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  • The administration of evidence necessarily implies that the evidence is first proposed and produced (submitted) by the parties and then approved by the court. The legislator of the Civil Procedure Code instituted a regime of evidence renewed in its spirit and in its formal expression, devoting, in addition to the general provisions on the administration of evidence (Articles 260–263 of the Civil Procedure Code), also some provisions specific to the administration of evidence by written documents (Articles 292–300 of the Civil Procedure Code), as well as to the conduct of the procedures for verification of documents (Articles 301–308 of the Civil Procedure Code). As a rule, the production (submission) of the documents takes place voluntarily, under the terms and conditions set by law. However, in some cases, the documents relating to the pending trial are not produced voluntarily, whereas their presentation in court could have consequences for those who hold them or for their spouse, kin or relatives. The attitude of the person who holds the document not to produce it voluntarily may have different motives: family secret, business secret, confidentiality, strictly personal matters about the dignity or private life of a person, etc. In other cases, bringing written documents to court would be too expensive or the documents would be too voluminous or numerous. In such cases, the justice of the dialogue will prevail. From the correlation of the provisions of the final sentence of Article 22 (2) with those of Article 254 (2), Article 254 (5) of the Civil Procedure Code, it appears that the legislator draws attention to the cooperation which must exist between the judge and the parties, as regards the evidence of facts, without thereby understanding that the judge substitutes the parties, automatically filling the passivity of the party either a claimant, or a defendant
  • Prin natura sa, omul reprezintă cea mai complexă și dinamică expresie a vieții. Știința și religia, încă și acum, în contemporaneitate, își dispută apartenența nașterii sau creației divine a acestuia. Credem că acum are loc cea mai mare schimbare a mentalității, prin acceptarea unei singure perspective asupra genezei noastre, ceea ce constituie revoluția în evoluția creației umanității. Justiția privită din perspectiva conceptului este abstractă, însă ceea ce îi conferă viață este judecătorul.
  • By the Decision on 29th January 2019, in Case No 6080/06 Ahunbay & others v. Turkey (6080/2006), the ECHR has made a great leap forward, by means of the subsequent considerations, in recognizing the general principle of the right of access to common cultural inheritance. The Court has rejected the principal claim as inadmissible (ratione materiae); even though, by finding that the object is related to an evolving field and by considering that given the international instruments and the common ground regarding international legal standards, compulsory or not, it cannot be a priori excluded the existence of a common European and International approach regarding the need to protect the access to cultural inheritance, it has opened significant perspectives for the process of giving this principle a legal shape. Thus, there have been created the premises so that, in the near future, by means of case law, several significant progresses can be made in this field.
  • According to our traditional legal model, the French one, the author tries to outline the theoretical bases and the legal elements defining a Romanian littoral law. Starting from the problems of the development and protection of the Black Sea Romanian littoral, the existing national legislation, the requirements of its harmonization with the EU law and the international regulations in the field, fully expanding, the analysis addresses and formulates adequate answers related to the (legal) notion of littoral, the delimitations of the neighbouring and connected rights, the springs (internal, European Union and international), with particular attention in this respect to the Convention on the Protection of the Black Sea against Pollution, the general and specific principles related to the field, the specific concepts and terms, its character of protective law, of interference and with an integrated approach. Particular attention is paid to identifying the necessary connections, interdependencies and delimitations between the littoral law, the maritime law and the law of the sea. In the author’s view, the littoral law is a new field of reflection and a specific regulatory matter under development, with a normative proteiform tissue, but with two clear and precise objectives: rendering the economic and social development compatible with the increased exigences of protection and preservation, under the sign of sustainable development.
  • Termenul de prescripție a dreptului la acțiune în rezoluțiunea promisiunii de vânzare-cumpărare începe a curge doar de la momentul în care partea interesată a dobândit certitudinea că pârâtul se află în imposibilitate de a-și executa principala obligație asumată.
  • This study aims to briefly analyze the promise of sale with the three forms in which the promise is objectified: unilateral promise, bilateral promise, option pact. In the opinion of the author, the versions of the promise are separate legal entities, all preceeding the final contract, which can be regarded as preparatory stages of the final contract, in the process of its progressive elaboration. In the view of the Romanian legislator, but also of the dominant doctrine, the unilateral promise is essentially different from the option pact, contrary to the French doctrine and to a part of the Romanian doctrine. In the enforcement of the promise the author appreciates that the pronouncing of a judgment, which replaces the contract, is a way of exception of the enforcement in kind, not being possible for the court to substitute for the lack of consent for the final conclusion of the contract expressed in the form provided by law for the final act, of any of the parties. Therefore, in essence, the principle of contractual freedom shall prevail over the principle of its binding force.
