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  • The problems of the land fund became of maximum importance after 1990. Romania, in relation to the new realities regarding the property, had to urgently adopt the Law No 18/1991. After more than 30 years of application, the Law on the land fund still gives rise to discussions on the topic of sharing the competence of the courts in matters of administrative acts issued in its application. The general framework in the matter of restitutions was completed by the appearance of the Law No 10/2001. Subsequently, the entry into force of the Law No 554/2004 has definitively established the legal regime of administrative acts in general. Therefore, we are at the confluence of several framework-laws in the field regarding the regime of administrative disputes, in general, and of the matter of the land fund, in particular. This study seeks to provide precisely an approach as analytical as possible of the manner the courts of law settle this issue.
  • Adopted in the 1922–1926 legislature, the Constitution of 1923 was indispensable for the project of legislative unification of Romania. Its norms impose unique fundamental principles and rules for the entire national legal system: the principle of national sovereignty; the principle of legality and supremacy of the Constitution; the interests of the social community may take precedence over individual interests in the matter of property right. The regulation of some unique institutions for the entire Romanian State ensures the unitary exercise of constitutional competences, and the regulated rights for all Romanians ensure a unique foundation of freedom and equality. Other provisions have a strong unifying role and each provide a point of constitutional support for future legislation. The supremacy of the constitutional norms in the system of legal norms, supported by the case law of the unique supreme court, but also the beneficial psychological effect determined by the constitutional unification complete the picture of the impact of the constitutional norms from 1923.
  • The study analyzes the provisions of the Law No 114/2021 on some measures in the field of justice in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic in civil cases. The mentioned normative act provides the conditions for conducting the court hearings in the civil trial by videoconference. The conditions are the following: to be decreed the state of alert instituted in order to prevent and combat the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic also for a period of 30 days from its cessation; to be about a civil case; to have the agreement of the parties in this respect; to have the possibility; the approval of the court of law. The Constitutional Court, by the Decisions No 157/2020 and No 457/2020, has established that the justice cannot stand still, not even during the COVID-19 pandemic, under this requirement the legislator regulating by the Law No 114/2021 the manner of conducting judicial proceedings during this period. However, the legislator did not rise up to the standards imposed by the Constitutional Court of Romania, in the sense that it did not regulate an effective way of access to justice, in the situation where the objective pandemic conditions restrict this possibility. Although we appreciate positively the provisions of the Law No 114/2021 referring to the development of the civil process by electronic means, we consider that the measures ordered should be generalized and not applied, as provided by Article 1 (2), only for reasons generated by the COVID-19 pandemic.
  • According to Article 19 of the Government Emergency Ordinance No 20/2021, the doctors, regardless of specialty, acquire or lose by a Government decision which declares or terminates the state of alert, without any training, evaluation or sanction, a special professional competence to treat persons infected with SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus, for which they would not be liable with their patrimony if they complied with the guides and protocols approved by the order of the Minister of Health. The regulation represents a violation of Article 34 (3) of the Romanian Constitution, generating an uncertainty regarding the existence and extent of the doctors’ rights and violating the fundamental right to the protection of citizens’ health. First, the criteria for exercising the medical profession (acquisition and loss of a professional competence) are delegated by emergency ordinance by the exceptional legislator (the Government) to the executive (the Government), in order to be established by a legal act with inferior force than the law, in violation of Article 1 (4) and (5) of the Constitution. Secondly, the fundamental rights to Life, provided by Article 2 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and, respectively, to Health care, regulated by Article 34 of the Constitution, guaranteed by the control of the medical profession (embodied in legal provisions imposing some strict conditions for acquiring professional competence and liability for the medical act), are eluded by the permission granted to non-specialists to intervene, apparently without liability, on the human body.
  • The behaviour of a free and conscious man is the result of his will, which is guided by a reasonable intentionality that gives it meaning. In the absence of a purpose, any action becomes chaotic, accidental and raises questions about the mental health of the person who takes action 1 . We find that the fourth essential condition, a substantive one, necessary for the valid existence of the sales contract is the cause. According to the rules of common law, in matters of legal acts, the cause is the determining reason for the consent expr essed when concluding the legal act. The obligation without cause or with an illicit or false cause cannot have any effect.
  • Principiul suveranității naționale consacrat în art. 2 alin. (1) din Constituție se reflectă la nivelul Parlamentului prin suveranitatea acestuia. Un prim efect direct al suveranității forului legislativ este independența acestuia și a membrilor săi, precum și autonomia organizatorică, funcțională, financiară și disciplinară a Camerei Deputaților și Senatului. ...
