This paper aims to analyse the interconnectivity between the will of the donor and the general validity requirements for donations in the Romanian civil law. As part of the continental tradition of civil law, the 2009 Civil Code of Romania maintains the will theory at the forefront of its contract law. Within this framework, the legal concept of will encompasses the mental process of volition, during which the individual reflects and arrives at a decision, and the utterance of said decision. As a result, the notion of free will forms the foundation of contractual freedom. Through its gratuitous nature, a donation is both a contract and an act of liberality. As such, the legislator’s reluctance in the field of liberalities has influenced how the general requirements of validity were ultimately shaped. Liberalities are demarcated, from the volitional point of view, by the liberal intent of the donor, and from the economic standpoint, by the reduction of the donor’s patrimony. This impoverishment of the donor is the source of the legislator’s reluctance. Thus, our effort sets out to trace the influence of the liberal intent upon the general validity requirements of a donation contract. For this purpose, the present paper is divided into four main sections, corresponding to said requirements: cause, consent, capacity and object. While cause and consent derive naturally from the will theory, capacity and object were also subordinated to the liberal intent of the donor. As such, the common incapacity was entwined with a special variant which absolutely presumes the suggestion or captation of the donor’s mind. In regard to the object, the donor cannot dispose of the good belonging to another, unlike in the case of a sale contract.

The direct action in the guarantee for hidden vices is still a new subject in the legal doctrine and especially in the Romanian judicial practice. At present, judicial practice has not committed such an action, although the issue has been debated, both in the doctrine of the old Civil Code, and especially in the doctrine of the new Civil Code. What is even more surprising is that the legislator understood to directly regulate such direct action in the case of the guarantee for eviction, without regulating it in the case of the cover for hidden vices. If technical and legal issues seem relatively simple in the case of direct action for hidden vices against a previous vendor or first seller, things get complicated when it comes to direct action in hidden vices against the contractor. The present study aims to identify the legal nature and the basis of the direct action in the guarantee for hidden vices against the contractor, thus establishing its admissibility criteria. By the arguments that we will render, we hope to contribute to the shaping of some defining elements of direct action that will facilitate its practical application.

The judicial administrator will submit a monthly report containing the description of how he has performed his duties, an account of the expenses incurred with the administration of the procedure or of other expenses made from the funds existing in the debtor’s estate, as well as, if necessary, the stage of performing the inventory. The report will also mention the fee received by the judicial administrator, by specifying modality of calculation thereof. The report will be submitted to the case file and an extract shall be published in the BIP. Every 120 days, the syndic-judge will analyze and rule on the stage of continuation of the procedure, through a resolution by which he will be able to establish certain measures as duty of the judicial administrator and he will grant an administrative term of control or of trial, as the case may be. In the event that there are contentious or non-contentious applications, as well as in the hypothesis in which the syndic-judge deems it necessary, he will order the urgent summoning of the interested persons and of the judicial administrator, for the purpose of solving the applications or for ordering the necessary measures.

The generation of public procurement directives1 adopted in 2014 supplemented the number of exclusion grounds from the contract award procedure, adding, inter alia, the hypothesis from Article 57 (4) (d): „where the contracting authority has sufficiently plausible indications to conclude2 that the economic operator has entered into agreements with other economic operators aimed at distorting competition”. The respective exclusion ground has been regulated in the public procurement directives as an optional ground, being however provided for the Member States the possibility to transpose it into national laws as a compulsory ground. This regulatory modality, which inexplicably restricts the scope of incidence only at the conclusion of agreements, although competition can be affected by other methods, and which allows different transpositions by the Member States, has led many doctrinaires to react critically to the prospect that such an important exclusion ground generate a relatively narrow and non-unitary practice at Union level.

The article presents the constitutional landmarks which justify the sanction of the absolute nullity of the violation of the provisions referring to the material competence and competence according to the person’s quality of the criminal investigation body and analyzes this nullity from the perspective of the processual and procedural documents that establish the sanction, which has the effect of resumption of the criminal prosecution by the competent body or the exclusion of some processual documents or probative procedures.

În lipsa unui probatoriu care să demonstreze existența unei activități autonome a inculpaților de inițiere, respectiv constituire a unei grupări infracționale, activitate care să rămână distinctă de comiterea infracțiunii ce a constituit scopul acesteia și care să vizeze organizarea acțiunilor infracționale, prin fixarea modalității și a coordonatelor de săvârșire a acestora, precum și a sarcinilor și rolului fiecărui membru în cadrul grupării constituite, fapta capătă valențele juridice ale pluralității ocazionale, prevăzute de articolul 77 lit. a) C.pen.