  • Declanșarea și judecarea unui proces atrag per se o serie de cheltuieli bănești care se materializează în taxele judiciare, onorariile avocaților, experților și ale altor specialiști, ori în sume de bani cuvenite martorilor chemați să răspundă în fața judecătorului, pe lângă multe alte inconveniente. Dacă sarcina înfăptuirii justiției aparține statului, principiu recunoscut în majoritatea sistemelor democratice, se pune problema sarcinii suportării cheltuielilor pe care le presupune judecarea unui litigiu. S-a ajuns astfel la „compromisul” prin care cheltuielile de judecată să fie împărțite, aproximativ proporțional, între stat și părțile litigante. Culpa procesuală este izvorul cheltuielilor de judecată, partea îndreptățită la acordarea acestora este partea litigantă, potrivnică celei care cade în pretenții și, pe cale de consecință, cea care a fost în culpă procesuală, prima fiind „victima” celei de-a doua. Ab initio trebuie precizat că stabilirea cheltuielilor de judecată va fi făcută de instanță numai în măsura în care acestea au fost solicitate în cursul procesului pendinte, faptul că instanța nu le-a acordat reprezentând o omisiune a acesteia, care poate fi îndreptată pe calea unei cereri de completare a hotărârii, dacă partea are deschisă această procedură. Probleme s-au ivit în legătură cu actualizarea cheltuielilor de judecată în faza de executare silită, când executorul judecătoresc proceda la punerea în executare a hotărârii judecătorești. Astfel, s-a născut întrebarea „Poate executorul judecătoresc să actualizeze sumele cuvenite creditorului cu titlu de cheltuieli judecătorești?” Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție a limpezit problema de drept ridicată și a statuat că sumele acordate printr-o hotărâre judecătorească pot fi actualizate în funcție de rata inflației, de executorul judecătoresc în etapa executării silite (cu notă aprobativă).
  • Proportionality of the enforcement measures constitutes, in essence, a fundamental principle of the civil enforcement procedure, which, although it does not have a regulation in terminis recognized in the Civil Procedure Code, already knows, at regulatory level, the valences of a principle, following only to be assimilated by the doctrine, by the practice and, consequently, by the legislator. Although it could be argued that proportionality is subsumed to the general principle of the right to a fair trial, we consider that it claims its own individuality at the level of the fundamental thesis leading the enforcement process, as compared to the specificity of the measures involved, the fairness of the procedure following to be appreciated by reference to the level at which all the other principles are observed, being a corollary thereof. The procedural guarantees which they enjoy, the remedies and the legally recognized consequences are elements that turn, therefore, the proportionality of the enforcement measures into a basic principle of the enforcement, on which a fair procedure is built, thus giving full expression to the valorisation of the rights and fundamental freedoms of the individual.
  • The author analyzes the condition of existence of common property for granting legal personality to an owners’ association in the light of the provisions included in the Law No 230/2007, starting from a solution of the judicial practice, reaching to the conclusion that the establishment of an association can not take place unless there is a common property of all members of the association.
  • This article examines the fiduciary property through a historical and comparative analysis of the legislation and doctrine of Québec, France and Romania. The contemporary fiducia ought not to be confused for the Roman fiducia, whose name it borrowed. As a result of the reception of the Anglo-American trust in the mixed legal system of the Canadian province of Québec, the fiducia has been the subject of subsequent legal transplants into the continental tradition. The Romanian legislator, inspired by its French counterpart, took over the restrictions brought to the fiducia in said legal system. In the matter of real rights, this legislative option also meant the rejection of the doctrine of an ownerless patrimony, an innovation of the legal system of Québec, in search of a continental instrument to replace the division of title between the legal holder (trustee) and the equitable one (beneficiary), as enshrined in the Common Law tradition. Commenting on the solutions proposed within French legal literature (including the classification as a method of ownership or even as a result of dismemberment), the author argues that only a combination of them may fully explain the mechanism of the fiduciary ownership. In essence, the fiduciary owner acts like a true owner, but by virtue of a title held under a resolutive condition, while the beneficiary enjoys a virtuality of law in his capacity as an owner under a suspensive condition. However, the constraints to which the right of ownership transferred to the trustee is subject, in terms of its exclusivity and perpetuity, may be explained by the fiducia contract itself, the effects of which are assimilated to the conventional limitation operated, for example, through an inalienability clause. In other words, the fiduciary owner may be considered an owner under a resolutive condition, yet he remains subject to the conventional limitations brought upon by the very nature of the fiduciary operation.
  • The regulation of the Civil Code on periodic ownership was preceded by the Law No 282/2002 and by the Government Emergency Ordinance No 14/2011, which have transposed the European Directives concerning consumer protection with regard to the utilisation or time-limited use of movable and immovable assets. As a legal modality of the ownership right, the characters of the periodic ownership, although qualified by Article 646 (1) of the Civil Code, which refers to Article 687 of the Civil Code, as a form of forced co-ownership, is delimited by it. The present study outlines these elements of difference, the specificity of periodic ownership as real right, the rights and obligations of the co-owners in the exercise of the prerogatives arising from this quality. Periodic ownership is a particular case of forced co-ownership, of a temporary nature, because several people successively and repetitively exercise the attribute of use, specific to the ownership right, over a movable or immovable asset, at fixed intervals of equal or unequal duration. This form of ownership implies an overlapping of the real right of each co-owner over the entire asset, but whose use is limited during one year to the duration indicated in the ownership title. The critical aspects concerning the relations between the co-owners are cantoned to the provisions of Article 691 (2) of the Civil Code on the sanction of excluding the co-owner who, through his conduct, causes to another co-owner a serious disturbance in the exercise of the prerogatives of the periodic ownership right.
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