The administration of evidence necessarily implies that the evidence is first proposed and produced (submitted) by the parties and then approved by the court. The legislator of the Civil Procedure Code instituted a regime of evidence renewed in its spirit and in its formal expression, devoting, in addition to the general provisions on the administration of evidence (Articles 260–263 of the Civil Procedure Code), also some provisions specific to the administration of evidence by written documents (Articles 292–300 of the Civil Procedure Code), as well as to the conduct of the procedures for verification of documents (Articles 301–308 of the Civil Procedure Code). As a rule, the production (submission) of the documents takes place voluntarily, under the terms and conditions set by law. However, in some cases, the documents relating to the pending trial are not produced voluntarily, whereas their presentation in court could have consequences for those who hold them or for their spouse, kin or relatives. The attitude of the person who holds the document not to produce it voluntarily may have different motives: family secret, business secret, confidentiality, strictly personal matters about the dignity or private life of a person, etc. In other cases, bringing written documents to court would be too expensive or the documents would be too voluminous or numerous. In such cases, the justice of the dialogue will prevail. From the correlation of the provisions of the final sentence of Article 22 (2) with those of Article 254 (2), Article 254 (5) of the Civil Procedure Code, it appears that the legislator draws attention to the cooperation which must exist between the judge and the parties, as regards the evidence of facts, without thereby understanding that the judge substitutes the parties, automatically filling the passivity of the party either a claimant, or a defendant

In this article, the author analyzes the legal nature of the Constitutional Court, a political jurisdictional authority of jurisdiction, whose role consists mainly in controlling the constitutionality of laws and of other acts adopted by the Romanian Parliament and by the Government. The Constituent Assembly of 1991 opted for the institutionalization of the European model of constitutional jurisdiction, according to which a body independent in relation to the powers of the State assumes the role of guarantor of the supremacy of the Constitution. The constituent legislators have preferred to abandon the control of the constitutionality of laws enforced by the supreme court, which was established by the Fundamental Law of 1923. In the constitutional architecture of the Romanian State, designed after the change of the political regime at the end of 1989, the Constitutional Court is a political-jurisdictional body whose legal nature derives from the way in which it is organized and structured, as well as from the attributions conferred to it by the Constitution. At the same time, the Constitutional Court also appears as a regulating body of the public authorities with governing powers in the state, which it obliges, through its decisions, to return to the constitutional legality. The author highlights both the political and the judicial nature of the Constitutional Court and shows that there must be a balance between the two essential characteristics of this public authority, in order for it to fulfil its constitutional role in a complete independence and impartiality and not to transform itself into a political tool for solving the relations between powers, especially between the legislative power and the executive power, which should benefit to one or another of the political actors.

The article deals with the legal regime of the convict’s money, their sources of origin and the destinations for their use during detention, in the Romanian criminal law and jurisprudence, bringing to light some proposals aimed at improving the situation of some categories of detainees in a state of economic precariousness. The objectives of the article are to determine the content of the notion of convict’s money in the current Romanian legislation, their sources of origin and the destinations for their use during detention, as well as to determine whether the current Romanian legislation complies with the requirements of the international instruments and whether the chosen legislative solutions are similar to those in other European states. The results show that the notion of prisoner’s money should include the money due to the convicted for the work done in prison, the sums received from natural or legal persons during detention and the amounts found upon them at the arrival in the penitentiary. It can be concluded that the amounts of money shown in the nominal account can be used for extinguishing the civil obligations established by the criminal conviction decision, without violating the rights of the detainees to receive, buy and possess goods, the right to telephone conversations, the right to petition and correspondence, the right to food, personal hygiene, the right to photocopy documents from the individual file and the right to medical treatment. The results also show that the present Romanian legislation regarding prisoner’s money complies with the international rules, such as the „Nelson Mandela Rules”, the U.N. Convention against torture adopted in 1984, ECHR/the Convention or the European Penitentiary Rules REC (2006)2, and it is similar to the legislation of other European states, such as France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Germany or Austria, regarding the sources from which this money may be legally obtained, and the destinations for which this money may be used. In the case of those detainees who do not obtain income from work, it may be beneficial for a regulation to provide, within a reasonable limit, an exemption from the attachment of their money. For all inmates who do not have income, provisions should be made for the prison administration to bear, within a reasonable degree, the cost of national telephone calls made by convicts in order to keep in touch with their family. The implications are to clarify the issues discussed, facilitating a unitary practice, supported by solutions in the jurisprudence.

According to the provisions of Article 260 paragraph 2 of the Criminal Code of 1968 [Article 273 (3) of the Criminal Code], both the „active” false testimony (the situation in which the witness gives false statements) and the „passive” false testimony (in which case the witness does not say everything he knows about essential circumstances he was asked) may be withdrawn, with the mention that, in the latter case, the witness must provide full and real details, which he perceived directly, which were essential and of which he was asked. In order to constitute a cause of non-punishment, the withdrawal of the false testimony must be carried out in the case in which it was given, and not in the case in which the criminal prosecution is conducted or in which the offence of false testimony is examined.

The present study analyzes the working hypotheses in the matter of the preliminary procedure regarding claims from European funds. The study identifies a number of working scenarios, starting from the particular way in which these claims arise, specific to European funding mechanisms. Another filter in the analysis is given by an irregularity in the management of funding, an irregularity that is treated differently as it appears before or after the payment, taking into account the variable, if it generates a debt to be recovered from the European Union budget/international public donors and/or national public funds related to them through an undue payment. Thus, the study observes a series of nuances in the hypothesis of undue payments, similar shades of contentious type to tax procedures1.

New technologies, such as wireless communications, generate unique threats to human health and to the quality of the environment. Among them, electromagnetic fields (EMF) – of the relay antennas or power lines – represent a colourless, odourless and invisible pollution with adverse sanitary effects. As the technologies of the field are rapidly evolving, even before their negative consequences can be sufficiently researched and proven by science, they create difficulties for the ability of the right to adapt and respond appropriately to the new problems thus raised. Among the first legal reactions in the matter are those registered as regards the human rights, especially ECHR case law, which assimilates the EMF threats in the context of Article 8 of the Convention, involves the precautionary principle and imposes the notion of gravity threshold. The Case Calancea and others v. The Republic of Moldova (2018) represents an important moment in the opening of the Strasbourg court to the new problems of EMF and, despite the reluctance manifested by means of the judgment delivered, this implies a recognition of the existence and of the need for legal assimilation of new threats to human rights and the jurisprudential consolidation, in this context, of the right to a healthy environment.