The study deals with the manner in which the provisions of Article 227 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code should be interpreted. It emphasizes that, although it should have been a relatively easy activity, by reference to the historical perspective, to the evolution of the texts which regulated this matter over time and to the rules set by the ECHR case law with reference to the preventive deprivation of liberty, reality proved that the judicial practice had encountered serious difficulties in interpreting and applying the provisions in question, with important repercussions also on other institutions in relation to the preventive measures. This doctrinal approach intends to analyze the different interpretations of Article 227 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code and to propose a thoroughly reasoned manner of interpretation and application.

In this article, the author analyzes the provisions of Article 124 of the Romanian Constitution, which have as regulatory object the administration of justice. The concept of justice can be examined from multiple points of view, including from the perspective of the theory of law. The author shows that, although justice is the favourite subject of examination of the theorists and practitioners of law specialised in the civil procedure and in the criminal procedure, it is also relevant the analysis of the term of justice from the point of view of the constitutional law. It is analyzed, thus, the concept of justice, the constitutional characters of justice, the constitutional significance of the independence of the judges and its legal effects. Unlike the independence of the judges, which is established by constitutional norm, the independence of prosecutors is established by the legislative will of the Parliament, which means that they do not benefit from constitutional guarantees, but only from the legal ones.

This study is devoted to a particular analysis of the reason for contestation for annulment provided by Article 503 (2) point 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, text which allows the cancellation of a judgment when it is found that „the solution given to the recourse” is the result of a „material error”. The author argues that the mentioned text does not allow a broad interpretation, namely in the sense that the material errors could lead to the cancellation of a judgment for mistakes that concern the merits of the case. The current regulation does not provide sufficient arguments for a different approach than the one promoted under the influence of the previous Civil Procedure Code, and this despite the fact that Article 318 (1) of this Code was using the phrase „material mistake”, and not that of „material error”. In the author’s view the whole physiognomy of the contestation for annulment is materialised in the fact that this extraordinary legal remedy was made available to the parties only for the removal of some procedural errors, and not of those on the merits as well. In order to remedy some misjudgments it is open the means of appeal, and, in some cases, of the revision as well. However the contrary opinion has the merit to emphasize that there are practical situations in which the current procedural remedies could be considered as insufficient. Therefore, some future legislative approaches might also consider some reassessments concerning the regulation of the legal remedies.

The Order of the minister of health No 1411/2016 introduces, in the Annex to the Order of the minister of health No 482/2007, a new article, that is Article 51, which regulates a new form of civil liability opposite to the liability of the principal for his agent, where the agent (the medical staff) is objectively liable for the deed [the situations provided by Article 655 (1) of the Law No 95/2006] of the principal (the sanitary unit). Article 51 of the Annex to the Order No 482/2007 is unlawful because it violates the express provisions of Article 654 (2) a) of the Law No 95/2006 (which exonerates ex lege the medical staff from the liability for the prejudices caused by the working conditions) and it is confusing, because, although it represents a methodological norm of a special law, it makes reference to the common law (Article 1373 of the Civil Code) which regulates exactly the opposite, namely the objective liability of the principal for the deed of the agent based on the idea of guarantee of the principal, that covers the risk of activity and of authority.

The imperative to not let the governors and the governed persons commit any abuses has generated a specific manner of regulation of the organization of public assemblies, especially when they take place in public. The result of this regulation which, although it does not expressly provide the condition of authorising the organization and the conduct of these public assemblies, contains it nevertheless by default, has implications on the problem of the administrative authorizations. This result is the specific manner of establishing a required authorization that is not included within the scope of express authorizations or in the one related to the tacit approval procedure, placed, as well as the latter, in the sphere of legal fictions. Whereas given the state of law and a genuine democracy it can not be explained the reaction of the authorities when they face the situation of spontaneous public assemblies, their regulation at legal level is required as well.

We mentally associate the first half of the nineteenth century with the affirmation of some ideas and projects of political and administrative reform of the two Romanian principalities connected to the most advanced spirit in Europe of those times. The national common sense watchword was, at that time, the modernization of the principalities in the spirit of the reforms stimulated and encouraged by the French Revolution in the late eighteenth century. Still under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire, Moldavia and Walachia were trying to receive European political and legal institutions and to place them into Romanian governance mechanisms, also preparing thereby the formation of a new legal thinking and practice, of a new government mentality, in the spirit of the Western Europe. From this perspective, the author analyzes the origins and the constitutional functions of the Legislative Council, using, for this, some prestigious doctrinal studies published in specialized magazines in the inter-war period of the twentieth century. Likewise, the author analyzes the role of the Legislative Council configured in Article 79 of the Constitution adopted in 1991 and its organic law.