  • Potrivit art. 246 C.pen., fapta de a îndepărta, prin constrângere sau corupere, un participant de la o licitație publică ori înțelegerea între participanți pentru a denatura prețul de adjudecare se pedepsește cu închisoarea de la unu la 5 ani. Conform art. 244 alin. (1) C.pen., inducerea în eroare a unei persoane prin prezentarea ca adevărată a unei fapte mincinoase sau ca mincinoasă a unei fapte adevărate, în scopul de a obține pentru sine sau pentru altul un folos patrimonial injust și dacă s-a pricinuit o pagubă, se pedepsește cu închisoarea de la 6 luni la 3 ani. Articolul 25 alin. (3) C.pr.pen. prevede că instanța, chiar dacă nu există constituire de parte civilă, se pronunță cu privire la desființarea totală sau parțială a unui înscris sau la restabilirea situației anterioare săvârșirii infracțiunii (cu notă parțial aprobativă).
  • Reclamanții nu pot solicita în temeiul răspunderii civile delictuale daune de la un terț pentru degradări aduse imobilului în condițiile în care au cumpărat imobilul în anul 2018 prin contract de vânzare-cumpărare în formă autentică și puteau invoca răspunderea civilă contractuală pentru vicii sau pentru evicțiune. Acțiunea în răspundere civilă delictuală este o acțiune personală care aparține proprietarului imobilului de la momentul producerii faptei ilicite și potrivit art. 1707 alin. (4) C.civ. reclamanții nu au dreptul să se plângă privitor la starea construcțiilor dobândite, deoarece lucrul dobândit are exact calitățile pe care le așteptau de la el. În categoria drepturilor accesorii se pot include drepturi reale (opozabile erga omnes), cum este, spre exemplu, dreptul de servitute, care se transmite automat odată cu înstrăinarea fondului (dominant sau aservit). În ceea ce privește eventualele drepturi personale consimțite de vânzător, ca regulă generală, acestea nu se transmit la cumpărător, care este un având cauză cu titlu particular. (Curtea de Apel Craiova, Secția I civilă, Decizia nr. 223 din 16 martie 2021,www.portaljust.ro)
  • In this article we shall present the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union concerning the right to entry and to stay of the third-countries nationals members of the family of the Union citizens, as it evolved from the beginning to the present day, with its incoherences and inconsistencies, but also with its advances. The Court of Justice has contributed to the European integration, through the freedom of movement, more than the political institutions of the Union (the Council, the Parliament and the Commission) , so that the new legislation adopted in this area has incorporated the jurisprudential acquis. The institution of the European citizenship, which transforms the Community and the Union into a more political organization, has also contributed to open the freedom of movement to the third-countries nationals in cases in which they couldn’t benefit of it and to transform the national legislation on immigration under the influence of the Union law as interpreted by the Court of Justice. Of course, the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice is often criticizable and, indeed, has encountered much criticism both from the part of the States and of the scholar literature for its openness to the third-countries nationals, which puts in danger the national legislations on immigration. We also gave our own opinion on the solutions of the Court, not only when we didn’t agree with them, but also when they has been criticised, in order to defend them because we considered that they are correct. As Romania is a member of the European Union, the implications of the jurisprudence in the area of the freedom of movement are of a great importance, so our study may contribute to inform the national jurisdictions in this respect.
  • The abuse of petitions committed by the natural persons is the most common form of abuse of law as the elements necessary to qualify a right as being abusively exercised, namely the subjective element (bad faith) and the objective element (diversion of the right from the purpose, economic and social finality or overcoming the internal limits of the law) presuppose a conduct of the holder of the right related to his mental ability to understand the meaning of the deed, to discern between what is good or bad, legal and illegal. This study analyzes the forms of abuse of right committed by persons deprived of liberty both at the level of courts of law and at the level of the offices of supervisory judges, as well as the psychic attitude of the subject towards the possibility of realizing the right in contradiction with its destination and purpose, and towards the consequences that may represent damages to the person, society or state. Even if the persons deprived of liberty constitute a vulnerable category of persons, the recognition of the right of access to justice, to petition, as well as of the possibility to use them at any time, as an application of the constitutional principle of equality of all persons before the law, does not confer them also the right to exercise them excessively, in a word, to abuse of them.
