Over time, the claim for awarding legal costs in the civil trial has not been paid due attention. Starting with 1959, following a decision of the Plenum of the Supreme Tribunal, in the practice of the courts, as well as in the specialized works has been taken over automatically, until it has been imprinted in the collective mind, the idea that the court costs can be claimed at any time until the debates are closed on the merits, and the court may even draw attention to this issue, or they may be claimed separately, even if they were initially requested within the dispute. The present study aims to analyze the legal status of awarding the claim for costs, while giving at the same time the correct legal classification of this claim by reference to the texts of the Civil Procedure Code. Thus, we will show that this claim brought to the justice can not be subject to the discretionary will of the parties, but must be circumscribed by the procedural rigors with regard to filing a claim before the court. In the first instance, the party must accordingly request court costs, respectively by way of introductory application, an objection, an intervention, etc. If it did not do it, as a rule, it will not be able to claim them within that litigation. If it did it, but then waives their request in the initial litigation, wishing to claim them separately, it will be subject to the consent of the opponent. In the redress or withdrawal means of appeal, claiming the court costs is conditionned twice, both in the compliance claim before the court of first instance and in the compliance claim before each court that has examined the case (by way of appeal, objection, etc.). The practical implications of the study are some of the most spectacular, since the party that does not comply with the procedural rigors of the claim for court costs will either be in a position to promote separate action for their recovery or in the event of a final impossibility to recover, in whole or in part, the advanced court costs.

Law does obviously not benefit from the privilege of having its own exhaustive language. We might say that most concepts used in law are borrowed from other branches of knowledge. The quite rare concepts that are its own often do not receive a definition that can be classified, according to the methodology of the act of definition itself, as “legal”. The amalgamation of legal terminology with the economic, political, sociological or philosophical terminology, without revising the concepts and without their clear understanding in the areas of knowledge from where they come makes the doctrine and the case law too often flat and stereotyped, if not even chaotic from the conceptual point of view. Lawyers are no longer seen as persons of learning, who try to explain the nature of things through justice, but as simple technicians, who apply concepts taken from other social-human sciences. Under these conditions, one of the fundamental problems for lawyers is to explain a fact that seems to be overlooked by our current culture: what is meant by a legal concept? Afterward, it becomes equally important to understand the way in which the non-legal concepts used in law should be revised, namely what the standards of the legal definition of concepts are. The above-mentioned article attempts to answer to these challenges.