DREPTUL LA VIAȚĂ. O PERSPECTIVĂ CONSTITUȚIONALĂ

To say that man is the supreme value of a democratic society and of the state of law is a partly true statement. This is because it is known that, in the long period in which the principles of the constitutional democracy and of the state of law have been affirmed in the social practice, no human society succeeded in fully providing the individual with the full extent of its political, social, economic, cultural or religious value. Even in the states considered, without reservations, to be democratic there have been and still are threats to the physical and mental integrity of the individual from some state authorities and even indifference for the individual’s life. In fact, this actually explains that the constitutional utterances according to which „the right to life is guaranteed”, „the dignity and the personality of the individual are supreme values”. The existence of a rule of law and, more so, of a rule of constitutional rank, which affirms and enshrines in normative models the importance of man as supreme value of a socio-political community, proves that the compliance with this value still remains a standard, a requirement imposed on everybody as model of social behaviour.