  • Guilt is that psychic attitude of the active subject, who – voluntarily committing an act provided by the criminal law, anti-juridical and imputable – is aware of the objective circumstances in which he externalizes his conduct or, although he does not have this conscience, should and could have it. Guilt is separate from the foresight of the criminal law and covers the subjective elements of the content of the crime. The structure of guilt includes two psychic processes, which are called factors thereof. The first is conscience or the intellective factor, and the second is the will or the volitional factor. The conscience deliberates on the deed and decides whether it will be committed. The will mobilizes the energy necessary for the implementation of the decision taken. The forms and modalities of guilt are defined by relating the conscience and the will to the objective circumstances. Intellectively, what relates to objective circumstances is the presence or absence of conscience. Volitionally, what relates to objective circumstances is the content of the will. Conscience can be present and objective circumstances can be represented correctly, when there is intent, direct or indirect. Conscience may be present, but objective circumstances may be misrepresented when there is premeditated guilt. Conscience may be absent when – in the presence of the obligation and of the possibility of predicting objective circumstances – there is guilt without foresight. Direct intent, indirect intent, and premeditated guilt are defined by the foresight of the objective circumstances. The direct intent is defined by pursuing the result, the indirect intent is defined by accepting the result, and the guilt with foresight is defined by rejecting the result. Guilt without foresight is defined by the failure to foresee the objective circumstances and by the obligation and the possibility to foresee them. The classification of the intent in direct and indirect is made according to the way of reporting the will to the result of the crime. The intent is direct, if the active subject pursues the result of the crime. According to the way in which the active subject prefigures the result of the crime, the direct intent has two degrees of intensity. Each degree in its turn has two stages. The active subject prefigures the result of the crime as an end in itself (the first stage of the first degree), as a necessary means to achieve another goal (the second stage of the first degree) or as an inevitable consequence (the first stage of the second degree) or very probable (the second stage of the second degree) of the manner in which the commission of the crime is conceived. The intent is indirect, if the active subject accepts the result of the crime. In case of indirect intent, two results are discussed. Indifference to the second result (which is illegal, provided by criminal law) is the essence of indirect intent. The classification of the intent into simple and qualified is made according to the existence of a special purpose or motive, expressly provided in the incrimination norm. The intent is simple, if the active subject commits the crime without pursuing a certain purpose and without being pushed by a certain motive, expressly provided in the incrimination norm. The intent is qualified, if the active subject commits the crime pursuing a certain purpose or being pushed by a certain motive, expressly provided in the incrimination norm. The qualified intent is direct when the characteristics of qualified intent and those of direct intent intertwine. The qualified intent can also be indirect, when the characteristics of the qualified intent dissociate from the characteristics of the direct intent. The qualified intent is direct, if: a certain circumstance is foreseen in the content of the crime both as a result and as a purpose or as a motive; a certain circumstance is provided in the content of the crime as a result and is prefigured by the active subject as a necessary means to achieve the special purpose or to satisfy the special motive or as an inevitable or very probable consequence of achieving the special purpose or satisfying the special motive. The qualified intent may also be indirect, if a certain circumstance is provided in the content of the crime as a result and another circumstance, different from the first, is provided as a special purpose or as a special motive and the result is not prefigured by the active subject neither for the achieving of the special purpose or for the satisfaction of the special motive, nor as an inevitable or very probable consequence of the achievement of the special purpose or of the satisfaction of the special motive. The classification of the intent into premeditated and spontaneous is made according to the mental state that the active subject has at the moment of making the decision to commit the crime, as well as the length of time between the time of making this decision and the time of its execution. The intent is premeditated, if the active subject decides to commit the crime in a state of calm and if from the moment of making the decision to commit the crime until the moment of its execution a longer time interval passes. There are two theories regarding premeditation: one objective and the other one subjective. In the objective theory it is considered that premeditation requires preparatory acts, that it is compatible with the provocation and that it is a personal circumstance, which is objectified in the content of the crime and produces the effects of a real circumstance. In the subjective theory, to which I adhere, premeditation does not require preparatory acts, is incompatible with the provocation and is a personal circumstance, which does not affect the participants. The intent is spontaneous, if the active subject decides to commit the crime in a state of over-excitement and if from the moment of making the decision to commit the crime until the moment of its execution, passes a time interval as short as possible. The intent is pure and simple, if it does not meet either the conditions of the premeditated intent, or the conditions of the spontaneous intent. The classifications of the intent highlight certain levels of danger of the active subject, which are investigated on the occasion of the individualization of the punishment. The different stages of danger of the active subject, detached from the different degrees and stages of intensity of the direct intent, impose different solutions with reference to the judicial individualization of the punishment. The danger stage of the active subject related to the indirect intent is lower than the one related to the direct intent. Qualified intent imprints a degree of danger, as a rule, greater or, exceptionally, lower of the active subject. The special purpose or motive enters into the content of the crime as a constitutive element or as an aggravating circumstantial element, as a rule, or as an attenuating circumstantial element, by exception. The premeditated intent is capitalized as an aggravating circumstantial element (in the content of the qualified murder), a general legal aggravating circumstance (pre-ordered intoxication) or an aggravating criterion of judicial individualization of the punishment. Spontaneous intent is capitalized as a legal, general (provocative) or special (killing or injuring the newborn by the mother) mitigating circumstance. Pure and simple intent is neutral from the point of view of judicial individualization.
