The notion of „principle” has known three approaches throughout its history: ontological (philosophical), logical, and normative. Ontologically, it would mean the primary object of knowledge stemming from the intellectual act, by the procedure of induction, generalization (a form of reasoning), starting from the particular and ending with the general, from facts to concepts. In a logical sense, it is a general proposal induced from particular rules, being a source for deductive reasoning wherein the conclusion follows necessarily premises that are sources of orientation: ideas, facts, situations. Legal logic has a wide content, and it is considered that logical principles denote, on the one hand, a body of rules stemming from a methodic and reflected development, rules ordered systematically, and, on the other hand, the axioms that substantiate a rational structure. This is how principles are linked with the perpetual work of sensibly organizing the law (the activity of legislation). In a normative sense, the principle no longer describes the object or a form of logic, nor does it describe an axiom or a reason-based system of rules, but a legal norm/standard whereby an obligation is asserted, establishing a resource for the legal interpreter. Interpretative adages which relate, however, to formal rules of logical reasoning, may clash and lack any compelling force, being used by the judge in the development of his/her own policy. The role of the principles is to ensure the coherence and harmony of the legal system, since they are the expression of superior values embedded in the spirit of the law. Regarding the content and the extent of the principle of legal certainly, legal literature has identified three levels of approach: pre-judicial legal certainty; procedural legal certainty and post-judicial substantial legal certainty; all of them meet to ensure the „predictability of the law” so that the parties/the litigants have a feeling of certainty.

Typical as they could be for the continental legal system and bearing common landmarks recommended by the Council of Europe and European Union, France, Italy and Spain are the three examples of states best suited to illustrate the European vision on the civil liability of judges and prosecutors for the damages caused by the exercise of their legal powers in deciding upon acts and measures taken in the framework of litigation, including the final decision on the case. The analysis of these examples represents the continuation of a former study published in the same legal journal on the matter, but viewed through the lenses of the US Supreme Court of Justice and laws. Based on the Council of Europe Charter on the Statute for Judges and Recommendation on the judge’s independence, efficiency and responsibilities, guided by the case law of the EU Court of Justice and ECHR, the law and legal practices on civil liability of judges and prosecutors find their expression in slightly different manners in France, Italy and Spain, but all of them respect the paramount principle of the indirect liability which could be enacted only based on the state’s direct liability. There are some national differences but nevertheless they don’t represent deviations from the common European approach. The present study searches for all different and common views of the three states on the subject, emphasizing on the main principles that should guide the continental legal system’s states on that respect.

The jurists naturally privilege the continuity, stability, coherence. If the political tends to periodically break the coherence of the social structures, the jurists conceive themselves as „doctors” thereof, and „their technique is precisely the extirpation of the void, the anticipation of the crises, the assurance of the continuity, or even the mending, after the stroke, of the ruptures of the institutional weave”1. The legal privileging of the continuity of the social evolution is translated by the structuring of the system on the basis of some principles aimed at attenuating the tendencies of radicalization of the social claims in the name of the prevalence of a certain conception about the good society over its alternatives. It is fundamental for the jurists that the law ensures the priority of the protection of freedom through the mechanisms of the rule of law over the general interest resulted from the democratic exercise of power. The law based on this vision can not be the result of a general transcendent interest over the interests of the members of the society, but must be the result of the accessibility and availability thereof.

This article has as object of study the issue of the marriages of convenience concluded for the sole purpose of ensuring the right of entry and of stay of a foreign citizen on the territory of Romania. In elaborating the study plan we have considered: a first introductory part which presents the normative basis relative to the legal regime of the foreigners; a section devoted to some decisions of the Romanian Constitutional Court which has been entrusted over time with analysing the concordance of the provisions regarding the legal regime of foreigners with our Fundamental Law; a point devoted to the European legislation relevant for the issue under our examination and a practical part which reveals how Romanian courts have settled cases concerning the assessment of the marriages of convenience.

On number of occasions, the Constitutional Court is in the position to determine whether a norm is constitutional or not, referring to the provisions of Article 1 (5) of the Constitution, republished version. In order to comply with the provisions of this article, it is necessary for the law, the obedience of which is required by the very first article of the Basic Law, to be clear, precise and predictable. There are numerous decisions of the Constitutional Court which state that the law is devoid of „quality”, i.e. the law is not clear, precise and predictable. The non-compliance of these requirements results in a violation of the provisions of Article 6 (1) of the Law No 24/2000 on normative technical norms for the drafting of normative acts, republished, subsequently amended and supplemented, according to which the draft of the normative act must establish necessary, sufficient and possible rules leading to the greatest legal stability and efficiency. Thus, whenever the legislator uses notions whose legal nature is uncertain or do not integrate from the conceptual point of view into the normative system, or when the legislator resorts to the use of innovative concepts in the normative acts and does not define them in their very content, the Constitutional Court will have all the reasons to establish that the provisions of Article 1 (5) of the Constitution are violated, the text being inadequately drafted.

In the Draft law drawn up by the Ministry of Justice, the offence of abuse of office provided by Article 297 (1) of the Criminal Code is defined simplistically and formally, without clarity, precision and predictability. According to the Draft law, any act of breach of the law, of a Government Ordinance or of a Government Emergency Ordinance by a civil servant is considered to be an offence of abuse of office, regardless of its gravity and of its consequences, because its legal content is not circumscribed. In order for the offence of abuse of office not to be confused with the other forms of civil, disciplinary, administrative, fiscal, material or contraventional legal liability, we have introduced in its definition the condition that the deed must be committed for material interests, and the damage must cause particular serious consequences. In this way, the abuses in the interpretation and application of Article 297 (1) of the Criminal Code will be completely removed.

