The developments which the Romanian, European and international society has experienced, especially in the last decade, coincide with the 10th anniversary of our country’s accession to the European Union, requiring new approaches of the multiple dimensions which the integration process involves. The integration into the European Union, which has generated a series of changes at constitutional level, is also one of the objectives of Romania at international level. Likewise, the process of accession to the European Union has conferred to the Romanian citizens, inclusively, the right to participate in the European Parliament elections, both as candidates and as voters, according to Article 38 of the Romanian Constitution, republished. In this study, the author intends to discuss the problems of Romania’s accession to the European Union from the perspective of the constitutional provisions.

This study aims to identify the constituent moment, a moment when the manifestation of the original constituent power intervenes. While in case of the derived constituent power formal and material limits are pre-established, and the revision of the Constitution is an activity with a consistent procedural component, in case of the original constituent power an analysis of comparative law can identify ex ante which are the main moments when we can speak about the manifestation of the constituent power. These moments are closely related to different internal and international social events which took place in the historical evolution of a state, and these can be grouped into: constituent moments mainly determined by a revolution, by the change in the political regime or by the formation of a state. Thus, the main questions to which we seek to answer are: Which is the onset signal that will lead to the beginning of the constituent procedure? Is the new Constitution legitimate? Is the new Constitution the work of an original constituent power or of a derived constituent power?

In the last decades, administrative law underwent a phenomenon of didactic fragmentation which nobody can ignore today. Numerous monographies within the doctrine of public law, whose purpose – stated in their own titles – is to treat, from multiple perspectives and in a more or less profound manner, (very) narrow subjects of administrative law, have invaded the book market. It happened not only in Romania, but also in France, a country which reasonably claims to be the homeland of administrative law as a branch of law, and therefore as a teaching subject, in its current European continental approach. This literary explosion went hand in hand with an unprecedented proliferation of master studies specializations offered by higher education institutions, in the area of administrative law and/or public administration. Are these phenomena able to fragment the theoretical discourse of administrative law in such a way that this subject loses its unity and, hence, ideological identity? Most likely not. The model proposed by us – that of the five ideological foundations of administrative law – seems to have the ability to prevent the undesirable result hereabove mentioned. With these five ideological foundations – the public administration, the public authority, the public service, the public interest and the public power – almost all the defining and descriptive equations of the major institutions of administrative law (such as the civil service, the public domain, the public enterprise, the unilateral administrative act, the administrative contract, the administrative litigation and public authorities’ financial liability for damage caused by their illegal acts) are likely to be solved. And if this is possible, then the idea of ideological unity/identity of the administrative law is safeguarded, despite the didactic fragmentation previously envisaged.

The complexity of the problem of configuration of the branches of law requires the recourse to various courts, which, without being infallible, can provide resources to legitimize a solution or another. In this regard, there may be invoked a series of coordinates such as the spirit of the law, as core of the legal knowledge, formed by the contribution of the fundamental concepts, of the principles of law and of its finalities, the interdisciplinary analyzes of the legal phenomenon or the meta-theoretical level of the scientific approach. With regard to this latter point of reference, we are trying to express wider considerations that emphasize plans of specificity, of customization and of specialization, but also processes of generalization and of integration. It is argued that any approach is entitled to cognitively participate in shaping the theoretical or practical solutions. However, no point of view can be declared unique, in a dogmatic, exclusive manner, or infallible, being necessarily open and capable to receive other information in critical or innovating terms, to convert them into a dialectical process of relative and imperfect knowledge, but always perfectible, in relation to a society and to a historical time.

In this article the author discusses from a constitutional perspective the concept of capital – commonly used by the Constituent Assemblies to designate within the constitutions the headquarters of the national sovereignty authorities. In his comments, the author presents the political conditions and the historical context of choosing Bucharest as residence of the princely court of Walachia mid seventeenth century and the evolution of the city from a historical, political and administrative viewpoint. The study presents in detail the changes suffered by the city of Bucharest during the Organic Regulations that have established administrative measures for its modernization. Bucharest became capital of the United Principalities in 1862 during the reign of Alexandru Ioan Cuza. Since then its status as capital has not been contested anymore, a situation also reflected in provisions of constitutional rank.

The article proposes procedural solutions, in compliance with the requirements of the ECHR practice, when changing the legal classification given to the deed, in appeal, by appreciating that the change in the legal classification given to the deed by the act of referral can be made by an undeniable conclusion, prior to the debate on the appeal, or by the conclusion for reinstating the case on the list of cases, provided that the court has debated the appeal, pending further ruling also for the reason concerning the change in the legal classification, which it found to be well-grounded.