  • Recognizing the climate emergency, and officially assuming the objectives of limiting the temperature growth up to 2 ° C and carbon neutrality work as an impulse for the establishing the constitutional basis of an adequate juridical and political reaction and for the institutionalizing the State’s and public authorities’ obligation to act against climate change. The presen ce of express referrals to climate in 10 fundamental laws and the ongoing initiatives for their modification and update in the sense of „climatizing” the pertinent provisions, reflect a vigorous process of constitutionalizing of the eco-climatic issues. Until then, assimilating climate to the enveloping concept of environment allows the extensive interpretation of existing dispositions, but the consolidation of the trend and the expression of the demands of the environmental transition impose inserting express constitutional provisions, well-articulated to the juridical and constitutional system as a whole. In this context, a special part is to be played by case law that by creative interpretation of existing text, supplies the directly regulated means of expression and suggest its apparition and its meanings. Regarding the Constitution of Romania, by interpreting the existent provisions (Article 35 which recognizes the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, Article 44 (7), and Article 135 (2) E and F), one can apprehend the general duty of any person, of the State, and of the public authorities, to protect and improve the environment, including climatically, the principle of non-regression and of constant progress in the field. The case law of the Constitutional Court of Romania, as well as the ECHR, is predisposed to „acclimatizing” developments, even if, for the time being, it has not had the chance to manifest itself notably in this direction. Under the impulse of international developments and of the strategic EU context (the Green Deal, the Climate Pact), more and more propositions come to life, in the sense of inscribing climate within the contents of the fundamental law.
  • The article aims to give a new interpretation of the functioning of the separation of powers principle, starting from the tango metaphor. Within it, music represents the principle (the supreme norm), dance, the gesturing of music, so the principle. The two protagonists of the dance (the man and the woman) are seen as the embodiment of the legislature and the executive. The judiciary is constituted by the dance teacher who is the main pawn in the tango logos, adapting the movements (sermo) to the music (ratio), while giving the framework in which to evolve the two protagonists who improvise starting from the principles. From the combination of music and dance, as ways of social organization, it results happiness. Against the background of a subtle harmony, the tango metaphor can account for the functioning of society, the relationship that is established between the tango partners, between them and music, between them and the dance teacher, but also between the protagonists and the public, shows how it works society as a whole.
  • The object of the contract 1 represents an essential substantive condition and validity of the contract and is a subject disputed in doctrine. The doctrinal dispute regarding the definition of the object of the contract generally has its origin in the polysemantic character of the term „object” 2 . Starting from the provisions of Article 962 of the Civil Code of 1864, the legal doctrine 3 has limited the object of the contract to the conduct of the parties established in that contract, to the action or inaction to which they are entitled or by which they are bound. In another opinion 4 it was mentioned that the object of the contract consists in the object of the obligations generated by it, i.e. in the service or services concerning the transmission of a right and a positive or negative fact of the debtor, as well as in the object of these services. The relation of determination between the object of the contract and the object of the obligation follows from the fact that all the characteristics of the latter have their origin in the nature of the object of the contract. In this sense, the current Civil Code removes the inaccuracy of the old Civil Code, which, in Article 964, confused the object of the contract with the object of the obligation. Thus, Article 1225 (1) of the current Civil Code provides that „The object of the contract is the legal operation, such as sale, lease, loan and others similar, agreed by the parties, as it appears from all contractual rights and obligations”. In other words, the object of the contract designates the legal operation through which an obligation is born, modified, extinguished, i.e. a legal relation, the content of which includes the rights and obligations of the parties 5 . The object of the obligation is the service to which the debtor is committed.
  • The study brings to attention the distinction, but also the relation between the operation of trust and the contract of trust, as a means of achieving an autonomous patrimonial property with character of destination. After analyzing the substantive, form, content and registration requirements of the contract, as well as the opposability of the assets in the trust property, the study focuses on the significance of the acceptance of the contract of trust by its beneficiary, as well as the acceptance mechanism, when one of the contracting parties is beneficiary. In the analysis of the prerogatives of the trustee’s property right as an effect of the contract, it is emphasized that this right is limited by the achievement of the purpose of the trust, found in the contract clauses and the duration of the contract, after which the trust property is subject to retrocession. The study tends to mark the distinction between the mandatary, term used or suggested by the regulation, and the position of the trustee in the configuration of the contract of trust, given that it concludes legal acts in the interest of the beneficiary and with an impact on the trust property. In regard to the trustee’s obligation to return the trust property at the expiration of the term or the achievement of the purpose of the trust, it is analyzed the distinction between this legal obligation of the trustee and the sale contract with repurchase agreement. The study also focuses on the acts of disposition that the trustee can make on the basis of a proxy, in the process of exploiting the trust property, stating that this right can be exercised only on the components of this property, individually or as a whole, and not on the trust property, which must remain intact, as a fraction of a universality.
  • Puțini sunt termenii din vocabularul științelor politice care să fi primit atât de multe definiții și caracterizări, de-a lungul timpului, cum este democrația. Fragmentul din Declarația Universală a Democrației pe care vi-l propun reflecției surprinde două aspecte ale termenului de democrație: unul instituțional, raportat la constituirea prin proceduri electorale democratice a instituțiilor reprezentative ale unui stat, la nivel național și local, și altul funcțional, raportat la puterea reală a poporului și mijloacele eficiente de care acesta poate dispune pentru a contribui, desigur, prin reprezentare, la activitatea legislativă și de control asupra acțiunilor Guvernului. Dacă primul aspect este relativ ușor de realizat, deși cunoașteți dovedite fraude electorale la nivel central și local, cel de-al doilea merită o atenție mai specială, întrucât nu cred că există un cetățean-alegător, grupuri de cetățeni-alegători, care să fie pe deplin convinși că sunt reprezentați, în mod real, în activitatea legislativă și, mai ales, în exercitarea funcției Parlamentului de control parlamentar.
