In this article the author aims to analyze, from a constitutional point of view, the content of Article 21 of the Basic Law. The constitutionalization of free access to justice and the provisions of Article 21 located in the First Chapter of the Second Title of the Basic Law, along with other rules and principles that protect the man-citizen as the primer pin of the governance system and the holder of sovereign political power, as well as exclusive beneficiary, proves thereof the concern of the Constituent Assembly of 1991 in creating the necessary guarantees in regard with the defence of the human rights and liberties in accordance with the general principles of the constitutional democracy and the rule of law as established in the documents of universal human rights, ratified by Romania.

The new Fiscal Procedure Code, approved by the Law No 207/2015, in force starting from 1 January 2016, through the transposition of some European acts into our domestic law, has brought significant mutations in matters of administrative and fiscal disputes as well. In the ambience of the new normative framework regulated by the Law No 207/2015 on the Fiscal Procedure Code, this study aims at analyzing a few aspects less regulated by the new normative framework and which could create controversies both in the application of the new normative framework by the public tax authorities and by the administrative disputes courts entrusted with the settlement of some litigations in matters of administrative and fiscal disputes. Starting from this desideratum, the study analyzes the categories of judgments pronounced by the administrative courts in matters of fiscal and administrative disputes, as well as the procedure for their enforcement, in relation to each category of judgments pronounced in this matter. There are also analyzed within this study the problems of suspension of the enforcement and of the contestation against enforcement in matters of administrative and fiscal disputes.

Clauza de dezicere inserată într-un antecontract de vânzare-cumpărare, prin care s-a prevăzut posibilitatea de răzgândire a promitentei-vânzătoare din motive subiective, rămâne fără efecte în situația decesului acesteia, neputând fi invocată de moștenitori. Și aceasta întrucât dreptul astfel prevăzut în favoarea promitenteivânzătoare are un caracter strict personal, iar datorită acestei caracteristici acest drept este incesibil, adică netransmisibil moștenitorilor, putând fi exercitat numai de către titular.

In this study, the author presents a constitutional reform on the Hungarian Constitutional Court, in the sense of extending its substantive jurisdiction, which entered into force at the beginning of the year 2012. Indeed, the mentioned reform preserves the classic system of the constitutional courts, but it receives an additional jurisdiction, i.e.: after a judgment has become final, either party may address to the Constitutional Court if the decision made is contrary to a fundamental right established by the Constitution. This way, concludes the author, the Constitutional Court is elevated at the level of a centre of the state power, an independent branch thereof which, in a certain sense, conducts a control on all branches of the state power.

The study is devoted to the analysis of the provisions of Article 304 of the Civil Code referring to the „putative marriage”, a legal institution meant to protect the good faith upon the conclusion of the null or annulled marriage. Unlike other authors, but in agreement with the provisions of Article 304 (1) of the Civil Code, we have also analyzed, together with the condition that at least one of the future spouses act in good faith, the requirement of existence, on the date of conclusion of marriage, of a factual situation which causes the nullity or the annulment thereof. Similarly, because the analysis of the effects of the putative marriage does not present difficulties of interpretation in case both future spouses have acted in good faith upon the conclusion of the marriage, we have focused on the situation in which, on the contrary, one of them acted in good faith and the other acted in bad faith. Finally, we have tried to elucidate the reason which determined the legislator to subject the patrimonial relations between former spouses, including in case that only one of them acted in good faith, to the provisions concerning the divorce and we have grounded a proposal de lege ferenda likely to eliminate the „legal compromise” generated by the current normative solution.

In principle, the confession is admissible as means of evidence in all the matters for which the civil processual law represents the common law of the procedure and for which there is no separate procedure. Exceptionally, the confession is not admissible: when it is expressly prohibited by law; whether, by admitting it, the imperative provisions of the law would be eluded; if the law requires that certain facts be proved only by certain means of evidence; if, by admitting it, one could reach to total or partial loss of a right which may not be waived or may not be subject to a transaction. The judicial confession shall be given by means of cross-examination, as reflected by Articles 351–358 of the Civil Procedure Code. Obviously, it is a question of provoked judicial confession, whereas the spontaneous judicial confession does not require any prior preparation and, as such, it does not require an express regulation. Instead, the written extrajudicial confession is subject to the regime of proof of evidence through written documents, and the extrajudicial verbal confession may be attested by witnesses, if the law allows the testimonial evidence. The legislator of the new Civil Procedure Code expressly establishes the principle of indivisibility of the judicial confession and, at the same time, he provides an exception from this principle, namely the situation in which the judicial confession contains separate facts not connected between them. In this study there are elaborated the ideas presented above