Personality’s rights are non-patrimonial rights, inherent to the natural person, in the sense that they are directly attached to and inseparable from the real man, and they serve to the free development of his personality. The new Civil Code regulates the following rights of the personality: right to life, right to health, right to physical and mental integrity, right to dignity, right to respect for private life, right to his own image, identification attributes of the natural person, and the right to dispose of oneself. They can be grouped in two categories: rights that protect the human body and its biological functions, and rights that protect moral values. The first category of rights is governed by three principles: the principle of inviolability of the human body (which may suffer certain exceptions); the principle of non-patrimoniality of the human body, and the principle of the priority of interest and of the good of the human being. The rights which protect moral values have a content determined by their relation to a series of generic notions, incompatible with a precise definition, such as freedom, honor, private life, respect, for which reason the Romanian lawmaker strove to contour such notions; as well as by the regulation of some of the deeds which may impair such rights. Some of the personality’s rights may suffer limitations, which are imposed either by the necessity to protect some major public values, or by the exercise of other persons’ similar rights.

The above study constitutes a theoretical synthesis of the jurisprudence of the High Court of Cassation and Justice of Romania from the last years in the field of legislation regarding the restitution of the immovable assets abusively taken over by the State in the period comprised between 1945 and 1989; of the interpretation of contracts in consideration of the real will of the parties; of the proxy’s fault in the mandate contract and of certain civil procedure issues, taking into account also the provisions of the new Romanian Civil Code (Law No. 287/ 2009, as amended by Law No. 71/2011), which has recently come into force (as of October 1, 2011).

According to Art. 244 para. (1) of the current (Romanian) Civil Procedure Code, the court may suspend trial if: – the settlement of the case depends, in full or in part, on the existence or inexistence of a right that forms the object of another trial; – criminal prosecution was initiated for a crime which would have a decisive influence on the decision to be issued. The author examines this text by correlation to Art. 248 et seq. of the same Code regulating superannuation. In this context, the author believes that the request to reopen the suspended case according to Art. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code for the re-initiation of trial is not a procedural act which must be fulfilled by the court ex officio. Moreover, the court of law may only re-place the case on the dockets to ascertain superannuation, on which occasion it shall have to grant trial expenses to the defendant or respondent in appeal (as applicable), which requests or produces proof of such expenses.

The above study makes a detailed analysis on the precise meaning of Art. 821 para. (1) of Law No. 161/2003, according to which “The deputy or senator who, during the exercise of term of office of a member of Parliament, desires to exert the profession of attorney at law may not plead in the cases judged by the courts of law or tribunals, nor may they provide legal services to the prosecutors’ offices attached to such courts of law.” In this context, the author concludes that the legal limitation of the interdiction mentioned only under the “pleading” in front of the courts of law and tribunals (or granting the legal assistance to the prosecutor’s offices attached to such courts of law), since the reasons which imposed the regulation under discussion are identical also in the situation of the cases which are judged by higher courts of law (Courts of Appeal, High Court of Cassation and Justice).

Starting from the case of Vergu vs. Romania, recently settled (January 11, 2011) by the European Court of Human Rights, the author, in light of Art. 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights, discusses the issue related to the right to a prior effective recourse with the internal (national) court of law, a sine qua non prior condition for notifying the Strasbourg Court, concluding that the European court of law (must make the severe application of the subsidiary nature principle. Only under entirely exceptional cases, with grounded motivations, in a circumspect and entirely isolated manner, may the Strasbourg Court release the claimant from its obligation to exhaust the internal means (of effective recourse with the national court).

In this study, the author examines Law No. 133/2011 for the amendment of several provisions of Law No. 360/2002 regarding the policeman’s status. The author has also certain positive appreciations on these amendments, but she primarily retains a series of negative sides on Law No. 133/2011, especially by the fact that the mentioned law provides that “the procedure and cases for modifying and/or suspending the policeman’s business relations shall be established under an order issued by the minister of administration and internal affairs”, which is, in the author’s opinion, contrary to the principles of the Romanian Constitution.