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The purpose of the author’s approach is to determine the real meaning of the contestation for annulment in relation to the other means of appeal regulated in the new Civil Procedure Code. In this respect, the author considers, in full agreement with the current case law and doctrine, that in the processual system in force the contestation for annulment has as a fundamental objective the correction of some procedural mistakes, and not of some substantive errors. In this study additional arguments are presented in favour of the thesis according to which the contestation for annulment regulated by Article 503 (2) point 2 of the new Civil Procedure Code can not have the meaning of envisaging the substantive mistakes, whereas such an approach does not have any support in the provisions of the legislation in force. The author expresses reservations also with regard to the establishment of an extraordinary means of appeal, of the sort of the former extraordinary recourse, which would make possible to remedy some substantive mistakes. In this respect, the author has noted that the trend of modern times is not one that would lead to the multiplication of the means of appeal, as it happened in our country in the last three decades, but to their rationalization and achievement of efficiency. However, an establishment of a new means of appeal could only be discussed in the context of a substantial reform of our judicial system. -
Paulian action represents, alongside oblique action and direct action, one of the most important means of protecting creditors in general. However, unlike direct actions, this legal mechanism provides general protection to all creditors, not just a few that are mentioned by the law. Against this backdrop, in the light of economic development and the many contracts concluded lately, especially in recent years, the knowledge of rights and the means of creditor protection should be of interest to all creditors. Unfortunately, although the paulian action is expressly provided for by law, creditors rarely resort to this legal mechanism to ensure the protection of their own claims. This reluctance is likely to arise from the fear of a long and cumbersome move to promote a litigation in the form of a paulian action. From this point of view, we hope that the present study will provide practitioners, theorists, and creditors with detailed information about this legal mechanism, to encourage the promotion of a paulian action whenever borrowers act against patrimony in order to avoid enforcement.
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Concluded on 12 December 2015, and entering into force on 4 November 2016, the Paris Agreement on Climate Change establishes the new international legal regime of the global response to threat of climate change. Contributing to the application of the Framework Convention of 1992, the Agreement adds the objective of adaptation and breaks the tradition of the Kyoto Protocol (1997), by imposing a new approach in this field, having in its center the limitation to 2°C and, whenever possible, 1,5°C of the growth of global average temperature, in relation to preindustrial levels, determined national contributions, and a transparency mechanism in ensuring the compliance of the self-assumed commitments. Accepting climate change as a „common concern of mankind” with scientific legitimacy of the conventional process and a specific legal value, being neither a „convention” nor a „protocol”, the Agreement has a universal nature, and it completes and transforms the international legal regime of the global climate action. Innovating principles are consecrated: intergenerational equity, climate justice or progression principle, new market mechanisms, with limited action, the facilitating mechanism, periodical evaluation, et al. An important role in imposing the new strategy and the new mechanism of action in climatic matters is held by the negotiations related to the post-2015 Conferences of Parties, designed to establish the „roadmap” and the proceedings for the preparation and enforcement, after 2020, of the Paris Agreement. Part of the new international conventional context regarding the new global challenges, the Agreement completes and updates the climate regime, as part of the international environmental law, bearing important specificities.
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Although the European Union’s activities hardly integrate into the civilist logic of the „illicit legal act”, its non-contractual liability is triggered in particular for what the doctrine generically calls „behaviours” considered to be illegal. Even under this generous hypothesis, the Union liability can only be engaged under very strict conditions, less established by the Treaties and, rather, by the judge in Luxembourg, on the basis of some rules that discourage the litigants, limiting the possibility, in procedural and material terms, to bring such actions. The jurisdiction to settle the disputes concerning non-contractual liability of EU exclusively pertains to the European Unional jurisdictions, by applying Article 268 TFEU, which necessarily implies that the non-contractual liability of the Union must be engaged solely on the basis and under the conditions of EU law. Such an argument is fundamentally justified by the fact that engaging this liability very often implies that the scope of application is an appreciation of the Union’s policy, which is why the exclusion of the competence of any national jurisdiction appears to be natural.
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By the provisions of Article 657 (2) of the Civil Code it is regulated the situation in which the destruction of a smaller part of a building takes place, destruction that does not affect the building as a whole nor in a proportion of no more than half of its value, in which situation the co-owners are bound to contribute to the restoration of the common parts proportionally to the quota-share of each of them. The law establishes the obligativity of those co-owners who either do not want or can not participate in the restoration, to assign the quota-shares of the right of forced joint ownership to the other co-owners, meaning that it establishes a modality of extinguishing the right of private property, which, in our opinion, is likely to give rise to some situations that are hard to accept.
