This study focuses on the legal issues involved by the provisions of Articles 125 (3) and 132 (2) of the Constitution (according to which the office of judge or public prosecutor shall be incompatible with any other public or private office, except for the didactic offices in the higher education institutions) in correlation with the provisions of Article 41 (1) of the Constitution (according to which the right to work shall not be restricted, and everyone has a free choice of his/her profession, trade or occupation, as well as work place). Currently, the relevant administrative practice and case law interpret and apply extensively (lato sensu) Articles 125 (3) and 132 (2). Such approach leads to the presumption that any other activity performed by judges or public prosecutors is forbidden (otherwise triggering disciplinary liability thereof) unless that other activity is not related to didactic offices in higher education or is not assimilated to such offices by special law (or, as it happens most often, by a decision issued by the Plenum of the Superior Council of Magistracy). This study demonstrates that, on the contrary, the aforementioned constitutional provisions establish a presumption according to which the judges and public prosecutors can lawfully perform not only the activities which consist in „didactic offices in higher education”, but also any other activity which is not an „office” and in relation to which there is no „conflict of interest” in the light of the relevant legal provisions. In order to reach this conclusion, the constitutional and legal provisions on the concept of holding multiple „offices” must cease to be interpreted extensively (lato sensu), as it is made currently by the administrative practice and the case law, but restrictively (stricto sensu) – as those constitutional provisions constitute an exception from the constitutional principle of the free right to work, establishing a restriction of this fundamental right exercise. The legal provisions laid down in this field can be qualified as consistent with the Constitution only if their normative content does not produce an extensive application of the constitutional provisions concerning the holding of multiple „offices”. Thus, by the words „other public or private office” (with which the office of judge or public prosecutor is prohibited to be held simultaneously) one has to understand exclusively a public or private activity performed regularly and in an organized manner within an institution (organization) against a remuneration.

The ordinary courts have the general competence to protect the rights and freedoms of individuals, whether provided or not in the international treaties or in the Constitution of Romania. The Constitutional Court’s claim to be the only one to exercise constitutional justice powers is based on a faulty interpretation of its own competence, which is constitutionally determined as being to ensure the supremacy of the Constitution, and on reducing the constitutional contentious to the contentious of rules. A correct interpretation of the constitutional provisions and the fructification of the Romanian tradition in the matter of constitutional justice demonstrate that the ordinary courts are competent to apply the Constitution in order to protect the rights and freedoms of individuals, therefore to exercise constitutional justice powers, because this is not reduced to the control of the constitutionality of the laws.

In this article, the author advocates the necessity to adopt a special law on the liability of magistrates for committing the judicial errors through bad faith or due to their own negligence. The beginning of reforming the political system set in motion in December 1989 has generated also the change of the judicial system as a whole and, at the same time with it, of the relations between the state and the citizen, according to the principles of the constitutional democracy. As the new government system places at its foundation the individual-citizen, it was natural for the state to assume a direct liability for the violation by its judicial agents of the legitimate rights and interests of the citizens. In this framework, it was built a system of corrections for judicial errors, extended to the effective legal liability of the judges and of the public prosecutors who, in bad faith or gross negligence, have violated the processual rights of the parties in the trial, have convicted them unjustly, or have subjected them without any grounds to some repressive procedures. This system of moral and material corrections does not work, the provisions in the matter, included in the processual legislation, are not sufficient for the citizen to gain full confidence in the act of justice. A special law is necessary not only to ensure the corrections of the judicial errors, but also to exemplarily sanction the guilty parties for violating the law.

Dacă, în ceea ce privește societățile pe acțiuni, legiuitorul a menționat expres în art. 118 alin. (1) din Legea nr. 31/1990 privind societățile posibilitatea ca în convocatorul pentru prima adunare generală să se fixeze ziua și ora pentru cea de-a doua adunare generală, când cea dintâi nu se ține, o asemenea posibilitate nu este prevăzută și pentru societățile cu răspundere limitată. O astfel de mențiune nu echivalează cu o convocare legală pentru cea de-a doua adunare generală, cerința celei de-a doua convocări rezultând din mențiunea expresă din cuprinsul art. 193 alin. (3) din Legea nr. 31/1990.

The authors plead for the distinct regulation of the manifestly illegal acts and measures showing that their legal treatment requires operative sanctions and their removal in due time having regard to their implications for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Taking into account the implications increased by the latest changes of the institution of the initiation and continuation of the criminal prosecution there are pointed out some inconsistencies of the criminal processual legislation with the provisions of the Constitution and of the European Convention of Human Rights, expressing some criticism of unconstitutionality. Thus they criticize the obligativity to initiate criminal prosecution „in rem” even when the authors are indicated or known, and make some „de lege ferenda” proposals, for the concordance of Article 304 (2), Article 305 (1), (2) and (3) and Article 339 (5) of the Criminal Procedure Code with the provisions of the Constitution.

This study has as object the incidental regulations in the matter of illegal border crossings and of asylum, as well as how they intersect, and it intends to find an adequate solution for what happens with the criminal prosecution, in the cases of fraudulent crossings of the state border, in the course of solving the application for being granted a form of protection submitted by the person who has illegally crossed the border. It is proposed the intervention of the legislator in the sense of introducing a rule which provides as cause of suspension of the criminal prosecution the situation where the person wanted for the fraudulent crossing of the state border has subsequently submitted an application for being granted a form of protection and is subject to the asylum procedure. The need for such intervention is motivated by the ineffectiveness of continuing the criminal prosecution and of the settlement of the case provided that, at the end of the asylum procedure, the person concerned can be granted a form of protection from among those recognized by the Law No 122/2006, the cause of non-punishment provided in Article 11 of this law being thus incidental.