplinary or even transdisciplinary approach (see the conclusion which the authors have reached with regard to the possibility of appearance of a new discipline, namely legal resilience), the competences of the legal science specialists, in general, and of those in the field of criminal law, in particular, together with the competences of the specialists in psychology, psychiatry, and others, are extremely important. The authors place the above-mentioned concepts on the law – psychology – psychiatry interface and they analyze them from the perspective of the criminal justice and of the relationship between the persons involved, respectively the victims of crimes (minors and adults to the same extent), with society, but also with the aggressor, both before committing the criminal act and thereafter. Moreover, with respect to resilience and victimology, after it is pointed out that they do not have unique definitions, generally-accepted, there are also revealed the essential points on which those involved in the research of these matters have agreed upon, as well as the exchange of information and of procedures performed at the the boundary between resilience and victimology. At the same time, the criminal justice is not treated under a retributive aspect, but more from the point of view of a reparative, restorative justice, of the means by which it contributes to the mental health of the victims, of the populations that live in traumatized societies, to repairing the social trauma, to establishing the causes and the prevention of victimization, etc. At the same time, the authors also present the guarantees of the right to a fair trial granted to the victims of crimes, as well as some regulations intended to prevent victimization and to grant legal protection to the persons in precarious situations, such as: refugees, mentally ill, abandoned children and others.

The person entitled to succession is the person that has the freedom to choose between the acquiring of the title of heir, by accepting the succession, and the denial of such quality, by waiver. The two sides of the successoral option – acceptance of inheritance and waiver of inheritance – both in their sense of subjective rights and in the sense of legal acts must be appreciated and understood in correlation with other notions and institutions, in the first place of the law of succession, and also belonging to other matters of civil law. In this context, there are presented some aspects of regulating the successoral option, which have been interpreted otherwise by doctrine or which have the potential for controversy, among others, as a result of shortcomings in phrasing of some texts of the Civil Code or by failing to observe some relationships they have, as mentioned above, with other legal notions and institutions.

This study provides a detailed and systemic analysis of the provisions of Article 358 of the Civil Code referring to the partition of common assets jointly owned by the spouses during the community matrimonial regimes. More specifically, it is analysed the possibility to extend the provisions of Article 358 of the Civil Code also over the partition of per-shares common assets of spouses, as well as the applicability of the provisions of Articles 669–686 of the Civil Code within this partition. Likewise, there are distinguished the elements of continuity and those of novelty of the present regulation, referring to the partition of jointly owned common assets during the community matrimonial regimes, in relation to the regulation previously established by Article 36 (2) of the Family Code. Finally, there are expressed some critical opinions in connection with the provisions of Article 36 of the Law No 71/2011 implementing the Law No 287/2009 on the Civil Code referring to the application in time of the provisions of Article 358 of the Civil Code.

In the practice of the courts in our country the punishment imposed for the offence of unintentional killing is, in most cases, imprisonment with suspended execution, even in the situations where the guilt rests solely on the offender or when there are several victims, a fact which can call into question the manner in which the principles governing the individualization of punishments are implemented, whereas, by imposing excessively lenient punishments, in relation to the seriousness of the facts, the desideratum concerning the educational and preventive role thereof is not achieved.

The institution of appeal in the interest of law has the role of unitarily ensuring the interpretation and implementation of law by courts of law. The legal nature of this procedure is not determined only by the criminal and civil normative provisions governing it. This study argues that this institution is constitutional in nature because, under the Constitution, the High Court of Cassation and Justice has the power to ensure the unitary interpretation of law by the courts of law. There are analyzed the consequences of the constitutional nature of this institution, the limits of obligativity of the settlements of matters of law given by the High Court of Cassation and Justice by means of the decisions ruled in these proceedings, as well as the ratio between the decisions of the Constitutional Court and the decisions of the High Court of Cassation and Justice respectively, ruled for a solution on the appeals in the interest of law. Recent case-law of the Constitutional Court reveals new aspects regarding the possibility of verifying the constitutionality of decisions ruled on this matter.