  • Contractul de ipotecă poate fi desființat, sub forma anulării, numai în condițiile art. 1648 alin. (1) C.civ. în ceea ce privește soluționarea cererii de anulare a contractului de ipotecă, exclusiv ca o consecință a rezoluțiunii contractului de vânzare prin care pârâta a dobândit dreptul de proprietate asupra terenului, cu privire la care a constituit ulterior un drept real, reprezentat de dreptul de ipotecă în favoarea pârâtei. Aceste dispoziții fac trimitere însă la regulile de carte funciară, urmând, așadar, ca, în continuare, să fie observate dispozițiile art. 908 C.civ., ce reglementează ipotezele în care se poate dispune rectificarea cărții funciare.
  • Making the due observations regarding the legal content of Article 6 of the Law No 143/2000, republished in 2014, the authors came to the final conclusion that Article 6 of the mentioned law contains three distinct incriminations regarding the high-risk drug trafficking. Thus, Article 6 (1) of the Law No 143/2000, republished, includes the crime of high-risk drug trafficking, representing the medically unnecessary prescription of such substances by a doctor. In paragraph (2) of Article 6 of the same law it is incriminated the high-risk drug trafficking, by releasing such substances from pharmacies on the basis of a recipe that includes a prescription that is not medically necessary or is falsified. In paragraph (3) of Article 6 of the same law, the high-risk drug trafficking is incriminated, by obtaining such substances from a pharmacy based on a fictitious medical recipe. In conclusion, the authors state, if a drug addict doctor prescribes to himself high-risk drugs on a recipe without being medically necessary and obtains them from a pharmacy, he will commit two crimes in real concurrence, namely the one provided in Article 6 (1) and the one provided in Article 6 (3) of the Law No 143/2000, republished.
  • The statement that he is the sole heir, given by the successor to the notary public, within the notarial successoral procedure, even if it is untrue and made in order to establish the inaccuracy of the persons entitled to acquire the succession patrimony, does not constitute a statement within the meaning required by the provisions of Article 326 of the Criminal Code, because it does not meet the essential condition that, according to the law or the circumstances, it should serve to produce the legal consequence pursued by the declarant. According to Article 108 (1) first sentence of the Law on public notaries and notarial activity No 36/1995, the quality of successor and/or, as the case may be, the title of legatee, as well as their number shall be established by civil status documents, by will and with witnesses. If the evoked legal provision does not mention the statement of the successor among the means of evidence by which the quality or number of successors can be proved, the inaccurate statement given by the successor is incapable of producing the intended legal effect, in the sense that the number and quality of successors cannot be established based on it. Moreover, as a legal nature, the statement of the successor is not a means of evidence, but a simple procedural act, performed within the notarial successoral procedure.
  • On 2 November 2020, it was published in the Official Journal of Romania, Part I, No 1019, the Law No 228/2020 for the amendment and completion of some normative acts in the criminal field in order to transpose some directives of the European Union (hereinafter, the Law No 228/2020), an act that modifies and completes both Law No 286/2009 regarding the Criminal Code and Law No 135/2010 on the Code of Criminal Procedure. Among the changes made by the legislator in the Criminal Code is the introduction of the extended confiscation in the case of third parties (which I will generically call „third party acquirers”) so that, taking into account this newly introduced hypothesis, this study aims, in a first stage, to address the issue, starting from the evolution of the institution of extended confiscation from the perspective of the european and national legislative framework, then continuing with a brief analysis of the changes made by Law No 228/2020. Finally, the article examines the possibility of ordering the extended confiscation security measure in the case of third parties in relation to the relevant doctrine and jurisprudence in this matter. In a second stage, the present study aims to examine from a procedural perspective the guarantees imposed by Directive (EU) 2014/42 and which the Romanian legislator, in order to respect the right to a fair trial, provides to the third party acquirer during the criminal proceedings, with a closer look at the existence of an effective remedy for the decisions of the courts of appeal which order for the first time the measure of extended confiscation. Also, this part analyzes the possible quality that the acquiring third party has during the criminal process. Finally, before drawing conclusions on those analyzed, it will also be shown how the other Member States have provided/transposed into their national legislation the particular hypothesis of extended confiscation in the case of third parties.
  • The action against climate change involves both civil society and public authorities. Putting them in an appropriate relationship is a historic challenge, and the climate paradigm is the context necessary for defining this relationship for the future. The issue of climate change occurs, at the level of public administration systems, at a time of transformations generated by a broad liberal trend at the level of the administrative action and of the administration-citizen relationship, and the generalization of dialogue between administration and citizens is a way to promote some new forms of action, such as the collaborative one, as a model of future administrative conduct. The problems of global warming and of the effects of climate change have imposed the intensification of the movement of association of the public to the decision-making process and the emergence of new forms of manifestation, in the sense of involving citizens in political options with a strong eco-climatic, scientific and technical dimension. Receiving extremely diverse characterizations, some even severe, from „innovation” to democratic „scam”, the public decision-making procedures with the substantial and direct involvement of citizens, such as those exposed, can be a solution to the growing lack of legitimacy of the traditional representative instruments, insufficiently able to meet the requirements of the eco-climatic emergency.
