This study intends to make a critical analysis of the solution enacted by Article 52 (2) of the Labour Code under three aspects: the holder of the obligation to pay damages, the content, their extent and the period for which they are owed. The solution prescribed by Article 52 (2) of the Labour Code is in conflict with other regulations of the same Code. In relation to the second sentence of Article 52 (1) b) of the Labour Code, the author considers that the holder of the payment obligation must be the Romanian State, for the reasons for which it is also liable in the situations regulated by Article 50 (1) g), Article 52 c1) and Article 61 b) of the Labour Code. The author’s opinion is that the damages are unreasonably limited. Provided that, de lege ferenda, reference would be made to the provisions of Article 540 of the Criminal Procedure Code, one can notice that this text does not cover the same limits and it would allow the compensation of the employee in relation to the real damages produced, both material and moral. As a protective measure, for the duration of the suspension motivated by the indictment for acts incompatible with the position held, the employee should have, ope legis, the quality of insured within the health social insurance system. The author also believes that it should be expressly regulated a period in which the employee must notify the employer both on the cause which can determine the suspension and the reason which requires its cessation.

The Government Emergency Ordinance No 111/2010 has established in Romania the grant of the leave for raising children (also called parental leave), with the payment of the related allowance. This normative act represents the transposition, in the Romanian legislation, of Directive 2010/18/EU of the Council of 8 March 2010, without, however, also properly supplementing the (Romanian) Labour Code (the Law No 53/2003). Given this situation and also taking into account the relevant creative case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the author makes an analysis of the regulations and of the practice in the field and, retaining some discrepancies, it comes to the conclusion that the provisions of the Emergency Government Ordinance No 111/2010 and of the Labour Code must be interpreted and applied in the light and in accordance with EU legislation and of the case-law of the Court in Luxembourg, the supplementation of the Labour Code being also required, so that the right of the employee to fully benefit by the rest leave, after taking the leave for raising children, be expressly provided in the Romanian legislation, a series of discussions and controversies being thus avoided.

The regulation (Article 225) of the new Criminal Procedure Code is not too different from the one (Article 1491 paragraphs 3–8 and Article 150) of the previous Criminal Procedure Code (1968). Instead, the new criminal processual law does no longer provide for the possibility to settle the proposal of preventive detention, in the absence of the defendant, when the defendant is abroad, as it was stipulated in the previous Criminal Procedure Code. The authors analyze the institution of settlement of the proposal of preventive detention, by presenting some critical issues and by proposing some improvements to the new regulation.

According to Article 172 (12) of the Criminal Procedure Code „After the finalisation of the fact-finding report, whenever the judicial body considers necessary the opinion of an expert or whenever the conclusions of the fact-finding report are contested, an expertise shall be ordered to be made.” This legal text is not correlated with the rest of the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code in force, nor with the other provisions of the previous codes, therefore, in the author’s opinion, this fact is likely to give rise to controversies. In a different line of ideas, the author argues that the legislator imposes as processual remedy that upon the finalization of the fact-finding report, in case its conclusions are only contested, to order an expertise to be conducted. This hypothesis is even more questionable as there is the possibility that the judicial body appreciates that the opinion of such an expert is not necessary. Thus, the legislator acts instead of the place of the judicial body in deciding on the admissibility of such means of evidence. Starting from such an inadvertence, in a given case, although the judicial body has concluded on the lack of utility and conclusiveness of an expertise, taking into account that one of the subjects to the trial, a defendant in this case, has contested the conclusions of some previous technical-scientific reports and even of an initial expertise report, both the prosecutor, during the phase of criminal prosecution, and the judge, during the phase of trial, had to admit, according to the text of the law, the contestation or the application of that subject to the trial respectively and thus to order an expertise to be conducted. The author believes that the mentioned text provision is also contrary to the contents of several normative acts that provide the independence of the judge and of the prosecutor in the activity of criminal investigation and in the phase of trial, as well as their exclusive competence to decide on the processual acts and measures, as the case is undergoing the phase of criminal prosecution, of preliminary chamber or of trial. Moreover, in support of the opinions which the author has expressed in this article, he also brings arguments of comparative law, showing that the analysis made has not identified legislations or points of view from other countries, convergent with the text of Article 172 (12) of the Criminal Procedure Code. In conclusion, for the reasons shown within this article, the author appreciates that it is required a reconsideration and reformulation of the text of Article 172 (12) of the Criminal Procedure Code from the legislator.

This article presents the provisions of the new Civil Procedure Code whose entry into force has been postponed again, by a recent normative act. These provisions refer to: the investigation of the trial, the preliminary procedure before the appeal and recourse court, the judgments which can not be challenged by recourse and the composition of the panel of judges for pronouncing a preliminary judgment by the Supreme Court. In a criticizable manner, in the author’s opinion, the legislator has prorogued the entry into force of these provisions, initially for 1 January 2016, and then for 1 January 2017. The conclusion of the study is that the legislator should have allocated material and human resources necessary in order to create all the conditions for a full entry into force of the new Civil Procedure Code from the beginning (15 February 2013), not a partial one, being required successively (for the texts not entered into force ab initio) two postponements (1 January 2016 and then 1 January 2017).

This study is devoted to some critical appreciations in connection with the use, in a relatively recent specialty paper, of some „practicist expressions” in order to designate the territorial jurisdiction of the court of first instance to settle the divorce applications („court of first instance having jurisdiction over the place of residence of the defendant”, „court of first instance having jurisdiction over the place of residence of the applicant” etc.). Likewise, our analysis also concerns the conclusions drawn within the same paper in connection with the concurrence between the territorial jurisdiction theses regulated by Article 3 (1) a) and those provided by letter b) of the Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000.