This paper presents a point of view regarding the correlated interpretation of both articles 53 from the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter, ECHR) and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (hereinafter, the Charter) in the context of EU accession to ECHR. Opinion 2/13 of the EU Court of Justice from 18 December 2014 establishes that there is no provision in the Commission’s project agreement for EU accession to ECHR that envisages to ensure a coordination between both articles 53, allowing Member States to provide for higher standards on human rights protection than ECHR or the Charter, which could entail the undermining of the primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law.

Se știe că, în materie represivă, prescripția produce un îndoit efect, acel de a stinge acțiunea publică și cea civilă, care izvorăște dintr’o crimă, delict sau contravenție polițienească (art. 593–595 C.pr.pen.), și acel de a stinge pedeapsa pronunțată de tribunalele represive art. (596–598 C.pr.pen.). Pentru a se justifica aceste dispoziții s’au dat mai multe motive, asupra căror vom reveni mai târziu tot în coloanele acestui ziar, când vom expune considerațiile generale asupra prescripției penale. Destul este să spunem deocamdată că motivul cel mai puternic și poate singurul motiv ce se poate invoca în specie este că societatea nu are nici un interes a pedepsi o infracțiune a cărei amintire este ștearsă. Legea penală nu vorbește de suspendarea prescripției, ci numai de întreruperea ei. Actele întreruptive consistă, când este vorba de prescrierea acțiunei publice, în acte de instrucțiune și de urmărire (art. 593 C.pr.pen.). Vom vederea îndată care sunt actele întreruptive de prescripție când este vorba de prescrierea executărei pedepselor.

The concept of material error is evoked in two texts of the Civil Procedure Code, respectively in Article 442 and in Article 503 (2) point 2. For the purposes of Article 442 of the Civil Procedure Code, according to the opinion unanimously accepted by the doctrine and by the case law, material error is the mistake slipped in the contents of the judgment, at the time of drafting, which does not affect the foundation or the legality of the solution pronounced by the court. The correction of such material errors is made according to a special procedure regulated by law, which has as its finality the correction of such errors slipped, at the time of drafting, within the minutes, the preambles, the recitals, or even within the operative part of a judgment, which may be a sentence, a decision or a minutes of the session. This category of material errors includes those related to: the name, quality and oral submissions of the parties, those of calculation, etc. The legal meaning of the concept of material error, within the meaning of Article 503 (2) point 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, is sensitively different from that attributed to this concept by Article 442 of the Civil Procedure Code. From this perspective, the material error is any essential and involuntary omission in relation to the situation existing in the file at the time when the court of recourse delivers the judgment. In other terms, the obvious material error concerns formal aspects of the recourse which had as consequence the wrongful settlement of this legal remedy. It is about that mistake made by the court by confusing some important elements or some material data and which determines the solution delivered. The doctrine defines the judicial error as the error of judgment committed by judges or by prosecutors in the course of conducting a judicial procedure. This error may be of law or of fact and in any system of law such an error stands as basis for exercising of the ordinary or extraordinary legal remedies.

The legal report between the commercial company and the administrator is a report of mandate. The administrator mandate can be with representation or without representation and has contractual content and also legal one. The powers of the administrator of the company include two elements: the power to fulfil management abilities; the power to represent if it was expressly granted. The power to represent is distinct from the power of administration and exists only if it has been conferred. The representation of the company by the administrator is exercised differently depending on the type of company. For concluding the dispositions, the company’s administrator does not need a special power of attorney in the authentic form for this purpose. When the acts concluded by the representatives of the company are done with the overcoming of its object, they are the duty of the company except in the cases when the third parties knew or should have known the overcoming of the object or when the acts of the same are concluded by exceeding the limits of the powers of the respective bodies.

This study has as object the incidental regulations in the matter of illegal border crossings and of asylum, as well as how they intersect, and it intends to find an adequate solution for what happens with the criminal prosecution, in the cases of fraudulent crossings of the state border, in the course of solving the application for being granted a form of protection submitted by the person who has illegally crossed the border. It is proposed the intervention of the legislator in the sense of introducing a rule which provides as cause of suspension of the criminal prosecution the situation where the person wanted for the fraudulent crossing of the state border has subsequently submitted an application for being granted a form of protection and is subject to the asylum procedure. The need for such intervention is motivated by the ineffectiveness of continuing the criminal prosecution and of the settlement of the case provided that, at the end of the asylum procedure, the person concerned can be granted a form of protection from among those recognized by the Law No 122/2006, the cause of non-punishment provided in Article 11 of this law being thus incidental.

In the situation that a person has been sanctioned by an administrative authority for committing a contravention, this person can no longer be subsequently prosecuted for the same deed contemplated in its materiality, whereas, in this situation it is applicable the ne bis in idem principle which determines, from the perspective of the criminal procedural law, the incidence of the case provided by Article 16 (1) i) of the Criminal Procedure Code, with reference to the authority of res judicata, which prevents the exercise of the criminal action against that person.