Law does obviously not benefit from the privilege of having its own exhaustive language. We might say that most concepts used in law are borrowed from other branches of knowledge. The quite rare concepts that are its own often do not receive a definition that can be classified, according to the methodology of the act of definition itself, as “legal”. The amalgamation of legal terminology with the economic, political, sociological or philosophical terminology, without revising the concepts and without their clear understanding in the areas of knowledge from where they come makes the doctrine and the case law too often flat and stereotyped, if not even chaotic from the conceptual point of view. Lawyers are no longer seen as persons of learning, who try to explain the nature of things through justice, but as simple technicians, who apply concepts taken from other social-human sciences. Under these conditions, one of the fundamental problems for lawyers is to explain a fact that seems to be overlooked by our current culture: what is meant by a legal concept? Afterward, it becomes equally important to understand the way in which the non-legal concepts used in law should be revised, namely what the standards of the legal definition of concepts are. The above-mentioned article attempts to answer to these challenges.

The principle of loyalty of evidence is a jurisprudential principle of the European Court of Human Rights. The author intended to provide an overall presentation of its evolution, both from the case law perspective and from the legislative point of view.

Through its varied meanings, “loyalty” is perhaps the noblest moral value. It is, in terms of law, a factor and a marker of legal relationships “moralization”, procedural relations including. Although unanimously accredited in the field legal relationships as well, including procedural relations, the loyalty principle is enshrined in terminis as a fundamental principle of civil proceedings. However, it is an implicit result of numerous provisions in the law of civil procedure, which finds appropriate forms of legal and judicial sanction. In our procedural civil regulatory climate, certain peremptory procedural exceptions having permanent effect make unnecessary the application of the praetorian “estoppel” rule established in common law and subsequently in other legal systems. Fundamental right of access to justice is not incompatible with assuming „duty of loyalty”.