In the study hereby, the author provides a critical analysis of the various positions adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court of Justice in terms of the relationship existing between the practical need of making use of hearsay evidence in criminal proceedings and the obligation incumbent upon the legal bodies to guarantee the culprit the effective exercise of the opportunity to test via counter interrogation the reliability of such evidence. The author proposed that the analysis of judicial practice to be carried out compliant with the structure followed within the specialty works in the United States, in order to distinctly put forward each category of cause in which a conflict might arise between the admissibility of hearsay evidence and compliance with the procedural guarantees established under the law in favour of the culprit and to distinctly highlight, for each category in question, solutions framed by the U.S. Supreme Court of Justice with the view to settle the conflict arisen.

In the study hereby, the author sets under review the body search institution, from the perspective of theoretical and practical approaches. Body search has a distinct character, being undertaken in some cases separately from other evidence procedures, but it is also frequently undertaken on home searches, detention or arrest of a person. The author puts forward, within the study, the main legal regulations applicable in the field of body search, focusing on the new amendments to the new Code of Criminal Procedure, and reasoning some de lege ferenda proposals.

Taking our stand upon the differing regulations under Article 283 and Article 315 of Law No. 1/2011 on National Education (texts according to which, as far as the pre-university teaching staff is concerned, recovery of damages to the employing unit in consequence of patrimonial liability takes place based on a charging decision, while, as far as the higher education teaching staff is concerned, the recovery in question takes place according to the labour law, so, as a rule, by way of the employer’s proceedings before the Labour Court of jurisdiction), the author makes a series of critical approaches (pointing out that this distinction in the procedure is not justified) and, concurrently, puts forward de lege ferenda proposals.

In the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, the issue of a broad interpretation of the right to marriage is all the more acutely debated, while the Court is beset with applications filed by homosexual and transgender individuals to have this right recognized. In the current state of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, the marriage of a couple in which one of the partners has resorted to a sexual Convention through gender reassignment surgery is considered legitimate (within the meaning of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms), stating that this is also a case of heterosexual marriage. However, so far, the European Court of Human Rights has not considered legitimate marriages between persons of the same biological sex (gay or lesbian).

The accession of Romania to the European Union on January 1st, 2007 also involved the need for harmonization of national legislation with the European one, which, inter alia, led to the elaboration of a new Criminal Code. This regulation covers some new elements, including the crime of harm to the unborn child, as provided for in Article 202 under the new Criminal Code, as an integral part of Title I of the Special Part dedicated to crime against the person. As stated in the Explanatory Memorandum to the new Criminal Code, by criminalizing such acts it was intended to cover a legal vacuum, i.e. to protect the fetus from the moment of the commencement of the delivery process until completion thereof. In the study hereby, the author examines from the criminal doctrine perspective, but also in terms of medical science, the meaning of the term fetus and the phrases “during childbirth” and “during pregnancy”, advancing some de lege ferenda proposals.

Under the study hereby, the author sets under review the institution of “recidivism” in the light of the new Criminal Code. Essentially, highlighting new issues both in relation to the definition and the terms of recidivism, and as regards punishment. Therefore, the terms of recidivism have been amended (limits thereof have been extended), and the sanctioning treatment was simplified. Also, the author notes the fact that the legislature does not make a distinction, in terms of conditions, between post-release recidivism and the post-sentencing recidivism, nor between low recidivism and high recidivism, the old rules being grouped in a single way.