  • In the judicial doctrine and practice, the differences of opinion and the plurality of the proposed solutions are not only an inherent effect of a current, complex and moldable legal reality, but also a desideratum of identifying the correct way of interpreting the legal norms in force and of resolving the legal disputes brought to justice. One of the legal institutions specific to administrative law among the most disputed over the last three decades is the one aimed at legally empowering the courts of law to verify the way in which the public administration authorities exercise their discretionary power to assess the opportunity to issue/adopt administrative documents, as well as the identification of the limits and, possibly, of the exceptions that can be retained from the rule of judicial control over the activity of the public institutions. The analysis of the legal topic in question will consider the approach of some didactic, linguistic, grammatical and of legal analysis methods, integrated and synergistic, having as sole finality the clarification of the meaning and of the limits, objective and subjective, of the right of appreciation and of the discretionary power which the public institutions benefit from. Therefore, it is required, in the beginning, to reveal the polyvalent meaning, attributed in the ordinary language to the notion „opportunity”, semantics that will be the basis for identifying the legal guarantees inherent to the process of exercising by the public administration authorities of the right to assess the time and appropriate means of issuance/adoption of the administrative acts. In the present study, without pretending to exhaust the issues presented above and to put an end to the long differences of opinion that it has caused, we intend to identify the various opinions expressed in the specialized literature, to provide a systematic interpretation of the various solutions adopted by the courts of law and, finally, to propose a viable and pertinent solution to the legal issue under discussion, offering logical-legal arguments and of teleological interpretation of the various competing legal norms, incidental in this legal matter. We intend to offer, through the conclusions of this study, a valuable and applied tool to practitioners in the field of administrative law, in identifying possible answers to complex and elaborate questions, involved by the activity of resolving the legal disputes brought to court with such an object.
  • The refund of the judicial stamp duty, as a result of the admission in whole or in part of an enforcement appeal, is a matter that has generated a non-unitary judicial practice. In this study, the author aims to analyze the way in which the national courts have interpreted and applied the rules governing the appellant’s right to recover the judicial stamp duty, as well as to identify legal solutions in relation to the various hypotheses presented.
  • As a result of the measures taken at the level of the Member States in order to combat the COVID-19 pandemic, the statistics show that the number of teleworkers has increased and, at the same time, telework can become an „endless job” with negative effects on the mental and physical health condition of teleworkers. In this context, at the level of the European Union, it was appreciated that it is necessary to secure the labour relations of teleworkers by unification of the legislations of the Member States in terms of the right to disconnect. The implicit way of regulating this right, which also exists in Romania, does not create an adequate protection for teleworkers. Exercising the right to disconnect implies a clear delimitation of the working time and of the rest time and the obligation of employers to monitor and measure the daily working time provided by teleworkers, as it results from the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. The role of the social partners is essential for the implementation of the right to disconnect and appropriate individual information measures must be taken in order to ensure that the employee is sensitized and made aware of the risks associated with permanent availability. Artificial intelligence creates the premises for telework to evolve into smartworking, which gives the teleworker full autonomy in choosing the place where he performs work.
  • Although we are close to the tenth anniversary of the entry into force of the new Civil Code, the doctrine outlined around the institution of granting the benefit of family dwelling place at divorce has had reservations in providing solutions to some crucial issues for solving this type of applications. At the same time, the courts have frequently come up with contradictory solutions to these issues, however some guiding solutions can be distinguished. The main aspects on which we noted the existence of some divergences have concerned the admissibility by separate way, after the pronouncement of the divorce, of the application for the allocation of the dwelling that served as a family dwelling. Another hypothesis on which we will focus in the present study is that of possession of the dwelling place by the spouses on t he basis of other rights than those expressly raised for discussion in Article 324 of the Civil Code, such as the right of usufruct or the one arisen from the loan agreement. At the same time, we will try to offer several arguments based on which the courts could assign to the non-title holder spouse of the lease contract, under certain conditions, even the dwelling place with special rental regime initially allocated to the other spouse according to the criteria provided by the Law No 152/1998 1 , there being numerous discussions around this subject just before the entry into force of the current Civil Code. The debates behind these divergences are not only of interest to legal theorists, but have strong practical implications, the fate of the entire application depending on the solution offered, thus being essential to establish some stable and predictable rules, especially in a matter where safety should prevail, given the often vulnerable situation of the parties involved in the process. Therefore, the present study tries to offer some adequate solutions for the above-mentioned inconveniences, starting with the analysis of the criteria which the legislator has created for the allocation of the conjugal dwelling place, especially in the higher interest of the minor, following that, in the second part of the study, we would actually deal with the issues mentioned.
