The notion of „principle” has known three approaches throughout its history: ontological (philosophical), logical, and normative. Ontologically, it would mean the primary object of knowledge stemming from the intellectual act, by the procedure of induction, generalization (a form of reasoning), starting from the particular and ending with the general, from facts to concepts. In a logical sense, it is a general proposal induced from particular rules, being a source for deductive reasoning wherein the conclusion follows necessarily premises that are sources of orientation: ideas, facts, situations. Legal logic has a wide content, and it is considered that logical principles denote, on the one hand, a body of rules stemming from a methodic and reflected development, rules ordered systematically, and, on the other hand, the axioms that substantiate a rational structure. This is how principles are linked with the perpetual work of sensibly organizing the law (the activity of legislation). In a normative sense, the principle no longer describes the object or a form of logic, nor does it describe an axiom or a reason-based system of rules, but a legal norm/standard whereby an obligation is asserted, establishing a resource for the legal interpreter. Interpretative adages which relate, however, to formal rules of logical reasoning, may clash and lack any compelling force, being used by the judge in the development of his/her own policy. The role of the principles is to ensure the coherence and harmony of the legal system, since they are the expression of superior values embedded in the spirit of the law. Regarding the content and the extent of the principle of legal certainly, legal literature has identified three levels of approach: pre-judicial legal certainty; procedural legal certainty and post-judicial substantial legal certainty; all of them meet to ensure the „predictability of the law” so that the parties/the litigants have a feeling of certainty.

Typical as they could be for the continental legal system and bearing common landmarks recommended by the Council of Europe and European Union, France, Italy and Spain are the three examples of states best suited to illustrate the European vision on the civil liability of judges and prosecutors for the damages caused by the exercise of their legal powers in deciding upon acts and measures taken in the framework of litigation, including the final decision on the case. The analysis of these examples represents the continuation of a former study published in the same legal journal on the matter, but viewed through the lenses of the US Supreme Court of Justice and laws. Based on the Council of Europe Charter on the Statute for Judges and Recommendation on the judge’s independence, efficiency and responsibilities, guided by the case law of the EU Court of Justice and ECHR, the law and legal practices on civil liability of judges and prosecutors find their expression in slightly different manners in France, Italy and Spain, but all of them respect the paramount principle of the indirect liability which could be enacted only based on the state’s direct liability. There are some national differences but nevertheless they don’t represent deviations from the common European approach. The present study searches for all different and common views of the three states on the subject, emphasizing on the main principles that should guide the continental legal system’s states on that respect.

The jurists naturally privilege the continuity, stability, coherence. If the political tends to periodically break the coherence of the social structures, the jurists conceive themselves as „doctors” thereof, and „their technique is precisely the extirpation of the void, the anticipation of the crises, the assurance of the continuity, or even the mending, after the stroke, of the ruptures of the institutional weave”1. The legal privileging of the continuity of the social evolution is translated by the structuring of the system on the basis of some principles aimed at attenuating the tendencies of radicalization of the social claims in the name of the prevalence of a certain conception about the good society over its alternatives. It is fundamental for the jurists that the law ensures the priority of the protection of freedom through the mechanisms of the rule of law over the general interest resulted from the democratic exercise of power. The law based on this vision can not be the result of a general transcendent interest over the interests of the members of the society, but must be the result of the accessibility and availability thereof.

This article has as object of study the issue of the marriages of convenience concluded for the sole purpose of ensuring the right of entry and of stay of a foreign citizen on the territory of Romania. In elaborating the study plan we have considered: a first introductory part which presents the normative basis relative to the legal regime of the foreigners; a section devoted to some decisions of the Romanian Constitutional Court which has been entrusted over time with analysing the concordance of the provisions regarding the legal regime of foreigners with our Fundamental Law; a point devoted to the European legislation relevant for the issue under our examination and a practical part which reveals how Romanian courts have settled cases concerning the assessment of the marriages of convenience.

On number of occasions, the Constitutional Court is in the position to determine whether a norm is constitutional or not, referring to the provisions of Article 1 (5) of the Constitution, republished version. In order to comply with the provisions of this article, it is necessary for the law, the obedience of which is required by the very first article of the Basic Law, to be clear, precise and predictable. There are numerous decisions of the Constitutional Court which state that the law is devoid of „quality”, i.e. the law is not clear, precise and predictable. The non-compliance of these requirements results in a violation of the provisions of Article 6 (1) of the Law No 24/2000 on normative technical norms for the drafting of normative acts, republished, subsequently amended and supplemented, according to which the draft of the normative act must establish necessary, sufficient and possible rules leading to the greatest legal stability and efficiency. Thus, whenever the legislator uses notions whose legal nature is uncertain or do not integrate from the conceptual point of view into the normative system, or when the legislator resorts to the use of innovative concepts in the normative acts and does not define them in their very content, the Constitutional Court will have all the reasons to establish that the provisions of Article 1 (5) of the Constitution are violated, the text being inadequately drafted.

In the Draft law drawn up by the Ministry of Justice, the offence of abuse of office provided by Article 297 (1) of the Criminal Code is defined simplistically and formally, without clarity, precision and predictability. According to the Draft law, any act of breach of the law, of a Government Ordinance or of a Government Emergency Ordinance by a civil servant is considered to be an offence of abuse of office, regardless of its gravity and of its consequences, because its legal content is not circumscribed. In order for the offence of abuse of office not to be confused with the other forms of civil, disciplinary, administrative, fiscal, material or contraventional legal liability, we have introduced in its definition the condition that the deed must be committed for material interests, and the damage must cause particular serious consequences. In this way, the abuses in the interpretation and application of Article 297 (1) of the Criminal Code will be completely removed.