  • The authors of this article, starting from a case, approach the new regulation of the novation contract by changing the debtor, analyzing some legal limits of this type of contract, in the hypotheses in which, the new debtor – legal entity – takes over a debt free of charge. In this sense, highlighting the limits provided by the Constitution, the Civil Code, the Law on companies No 31/1990 1 , Criminal Code, Law on the procedures for preventing insolvency and for insolvency No 85/2014 2 , conclude that the novation contract by changing the debtor and taking over free of charge the debt of the old debtor by a legal entity third party is prohibited by several mandatory provisions of the Civil Code, the Law on companies No 31/1990, the Criminal Code and the Law on the procedures for preventing insolvency and for insolvency 85/2014. To admit otherwise means to accept the enrichment of the old debtor without just cause, to favour the administrators of the old debtor to evade the responsibility for being brought into insolvency or state of default, as well as the prejudice of the new debtor’s associates, his creditors, etc.
  • Două opțiuni a avut Adunarea Constituantă în 1991 cu privire la echilibrarea raporturilor între puteri, îndeosebi între Parlament, ca depozitar suveran al puterii legislative și cele două autorități de vârf ale puterii executive: Președintele României și Guvernul 1 . Fiecare opțiune cu avantajele, neajunsurile și riscurile ei. Adunarea Constituantă ar fi putut să instituie republica parlamentară, ca specie eminamente și formal democratică a regimului parlamentar, consacrat și prin constituțiile din 1866 și din 1923, dar nealterat esențial de regimurile autoritare ulterioare, sau să modifice tradiția parlamentară a regimului politic și să instituie un alt tip de regim. Regimul prezidențial nici nu a intrat în calculele Adunării Constituante, deoarece acesta, ca tip de separație și echilibrare a puterilor, nu a putut fi extins la niciun popor în forma sa clasică, izbutită exclusiv în Statele Unite ale Americii...
  • Potrivit art. 46 alin. (1) C.pr.pen., pentru motive temeinice privind mai buna desfășurare a judecății, instanța poate dispune disjungerea acesteia cu privire la unii dintre inculpați sau la unele dintre infracțiuni. Conform art. 421 pct. 2 lit. b) C.pr.pen., instanța, judecând apelul, pronunță una dintre următoarele soluții: admite apelul și desființează sentința primei instanțe și dispune rejudecarea de către instanța a cărei hotărâre a fost desființată pentru motivul că judecarea cauzei la acea instanță a avut loc în lipsa unei părți nelegal citate sau care, legal citată, a fost în imposibilitate de a se prezenta și de a înștiința instanța despre această imposibilitate, invocată de acea parte. Rejudecarea de către instanța a cărei hotărâre a fost desființată se dispune și atunci când instanța nu s-a pronunțat asupra unei fapte reținute în sarcina inculpatului prin actul de sesizare sau asupra acțiunii civile ori când există vreunul dintre cazurile de nulitate absolută, cu excepția cazului de necompetență, când se dispune rejudecarea de către instanța competentă. Articolul 6 paragr. 1 din Convenția (europeană) pentru apărarea drepturilor omului și a libertăților fundamentale (în continuare „Convenția”) stabilește că orice persoană are dreptul la judecarea cauzei sale în mod echitabil, în mod public și într-un termen rezonabil, de către o instanță independentă și imparțială, instituită de lege, care va hotărî fie asupra încălcării drepturilor și obligațiilor sale cu caracter civil, fie asupra temeiniciei oricărei acuzații în materie penală îndreptate împotriva sa. Potrivit art. 2 paragr. 1 din Protocolul nr. 7 la Convenție, orice persoană declarată vinovată de o infracțiune de către un tribunal are dreptul să ceară examinarea declarației de vinovăție sau a condamnării de către o jurisdicție superioară. Exercitarea acestui drept, inclusiv motivele pentru care acesta poate fi exercitat, sunt reglementate de lege. (cu notă aprobativă).
  • În temeiul dispozițiilor art. 1 alin. (1), art. 8 alin. (1), art. 18 alin. (3) și art. 19 din Legea nr. 554/2004 1 , care reglementează regimul juridic al acțiunii în despăgubiri, revine instanței de contencios administrativ să se pronunțe asupra dreptului la repararea pagubei cauzate, analizând condițiile de admisibilitate a cererii, inclusiv existența dreptului la reparație și modalitatea de acordare a acesteia. Astfel, acțiunea având ca obiect repararea pagubei produse ca urmare a anulării unor acte administrative atrage, în raport cu aceste dispoziții legale, competența instanței de contencios administrativ, potrivit principiului general de drept conform căruia legea specială derogă de la legea generală. „Specialia generalibus derogant” este un principiu juridic ce implică faptul că norma specială e cea care derogă de la norma generală și că norma specială este de strictă interpretare la cazul respectiv. Mai mult, o normă generală nu poate înlătura de la aplicare o normă specială. Fiind derogatorie de la norma generală, rezultă că norma specială se aplică ori de câte ori ne găsim în fața unui caz ce intră sub incidența prevederilor sale, deci norma specială se aplică prioritar față de norma generală, chiar și atunci când norma specială este mai veche decât norma generală. Aplicarea principiului conform căruia legea specială derogă de la legea generală are ca efect înlăturarea dreptului comun de la aplicare. Așadar, incidența acestui principiu înlătură, totodată, posibilitatea coexistenței a două căi judiciare, una pe legea specială și cealaltă pe dreptul comun. (Î.C.C.J., s. a I-a civ., Dec. nr. 1016 din 2 iunie 2020, www.scj.ro)
  • Unitatea Teritorială de Analiză a Informațiilor (UTAI) Oradea nu a desfășurat activități de punere în executare a vreunui mandat de supraveghere, în speță, ci doar a transmis cererea organelor de cercetare penală și ulterior a transmis către acestea răspunsul primit de la operatorii de telefonie mobilă. Prin urmare, nu se poate aprecia că aceștia au administrat probe în dosar, ci doar au intermediat, fără a face cercetări suplimentare, transmiterea corespondenței între organul de cercetare penală și operatorii de telefonie mobilă, acesta fiind și motivul pentru care nu aveau nevoie de aviz de poliție judiciară, întrucât nu desfășurau acte de urmărire penală. (Judecătoria Oradea, Secția penală, Încheierea nr. 198 din 10 ianuarie 2020).
  • The article presents the interpretation established by the Court of Justice of the European Union of Article 8 (1) (c) of the Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, as amended by Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009, according to which the notion „arrest warrant”, as set out in this provision, is to be understood as designating a national arrest warrant distinct from the European arrest warrant. From another perspective, there are analyzed the consequences of the Decision in the Case C-241/15 and the effects on the procedure for enforcing the European arrest warrant of the requested person issued by a judicial authority from a Member State of the European Union.
  • The cases that justify a home search are still the subject of important controversies both in doctrine and especially in practice. Also, the delimitation between the situation in which the criminal investigation agents enter a person’s home in order to carry out a home search and the situations in which the police agents are obliged to enter a home to fulfil their duties is of ten extremely sensitive. It is precisely these controversies that often lead state agents to be reluctant to enter a private space in order to avoid being accused of committing a crime. We hope that this study will prove to be a useful tool in identifying those hypotheses in which it is really necessary to resort to a home search as well as the criteria for delimiting the search and other institutions of criminal procedural law.
  • The completion of the criminal justice activity requires the immediate execution of the final criminal decisions and continuity in the enforcement activity. However, there are also exceptional situations in which the report on criminal enforcement law is suspended as a result of impediments to the execution of the punishment. Such a situation is also the postponement of the execution of the prison sentence or life imprisonment. Postponing the execution of the punishment is not a removal of the punishment imposed on the convict, but only the delay from which it is to begin, being an exception to the rule of immediate enforcement of the criminal judgment. In order to avoid situations of unjustified delay in the execution of the punishment, or even to the abolition of punishment, the legislator provided expressly and limitatively the cases and conditions in which the sentenced person may obtain the postponement of the execution of the punishment. Far from being exhaustive, the present study can represent a supporting element for certain legal or practical clarifications related to the institution of postponing the execution of imprisonment or life imprisonment.
  • Starting from the specifics of the action in deficiency in the European Union law, the author pleads for the reconsideration of this action in the Romanian administrative law, as a legal means of stimulating the public administration in exercising the attributions regarding the organization of the law enforcement, so that it can become concretely applicable. In this sense, there are presented the theoretical and practical considerations that converge towards the recognition in our law as well of the defective action in accordance with the provisions of the European Union law, as well as the proposals de lege ferenda regarding the reconfiguration of the legal regime of this action.
  • In this study, the author analyzes, in the light of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the manner of observing the principle of impartiality of the Romanian judges within the national procedures regarding the establishment and functioning of the associations and foundations. Within the introductory section, general elements regarding the freedom of peaceful assembly and association are presented, according to Article 11 of the Convention. Subsequently, the relevant provisions of the Government Ordinance No 26/2000 on associations and foundations are emphasized. Their analysis, from the perspective of the civil side of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,considers the minimum standard imposed on Romania by this treaty. After presenting the conventional reference provisions applicable at the level of the Member States of the Council of Europe, the author demonstrates the lack of a hermetic delimitation between the subjective impartiality and the objective impartiality of the national judge, in the analyzed hypothesis. At the same time, it is outlined the need to respect the role of neutral arbitrator of the court. Based on the rich case law of the European Court of Human Rights, the author manages to capture the shortcomings of the national regulation. This study includes both a theoretical and practical debate on the obligations and responsibility of the Romanian state, according to the Convention, and a proposal de lege ferenda, in order to respect the principle of impartiality of judges. In relation to the large number of case files registered annually by courts of first instance, regarding the establishment and functioning of associations and foundations, the study is also an alarm signal, in order to avoid the responsibility of the Romanian state, according to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
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